Dynamically Consistent Cooperative Solution in a Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution

2007 ◽  
Vol 134 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. W. K. Yeung
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Chuansheng Wang ◽  
Fulei Shi ◽  
Cuiyou Yao

In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Sheng Zhang

Considering the fact that transboundary pollution control calls for the cooperation between interested parties, this paper studies a cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nations in infinite-horizon level. In this paper, we model two ways of transboundary pollution: one is an accumulative global pollutant with an uncertain evolutionary dynamic and the other is a regional nonaccumulative pollutant. In our model, firms and governments are separated entities and they play a Stackelberg game, while the governments of the two nations can cooperate in pollution reduction. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms, and it is found that the governments being cooperative in transboundary pollution control will set a higher pollution tax rate and make more pollution abatement effort than when they are noncooperative. Additionally, a payment distribution mechanism that supports the subgame consistent solution is proposed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450005 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEFAN WRZACZEK ◽  
EKATERINA SHEVKOPLYAS ◽  
SERGEY KOSTYUNIN

We formulate an overlapping generations model on optimal emissions with continuous age structure. We compare the noncooperative solution to the cooperative one and obtain fundamental differences in the optimal strategies. Also including an altruistic motive does not avoid the problem of the myopic noncooperative solution. Finally we define a time-consistent tax scheme to obtain the cooperative solution in the noncooperative case.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (03) ◽  
pp. 1750028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario A. García-Meza ◽  
Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova ◽  
José Daniel López-Barrientos

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of an oligopoly playing an advertising game of goodwill accumulation with random terminal time. The goal is to find a cooperative solution that is time-consistent, considering a dynamic accumulation of goodwill with depreciation for a finite number of firms.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-87
Author(s):  
Ronald D. Fischer ◽  
Leonard J. Mirman

We examine an economy with n production sectors that interact via a production externality. We find a solution to the resulting dynamic differential game between sectors and compare it to the cooperative solution. As the number of sectors increases, the limiting policy is the optimal policy without a production externality. This policy is inefficient and, depending on the sign of the externality between sectors, the inefficiency is due to over- (or under-) consumption.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (15) ◽  
pp. 1830
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Gromova ◽  
Anastasiia Zaremba ◽  
Shimai Su

This work is aimed at studying the problem of maintaining the sustainability of a cooperative solution in an n-person hybrid differential game. Specifically, we consider a differential game whose payoff function is discounted with a discounting function that changes its structure with time. We solve the problem of time-inconsistency of the cooperative solution using a so-called imputation distribution procedure, which was adjusted for this general class of differential games. The obtained results are illustrated with a specific example of a differential game with random duration and a hybrid cumulative distribution function (CDF). We completely solved the presented example to demonstrate the application of the developed scheme in detail. All results were obtained in analytical form and illustrated by numerical simulations.


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