Stable Marketing Cooperation in a Differential Game for an Oligopoly

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (03) ◽  
pp. 1750028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario A. García-Meza ◽  
Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova ◽  
José Daniel López-Barrientos

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of an oligopoly playing an advertising game of goodwill accumulation with random terminal time. The goal is to find a cooperative solution that is time-consistent, considering a dynamic accumulation of goodwill with depreciation for a finite number of firms.

Author(s):  
Abbas Ja'afaru Badakaya ◽  
Bilyaminu Muhammad

We study a pursuit differential game problem with finite number of pursuers and one evader on a nonempty closed convex subset of the Hilbert space l2. Players move according to certain first order ordinary differential equations and control functions of the pursuers and evader are subject to integral constraints. Pursuers win the game if the geometric positions of a pursuer and the evader coincide. We formulated and prove theorems that are concern with conditions that ensure win for the pursuers. Consequently, wining strategies of the pursuers are constructed. Furthermore, illustrative example is given to demonstrate the result.


2019 ◽  
pp. 377-394
Author(s):  
Mario A. García-Meza ◽  
Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova ◽  
José Daniel López-Barrientos

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450005 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEFAN WRZACZEK ◽  
EKATERINA SHEVKOPLYAS ◽  
SERGEY KOSTYUNIN

We formulate an overlapping generations model on optimal emissions with continuous age structure. We compare the noncooperative solution to the cooperative one and obtain fundamental differences in the optimal strategies. Also including an altruistic motive does not avoid the problem of the myopic noncooperative solution. Finally we define a time-consistent tax scheme to obtain the cooperative solution in the noncooperative case.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Gila E. Fruchter ◽  
Hussein Naseraldin

Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-87
Author(s):  
Ronald D. Fischer ◽  
Leonard J. Mirman

We examine an economy with n production sectors that interact via a production externality. We find a solution to the resulting dynamic differential game between sectors and compare it to the cooperative solution. As the number of sectors increases, the limiting policy is the optimal policy without a production externality. This policy is inefficient and, depending on the sign of the externality between sectors, the inefficiency is due to over- (or under-) consumption.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (15) ◽  
pp. 1830
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Gromova ◽  
Anastasiia Zaremba ◽  
Shimai Su

This work is aimed at studying the problem of maintaining the sustainability of a cooperative solution in an n-person hybrid differential game. Specifically, we consider a differential game whose payoff function is discounted with a discounting function that changes its structure with time. We solve the problem of time-inconsistency of the cooperative solution using a so-called imputation distribution procedure, which was adjusted for this general class of differential games. The obtained results are illustrated with a specific example of a differential game with random duration and a hybrid cumulative distribution function (CDF). We completely solved the presented example to demonstrate the application of the developed scheme in detail. All results were obtained in analytical form and illustrated by numerical simulations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 62-92
Author(s):  
Пин Сунь ◽  
Ping Sun ◽  
Елена Михайловна Парилина ◽  
Elena Parilina

We propose a model of a network formation using the theory of stochastic games with random terminal time. Initially, the leader proposes a joint project in the form of a network to the players. Then, the players have the opportunities to form new links with each other to update the network proposed by the leader. Any player's payoff at any stage is determined by the network structure. It is also assumed that the formation of links proposed by the players is random. The duration of the game is also random. As a result of the players' actions and the implementation of the random steps of the Nature, a network is formed. We consider a cooperative approach to network formation, and we use the CIS-value as a cooperative solution. In this paper, a recurrent formula for its derivation in any cooperative subgame is obtained. The paper also investigates the dynamic consistency of CIS-value. The theoretical results are demonstrated by a numerical example.


Author(s):  
R. A. Crowther

The reconstruction of a three-dimensional image of a specimen from a set of electron micrographs reduces, under certain assumptions about the imaging process in the microscope, to the mathematical problem of reconstructing a density distribution from a set of its plane projections.In the absence of noise we can formulate a purely geometrical criterion, which, for a general object, fixes the resolution attainable from a given finite number of views in terms of the size of the object. For simplicity we take the ideal case of projections collected by a series of m equally spaced tilts about a single axis.


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