A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability

2006 ◽  
Vol 132 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Funkhouser
Author(s):  
Joseph Chan

Since the very beginning, Confucianism has been troubled by a serious gap between its political ideals and the reality of societal circumstances. Contemporary Confucians must develop a viable method of governance that can retain the spirit of the Confucian ideal while tackling problems arising from nonideal modern situations. The best way to meet this challenge, this book argues, is to adopt liberal democratic institutions that are shaped by the Confucian conception of the good rather than the liberal conception of the right. The book examines and reconstructs both Confucian political thought and liberal democratic institutions, blending them to form a new Confucian political philosophy. The book decouples liberal democratic institutions from their popular liberal philosophical foundations in fundamental moral rights, such as popular sovereignty, political equality, and individual sovereignty. Instead, it grounds them on Confucian principles and redefines their roles and functions, thus mixing Confucianism with liberal democratic institutions in a way that strengthens both. The book then explores the implications of this new yet traditional political philosophy for fundamental issues in modern politics, including authority, democracy, human rights, civil liberties, and social justice. The book critically reconfigures the Confucian political philosophy of the classical period for the contemporary era.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-135
Author(s):  
Anton V. Kuznetsov

The articles examines the teleofunctional solution to the problem of mental causation, presented by Dmitry Volkov in his recently published book Free Will. An Illusion or an Opportunity. D.B. Volkov proposes solutions to three big metaphysical problems – mental causation, personal identity, and free will. Solving the first problem, Volkov creatively combines the advantages of Dennett’s teleofunctional model and Vasilyev’s local interactionism. Volkov’s teleofunctional model of mental causation seeks to prove the causal relevance of mental properties as non-local higher order properties. In my view, its substantiation is based on three points: (a) critics of the exclusion problem and Kim’s model of mental causation, (b) “Library of first editions” argument, (c) reduction of the causal trajectories argument (CTA 1) by Vasilyev to the counterpart argument (CTA 2) by Volkov. Each of these points faces objections. Kim’s criticism is based on an implicit confusion of two types of reduction – reduction from supervenience and from multiple realizability. The latter type does not threaten Kim’s ideas, but Volkov uses this very type in his criticism. The “Library of first editions” argument does not achieve its goal due to compositional features and because non-local relational properties are a type of external properties that cannot be causally relevant. The reduction of CTA 1 to CTA 2 is unsuccessful since, in the case of this reduction, important features of CTA 1 are lost – these are local mental properties, due to which the influence of non-local physical factors occurs. My main objection is that the concept of causally relevant non-local properties is incompatible with the very concept of cause. The set of causally relevant properties of cause can only be local.


Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick

Some dispositions have causal bases or grounding properties. However, ungrounded dispositions do not have causal bases. Ungrounded dispositions are also known as powers, baseless dispositions, and bare dispositions. Ungrounded dispositions are not supplanted by mechanistic explanations, for even mechanistic explanations ultimately reference dispositions. While some argue that citing dispositions does not really explain anything, dispositions can in fact figure in adequate explanations. Furthermore, scientific explanations reference dispositions with no known grounds. This lends some support for the view that ungrounded dispositions are metaphysically possible. Philosophical arguments based on multiple realizability or the demand for truth-makers fail to show that ungrounded dispositions are impossible.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-41
Author(s):  
William J. Novak ◽  
Stephen W. Sawyer ◽  
James T. Sparrow

Pierre Bourdieu began his posthumously published lectures “On the State” by highlighting the three dominant traditions that have framed most thinking about the state in Western social science and modern social theory. On the one hand, he highlighted what he termed the “initial definition” of the state as a “neutral site” designed to regulate conflict and “serve the common good.” Bourdieu traced this essentially classical liberal conception of the state back to the pioneering political treatises of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.1 In direct response to this “optimistic functionalism,” Bourdieu noted the rise of a critical and more “pessimistic” alternative—something of a diametric opposite.


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (01) ◽  
pp. 18-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Vanderheiden

Scholars of justice theory often refuse to apply their principles to concrete social or political issues; instead, they develop those principles in abstraction from contemporary value conflicts or policy debates, preferring to remain silent on how justice might inform controversial political decisions. Rawls, for example, casts questions concerning the application of his “justice as fairness” conception across national, generational, and species boundaries as among the several “problems of extension” for which his theory may or may not be equipped, noting that “the idea of political justice does not cover everything, nor should we expect it to” (1993, 20–21). Even where he applies his justice theory to problems of international relations in hisThe Law of Peoples, Rawls describes its application as merely “an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples” (1999, 9), as though constructing and applying justice principles are entirely discrete steps, with its application to concrete social or political issues a unidirectional project of wielding static principles as practical tools, offering nothing of importance to a normative theory's development.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


2021 ◽  
pp. 79-115
Author(s):  
Philip Kitcher

The chapter aims to give a precise account of the notion of personal fulfillment. Two questions have been central to philosophy since its origins: How should I live? How should we live together? These questions should be rephrased—instead of striving for perfection, we should ask how to make human lives and human societies go better. The individual question is addressed by revising a standard liberal conception, according to which people should formulate the plans for their lives (their identities) autonomously. Probing the concept of autonomy, it is suggested that education consists in a delicate dialogue between society and the individual, in which the voices of both must be heard. This approach is elaborated by showing how it applies to the concrete proposals made in Chapter 2.


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