scholarly journals Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brett Topey
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Modal Interpretation ◽  
Satisfactory Explanation

AbstractA Benacerraf–Field challenge is an argument intended to show that common realist theories of a given domain are untenable: such theories make it impossible to explain how we’ve arrived at the truth in that domain, and insofar as a theory makes our reliability in a domain inexplicable, we must either reject that theory or give up the relevant beliefs. But there’s no consensus about what would count here as a satisfactory explanation of our reliability. It’s sometimes suggested that giving such an explanation would involve showing that our beliefs meet some modal condition, but realists have claimed that this sort of modal interpretation of the challenge deprives it of any force: since the facts in question are metaphysically necessary and so obtain in all possible worlds, it’s trivially easy, even given realism, to show that our beliefs have the relevant modal features. Here I show that this claim is mistaken—what motivates a modal interpretation of the challenge in the first place also motivates an understanding of the relevant features in terms of epistemic possibilities rather than metaphysical possibilities, and there are indeed epistemically possible worlds where the facts in question don’t obtain.

Possible Worlds in the Modal Interpretation

1996 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. S330-S337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meir Hemmo
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Interpretation

The Nature of the Intramembrane Particle

1980 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 688-691
Author(s):  
A.J. Verkleij
Keyword(s):  
Escherichia Coli ◽  
Tight Junction ◽  
Gap Junction ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fracture Face ◽  
Band 3 Protein ◽  
Satisfactory Explanation ◽  
Freeze Fracturing ◽  
Intramembrane Particle ◽  
Luminal Membrane

Freeze-fracturing splits membranes into two helves, thus allowing an examination of the membrane interior. The 5-10 rm particles visible on both monolayers are widely assumed to be proteinaceous in nature. Most membranes do not reveal impressions complementary to particles on the opposite fracture face, if the membranes are fractured under conditions without etching. Even if it is considered that shadowing, contamination or fracturing itself might obscure complementary pits', there is no satisfactory explanation why under similar physical circimstances matching halves of other membranes can be visualized. A prominent example of uncomplementarity is found in the erythrocyte manbrane. It is wall established that band 3 protein and possibly glycophorin represents these nonccmplanentary particles. On the other hand a number of membrane types show pits opposite the particles. Scme well known examples are the ";gap junction',"; tight junction, the luminal membrane of the bladder epithelial cells and the outer membrane of Escherichia coli.

Combining the Best of Two Possible Worlds

1991 ◽  
Vol 36 (12) ◽  
pp. 1057-1058
Author(s):  
Marvin R. Goldfried ◽  
Douglas A. Vakoch
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds

Multiple Strands and Possible Worlds

2002 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 44-61
Author(s):  
Ruth Perlmutter
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds

The Essence of Eschatology: A Modal Interpretation

1996 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 206-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Davenport
Keyword(s):  
Modal Interpretation

The Failure of Conceptual Analysis

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Conditional Statements ◽  
Reductive Analysis

Dispositions are often regarded with suspicion. Consequently, some philosophers try to semantically reduce disposition ascriptions to sentences containing only non-dispositional vocabulary. Typically, reductionists attempt to analyze disposition ascriptions in terms of conditional statements. These conditional statements, like other modal claims, are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds semantics. However, conditional analyses are subject to a number of problems and counterexamples, including random coincidences, void satisfaction, masks, antidotes, mimics, altering, and finks. Some analyses fail to reduce disposition ascriptions to non-modal vocabulary. If reductive analysis of disposition ascriptions fails, then perhaps there can be metaphysical reduction of dispositions without semantic reduction. However, the reductionist still owes us an account of what makes disposition ascriptions true. But to posit a causal power for every unreduced dispositional predicate is an overreaction to the failure of conceptual analysis.

Is There Life in Possible Worlds?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Machine Design ◽  
Lagrangian Mechanics ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Search Spaces ◽  
Dimensional Modeling ◽  
Lower Dimensional

Scientists have developed various collections of specialized possibilities to serve as search spaces in which excessive reliance upon speculative forms of lower dimensional modeling or other unwanted details can be skirted. Two primary examples are discussed: the search spaces of machine design and the virtual variations utilized within Lagrangian mechanics. Contemporary appeals to “possible worlds” attempt to imbed these localized possibilities within fully enunciated universes. But not all possibilities are made alike and these reductive schemes should be resisted, on the grounds that they render the utilities of everyday counterfactuals and “possibility” talk incomprehensible. The essay also discusses whether Wittgenstein’s altered views in his Philosophical Investigations reflect similar concerns.

Explaining Perceptual Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
External World ◽  
Satisfactory Explanation ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Problem ◽  
The Way

This chapter offers a response to Quassim Cassam’s ‘Seeing and Knowing’, which challenges some of the conditions Cassam thinks the author has imposed on a satisfactory explanation of our knowledge of the external world. According to Cassam, the conditions he specifies can be fulfilled in ways that explain how the knowledge is possible. What is at stake in this argument between Cassam and the author is the conception of what is perceived to be so that is needed to account for the kind of perceptual knowledge we all know we have. That is what must be in question in any promising move away from the overly restrictive conception of perceptual experience that gives rise to the hopelessness of the traditional epistemological problem. The author suggests that we should explore the conditions of successful ‘propositional’ perception of the way things are and emphasizes the promise of such a strategy.

Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Satisfactory Explanation

This chapter attempts to solve the puzzle of transparency for belief. The notion of an epistemic rule is introduced, and the proposed solution is that knowledge of one’s beliefs may be (and typically is) obtained by following the epistemic rule: BEL If p, believe that you believe that p. This is an inferential theory of knowledge of what we believe; it can be extended to an inferential theory of knowledge of what we know. The theory is also economical and detectivist, and is argued to give a satisfactory explanation of both privileged and peculiar access. The chapter concludes by examining a variety of objections.

Pythagorean Women Philosophers

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorota M. Dutsch
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual History ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Literary Tradition ◽  
First Century ◽  
Wisdom Literature ◽  
Greek Culture ◽  
Female Voices ◽  
Grant Agency ◽  
Women Philosophers ◽  
Historical Accounts

Modern scholarly accounts of Greek philosophical history usually exclude women. And yet, from Dixaearchus of Messana to Diogenes Laertius, classical writers record the names of women philosophers from various schools. What is more, pseudonymous treatises and letters (likely dating after the first century CE) articulate the teachings of Pythagorean women. How can this literature inform our understanding of Greek intellectual history? To take these texts at face value would be naïve; to reject them, narrow-minded. This book is a deep examination of the literary tradition surrounding female Pythagoreans; it envisions the tradition as a network of texts that does not represent female philosophers but enacts their role in Greek culture. Part I, “Portraits,” assembles and contextualizes excerpts from historical accounts and wisdom literature. Part II, “Impersonations,” analyzes pseudonymous treatises and letters. Texts are approached with a mixture of suspicion and belief, inspired by Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Suspicion serves to disclose the misogyny of the epistemic regimes that produced the texts about and by women philosophers. Belief takes us beyond the circumstances of the texts’ production to possible worlds of diverse readers, institutions, and practices that grant agency to the female knower. In the process, the book uncovers traces of a fascinating dialogue about the gender of philosophical knowledge, which includes female voices.

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