scholarly journals Interinstitutional perspectives on contract cheating: a qualitative narrative exploration from Canada

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Elaine Eaton ◽  
Nancy Chibry ◽  
Margaret A. Toye ◽  
Silvia Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Educational Development ◽  
Personal Narratives ◽  
Academic Work ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Contract Cheating ◽  
Post Secondary ◽  
The Third ◽  
Personal Connections ◽  
The Third Party

AbstractThis paper explores contract cheating from the perspectives of researchers at three post-secondary institutions in Alberta, Canada, describing their efforts to develop and advance awareness of, interventions against, and responses to contract cheating at their respective institutions. Contract cheating is when a third party produces or completes academic work for a student, and the student then presents the work as their own. The student might have personal connections to the third party, or the student might pay a fee and outsource the academic work to the third party. All three institutions are experiencing an increase in the incidence of contract cheating, which is consistent with trends at colleges and universities across Canada and the world. Contract cheating is not a new phenomenon, but it is a growing one, due in part to students having access to thousands of online companies offering to help them with their academic work. This paper examines personal narratives from four researchers and identifies five key themes: types of contract cheating, students, awareness, evidence and policy implications, and educational development.

Automating accountability? Privacy policies, data transparency, and the third party problem

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lie ◽  
Lisa M. Austin ◽  
Peter Yi Ping Sun ◽  
Wenjun Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Privacy Policy ◽  
Privacy Policies ◽  
The Third ◽  
Data Transparency ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Data Ecosystem

We have a data transparency problem. Currently, one of the main mechanisms we have to understand data flows is through the self-reporting that organizations provide through privacy policies. These suffer from many well-known problems, problems that are becoming more acute with the increasing complexity of the data ecosystem and the role of third parties – the affiliates, partners, processors, ad agencies, analytic services, and data brokers involved in the contemporary data practices of organizations. In this article, we argue that automating privacy policy analysis can improve the usability of privacy policies as a transparency mechanism. Our argument has five parts. First, we claim that we need to shift from thinking about privacy policies as a transparency mechanism that enhances consumer choice and see them as a transparency mechanism that enhances meaningful accountability. Second, we discuss a research tool that we prototyped, called AppTrans (for Application Transparency), which can detect inconsistencies between the declarations in a privacy policy and the actions the mobile application can potentially take if it is used. We used AppTrans to test seven hundred applications and found that 59.5 per cent were collecting data in ways that were not declared in their policies. The vast majority of the discrepancies were due to third party data collection such as adversiting and analytics. Third, we outline the follow-on research we did to extend AppTrans to analyse the information sharing of mobile applications with third parties, with mixed results. Fourth, we situate our findings in relation to the third party issues that came to light in the recent Cambridge Analytica scandal and the calls from regulators for enhanced technical safeguards in managing these third party relationships. Fifth, we discuss some of the limitations of privacy policy automation as a strategy for enhanced data transparency and the policy implications of these limitations.

scholarly journals Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou ◽  
Hualin Xie ◽  
Xinmin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

To promote third-party environmental pollution control in China, it is necessary to dissect the mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. This study first discusses the acting paths of fiscal policies on third-party environmental pollution control in theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise is established. The replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability strategies, and numerical simulation of the behavior of the three participants are analyzed to further study the acting mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. In addition, the influences of other parameters on the implementation of third-party environmental pollution control are evaluated. The results show that the behaviors of the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise influence each other. Furthermore, strengthening the relevant fiscal policy, reducing the risks of the polluting enterprise and third-party enterprise, and improving the benefit to the local government are conducive to promoting third-party environmental pollution control in China. Based on these results, this study proposes the following policy implications: formulating fiscal policies for third-party environmental pollution control, implementing fiscal policies in a dynamic and progressive manner, improving the market mechanism of third-party environmental pollution control, and strengthening the environmental performance assessment of the local government.

Resolving tension from the third-party forgiveness effect

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaclyn M. Moloney ◽  
Chelsea A. Reid ◽  
Jody L. Davis ◽  
Jeni L. Burnette ◽  
Jeffrey D. Green
Keyword(s):  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

Relaxations of Contractual Privity and the Need for Third Party Rights in Chinese Contract Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Lei
Keyword(s):  
Direct Action ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Chinese Law ◽  
The Third ◽  
Right Of Action ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Right

This chapter examines the position of third party beneficiaries in Chinese law. Article 64 of the Chinese Contract Law states that where a contract for the benefit of a third party is breached, the debtor is liable to the creditor. The author regards this as leaving unanswered the question of whether the thirdparty has a right of direct action against the debtor. One view regards the third party as having the right to sue for the benefit although this right was ultimately excluded from the law. Another view, supported by the Supreme People’s Court, is that Article 64 does not provide a right of action for a third party and merely prescribes performance in ‘incidental’ third party contracts. The third view is that there is a third party right of action in cases of ‘genuine’ third party contracts but courts are unlikely to recognize a third party action where the contract merely purports to confer a benefit on the third party.

Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties Under the Taiwan Civil Code

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN
Keyword(s):  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Legal Relationship ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Privity Of Contract

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.

Attitudes toward Extrarelational Sex as a Function of Participant's and Third Party's Gender

2004 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 965-968
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Qaqiesh ◽  
Pamela C. Regan
Keyword(s):  
Romantic Partner ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Individual Male ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
And Gender

An experiment was conducted to examine whether attitudes toward extrarelational sex, i.e., “swinging,” differed as a function of participant's gender and gender of the third party, i.e., the “swinging” partner. Participants were asked to imagine that their current romantic partner had expressed an interest in “swinging” with another individual (male or female, randomly assigned). Analysis yielded several significant differences by participants' gender. Specifically, men expressed greater interest than did women in joining a swinger's club, reported a higher likelihood than did women of actually joining such a club, and believed more than women that their sex life with their partner would improve after joining a swinger's club. Participants also preferred a female more than a male swinging partner, although this comparison was not statistically significant.

scholarly journals Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Soil Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Party Control ◽  
The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

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