scholarly journals Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou ◽  
Hualin Xie ◽  
Xinmin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

To promote third-party environmental pollution control in China, it is necessary to dissect the mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. This study first discusses the acting paths of fiscal policies on third-party environmental pollution control in theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise is established. The replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability strategies, and numerical simulation of the behavior of the three participants are analyzed to further study the acting mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. In addition, the influences of other parameters on the implementation of third-party environmental pollution control are evaluated. The results show that the behaviors of the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise influence each other. Furthermore, strengthening the relevant fiscal policy, reducing the risks of the polluting enterprise and third-party enterprise, and improving the benefit to the local government are conducive to promoting third-party environmental pollution control in China. Based on these results, this study proposes the following policy implications: formulating fiscal policies for third-party environmental pollution control, implementing fiscal policies in a dynamic and progressive manner, improving the market mechanism of third-party environmental pollution control, and strengthening the environmental performance assessment of the local government.

scholarly journals Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Soil Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Party Control ◽  
The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

scholarly journals Study on Application of the Evaluation Indicator System for the Third-party Environmental Pollution Control

2018 ◽  
Vol 175 ◽  
pp. 04002
Author(s):  
Xu Bingsheng ◽  
Guo Huiting ◽  
Lin Ling ◽  
Huang Jin ◽  
Hou Shan
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Indicator System ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Comprehensive Treatment ◽  
Iron And Steel ◽  
Evaluation Indicator ◽  
The Third ◽  
Evaluation Indicator System ◽  
The Third Party

A pilot evaluation indicator system was applied to environmental pollution governance. Four iron and steel enterprises introducing the third-party environmental pollution governance service were selected to carry out the evaluation and application, including sintering flue gas desulfurization and dust removal projects and waste water comprehensive treatment projects to which iron and steel enterprises pay high attention in “the 13th Five-Year Plan” period. Delphi Method was used to grade and quantify each indicator according to experience and determine the validity of scores. Radar charts for the four enterprises were formed based on the weights of Level-2 indicators for comprehensive evaluation and quantification of basic capability, facility operation, technical economy, environmental benefits and management level, and conclusions related to advantages and disadvantages of these enterprises were drawn. This research supplies a scientific method for evaluating the effect of environmental pollution control by third-party enterprises.

Automating accountability? Privacy policies, data transparency, and the third party problem

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lie ◽  
Lisa M. Austin ◽  
Peter Yi Ping Sun ◽  
Wenjun Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Privacy Policy ◽  
Privacy Policies ◽  
The Third ◽  
Data Transparency ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Data Ecosystem

We have a data transparency problem. Currently, one of the main mechanisms we have to understand data flows is through the self-reporting that organizations provide through privacy policies. These suffer from many well-known problems, problems that are becoming more acute with the increasing complexity of the data ecosystem and the role of third parties – the affiliates, partners, processors, ad agencies, analytic services, and data brokers involved in the contemporary data practices of organizations. In this article, we argue that automating privacy policy analysis can improve the usability of privacy policies as a transparency mechanism. Our argument has five parts. First, we claim that we need to shift from thinking about privacy policies as a transparency mechanism that enhances consumer choice and see them as a transparency mechanism that enhances meaningful accountability. Second, we discuss a research tool that we prototyped, called AppTrans (for Application Transparency), which can detect inconsistencies between the declarations in a privacy policy and the actions the mobile application can potentially take if it is used. We used AppTrans to test seven hundred applications and found that 59.5 per cent were collecting data in ways that were not declared in their policies. The vast majority of the discrepancies were due to third party data collection such as adversiting and analytics. Third, we outline the follow-on research we did to extend AppTrans to analyse the information sharing of mobile applications with third parties, with mixed results. Fourth, we situate our findings in relation to the third party issues that came to light in the recent Cambridge Analytica scandal and the calls from regulators for enhanced technical safeguards in managing these third party relationships. Fifth, we discuss some of the limitations of privacy policy automation as a strategy for enhanced data transparency and the policy implications of these limitations.

scholarly journals Interinstitutional perspectives on contract cheating: a qualitative narrative exploration from Canada

