scholarly journals HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

Episteme ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Hazlett
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Doxastic Attitude ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Epistemic Attitudes ◽  
Doxastic Attitudes ◽  
Necessary Connections ◽  
Proper Response

AbstractThis paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.

Intellectual Humility and Incentivized Belief

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 268-278
Author(s):  
Kent Dunnington
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Test Case ◽  
Religious Institutions ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Broad Agreement ◽  
Social Rewards ◽  
Epistemic Attitudes ◽  
Doxastic Attitudes

Despite disagreement about what is fundamental or necessary to intellectual humility, there is broad agreement that intellectual humility will bear on the higher-order epistemic attitudes one takes towards one’s beliefs (and other doxastic attitudes). Intellectually humble people tend not to under- or overstate the epistemic strength of their doxastic attitudes. This article shows how incentivized beliefs—beliefs that are held partly for pragmatic reasons—present a test case for intellectual humility. Intellectually humble persons will adopt ambivalent higher-order epistemic attitudes towards their incentivized beliefs. This is important for institutions that incentivize belief with material or social rewards, such as religious institutions that require orthodoxy for membership. The article argues that such institutions cannot simultaneously incentivize orthodox belief and enjoin conviction about such beliefs, unless they are willing to reject intellectual humility as a virtue.

Fine-tuning the Relationship between Religion and Intellectual Humility

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 305-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Everett L. Worthington
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
The Self ◽  
Content Area ◽  
Fine Tuning ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
The Core ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Meaning System ◽  
The Relationship

I examine religious humility, which is one content area of intellectual humility. Intellectual humility is the subtype of humility that involves taking a humble stance in sharing ideas, especially when one is challenged or when an idea is threatening. I position religious humility within the context of general humility, spiritual humility, and relational humility, and thus arrive at several propositions. People who are intensely spiritually humble can hold dogmatic beliefs and believe themselves to be religiously humble, yet be perceived by others of different persuasions as religiously dogmatic and even arrogant. For such people to be truly religiously humble, they must feel that the religious belief is core to their meaning system. This requires discernment of which of the person’s beliefs are truly at the core. But also the religiously humble person must fulfill the definition of general humility, accurately perceiving the strengths and limitations of the self, being teachable to correct weaknesses, presenting oneself modestly, and being positively other-oriented. Humility thus involves (1) beliefs, values, and attitudes and (2) an interpersonal presentational style. Therefore, intellectually humble people must track the positive epistemic status of their beliefs and also must present with convicted civility.

An Alternative Approach Towards the Higher Order Denoising of Images. Analytical Aspects

2017 ◽  
Vol 224 (3) ◽  
pp. 414-441
Author(s):  
M. Bildhauer ◽  
M. Fuchs ◽  
J. Weickert
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Alternative Approach

The Grammar of PP-like Free Relatives: Evidence from Subordinate wo-Clauses in German

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-47
Author(s):  
Sebastian Bücking
Keyword(s):  
Compositional Analysis ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Free Relatives ◽  
Subordinate Clauses ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
General Constraints ◽  
Interrogative Clauses ◽  
Type Shifting

Abstract This paper addresses the grammar of PP-like free relatives (= PP-FRs) such as the locative clause in Bello schläft, wo Grace schläft ‘Bello is sleeping where Grace is sleeping’. The most prominent compositional analysis of PP-FRs is developed by Caponigro (2004), Caponigro and Pearl (2009), and Hall and Caponigro (2010). They derive PP-FRs from a stacked CP-structure that is based on silent prepositions and a nominal treatment of wh-words such as where. I first take issue with this analysis by means of a detailed discussion of subordinate clauses introduced by wo ‘where’ in German. Specifically, I show that wo-clauses do not involve silent prepositions, and that both wo and wo-clauses have a prepositional instead of a nominal nature. Second, I sketch a surface-oriented alternative approach to PP-FRs that dispenses with silent prepositions and assigns the prepositional nature of PP-like wh-words a key role in the derivation. Specifically, I propose that the fronting of PP-like wh-words in free relatives licenses an abstraction over predicates (instead of entities) and a corresponding type shifting. The new analysis is related to analyses of corresponding subordinate headed relative and interrogative clauses. Furthermore, it is confronted with potential general constraints on higher-order abstraction as argued for, in particular, by Poole (2017).

scholarly journals Disagreement and epistemic improvement

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal ◽  
Mona Simion
Keyword(s):  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Doxastic Attitude ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Normative Framework

AbstractThis paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast.

LOOKING FOR CHAOS.

1996 ◽  
Vol 06 (03) ◽  
pp. 485-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
HARRY DANKOWICZ
Keyword(s):  
Melnikov Method ◽  
Homoclinic Orbits ◽  
Melnikov Function ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Analysis ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Calculation ◽  
Alternative Approach

This paper derives an alternative approach to the Melnikov method, which greatly reduces the amount of algebra involved in higher-order calculations. To illustrate this, a particular system is studied for which such a higher-order analysis is necessary, due to an identically vanishing first-order Melnikov function. The results of a second-order calculation imply the existence of transverse homoclinic orbits and, consequently, the existence of a horseshoe.

scholarly journals Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 702-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter ◽  
Robin McKenna
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Work ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Liberal Democracies

AbstractEmpirical work on motivated reasoning suggests that our judgments are influenced to a surprising extent by our wants, desires, and preferences (Kahan 2016; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Molden and Higgins 2012; Taber and Lodge 2006). How should we evaluate the epistemic status of beliefs formed through motivated reasoning? For example, are such beliefs epistemically justified? Are they candidates for knowledge? In liberal democracies, these questions are increasingly controversial as well as politically timely (Beebe et al. 2018; Lynch Forthcoming, 2018; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). And yet, the epistemological significance of motivated reasoning has been almost entirely ignored by those working in mainstream epistemology. We aim to rectify this oversight. Using politically motivated reasoning as a case study, we show how motivated reasoning gives rise to three distinct kinds of skeptical challenges. We conclude by showing how the skeptical import of motivated reasoning has some important ramifications for how we should think about the demands of intellectual humility.

scholarly journals On Epistemic Justice

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-74
Author(s):  
A. А. Shevchenko
Keyword(s):  
Social Group ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Epistemic Justice ◽  
Collective Experience ◽  
Epistemic Attitudes ◽  
Complete Overhaul

The paper deals with the concept of epistemic justice and analyses two types of epistemic injustice - testimonial and hermeneutical. The latter is given priority due to the fact that any individual inteгaction involves an individual as а member of а certain social group or community. This requires а study into collective epistemic attitudes, first of all - collective prejudices which Ыосk epistemic resources required for understanding and discussing personal and collective experience. The paper also looks into two related topics - the proЬlem of expertise and the phenomenon of post-truth. S. Fuller's charitaЫe interpretation of post-truth helps to show that this approach can solve the main proЬlem of epistemic justice - that of unequal epistemic status of knowers. However, the price of such levelling-down is too high and would require а complete overhaul of the expertise system.

scholarly journals Symmetries as Humean Metalaws

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Callum Duguid
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Symmetry Principles ◽  
Work Done ◽  
Necessary Connections

Abstract Symmetry principles are a central part of contemporary physics, yet there has been surprisingly little metaphysical work done on them. This paper develops the Wignerian treatment of symmetries as higher-order laws – metalaws – within a Humean framework of lawhood. Lange has raised two obstacles to Humean metalaws, and the paper shows that the account has the resources available to respond to both. It is argued that this framework for Humean metalaws stands as an example of naturalistic metaphysics, able to bring Humeanism into contact with the practice of actual science without giving up on the central denial of necessary connections.

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