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Elaine Eaton ◽  
Nancy Chibry ◽  
Margaret A. Toye ◽  
Silvia Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Educational Development ◽  
Personal Narratives ◽  
Academic Work ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Contract Cheating ◽  
Post Secondary ◽  
The Third ◽  
Personal Connections ◽  
The Third Party

AbstractThis paper explores contract cheating from the perspectives of researchers at three post-secondary institutions in Alberta, Canada, describing their efforts to develop and advance awareness of, interventions against, and responses to contract cheating at their respective institutions. Contract cheating is when a third party produces or completes academic work for a student, and the student then presents the work as their own. The student might have personal connections to the third party, or the student might pay a fee and outsource the academic work to the third party. All three institutions are experiencing an increase in the incidence of contract cheating, which is consistent with trends at colleges and universities across Canada and the world. Contract cheating is not a new phenomenon, but it is a growing one, due in part to students having access to thousands of online companies offering to help them with their academic work. This paper examines personal narratives from four researchers and identifies five key themes: types of contract cheating, students, awareness, evidence and policy implications, and educational development.

scholarly journals Measuring the Efficiency of Fiscal Policies for Environmental Pollution Control and the Spatial Effect of Fiscal Decentralization in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (23) ◽  
pp. 8974
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou ◽  
Xinmin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Technical Efficiency ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Spatial Effect ◽  
Assessment System ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
Fiscal Revenue ◽  
Fiscal Expenditure

This paper uses both fiscal expenditure policy and fiscal revenue policy as input indicators and selects environmental pollution control results reflecting different forms and sources of pollution as output indicators. The efficiency of fiscal policies for environmental pollution control (EFPE) of 30 provincial-level administrative divisions in China from 2007 to 2017 is measured by adopting the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method. Then, the spatial effect of fiscal decentralization on EFPE is empirically analyzed by using the spatial lag model (SLM). The results show that EFPE values in China have been greatly improved overall since 2014. The change in technical efficiency (TE) is caused mainly by the change in pure technical efficiency (PTE). EFPE values have regional heterogeneity and convergence. The eastern region has clearly higher EFPE values than other regions. The growth rate of the low efficient region is greater than that of the high efficient region. Fiscal expenditure decentralization has a direct negative effect and spatial spillover effect on EFPE values, while fiscal revenue decentralization has a non-significant effect. Based on these results, this paper proposes the following policy implications: increasing the level of fiscal expenditure of environmental pollution control and improving the central transfer payment system for environmental protection; reforming the government performance assessment system and innovating the conditions of government expenditure on environmental pollution control; and promoting horizontal fiscal cooperation in cross-regional environmental governance.

scholarly journals The Impact of Guarantees on Peer-to-Peer Lending Platform: Evolutionary Game Analysis and Empirical Evidence from China

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 2708-2731
Author(s):  
Zhicheng Weng ◽  
Pinliang Luo
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Screening Effect ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Peer Lending ◽  
The Impact

The peer-to-peer lending market has developed rapidly over the past decade and reveals a severe problem of information asymmetry. This research constructed a four-party evolutionary game model to analyze the influence pathway of the guarantee mechanism on the users’ participation of the peer-to-peer lending platform and conducted an empirical study applying the mediating effect model and simultaneous equation model based on data of China’s peer-to-peer lending platform. The theoretical model shows that the guarantee mechanism reduced the participation of borrowers of the peer-to-peer lending platform through a screening effect, but increased the participation of investors through a signal effect. In the case of the platform self-guarantee, there existed a self-screening effect, whose influence on the participation of investors depended on the strength of external constraints imposed on the platform enterprises. Further, the empirical study shows that during the sample period, the platform self-guarantee mechanism reduced the scale of borrowers and investors of the peer-to-peer lending platform at the same time, thus reducing the transaction volume of the platform. Although the third-party guarantee mechanism reduced the scale of borrowers, it increased the scale of investors, and the comprehensive effect was to increase the transaction volume of the platform. On this basis, this research puts forward suggestions such as strengthening the qualification examination of the platform enterprises, transforming the platform self-guarantee mechanism into the third-party guarantee mechanism, and introducing more signal mechanisms.

Resolving tension from the third-party forgiveness effect

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaclyn M. Moloney ◽  
Chelsea A. Reid ◽  
Jody L. Davis ◽  
Jeni L. Burnette ◽  
Jeffrey D. Green
Keyword(s):  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party
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