Issue Linkage

2016 ◽  
pp. 513-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Maggi
Keyword(s):  
Issue Linkage

Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945

2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Poast
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Research Design ◽  
Formation Process ◽  
Original Data ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
High Rate ◽  
Alliance Formation ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Multiple Issues ◽  
Matching Techniques

AbstractThough scholars widely claim that issue linkage—the simultaneous negotiation of multiple issues for joint settlement—can help states conclude international agreements, there exist some notable skeptics. Resolving this debate requires empirical evidence. However, beyond a few case studies, there exists no direct and systematic evidence that issue linkages actually increase the probability of agreement. I address this lack of direct and systematic evidence by combing original data on failed alliance negotiations with data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) database. Using matching techniques, I find that, for alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945, offers of trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement. Besides confirming issue linkage's ability to help clinch an agreement, this article's research design and evidence have far-reaching implications for the study of negotiations and alliances. The research design illustrates the value of considering the “dogs that didn't bark” as it identifies both successful and failed negotiations. The article's evidence explains the high rate of alliance compliance identified by previous scholars and highlights a need to rethink the alliance formation process.

scholarly journals Fra konflikt til kompromis: Bidrager issue linkage til at opnå aftaler i klimaforhandlingerne?

Politica ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 417-439
Author(s):  
Henrik Jepsen
Keyword(s):  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Men I

Issue linkage betegner en simultan forhandling om flere issues med henblik på en samlet aftale. På den ene side gør issue linkage det muligt at opnå større aftaler gennem udveksling af indrømmelser på tværs af issues. På den anden side indebærer issue linkage en risiko for, at en hårdknude på ét issue kommer til at blokere for fremskridt på andre issues. Min analyse viser, at issue linkage i de seneste runder af klimaforhandlingerne har bidraget til aftaler om teknologi, skovrydning, tilpasning og finansiering, men i mindre grad til en aftale om reduktion af drivhusgasudledninger.

Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions

1993 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa L. Martin
Keyword(s):  
International Cooperation ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Credible Commitments ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
Issue Linkages

The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on the credibility of these issue-linkages. The use of high-cost sanctions and international institutions raises the potential for high audience costs if the leading sender reneges. These policies thus indicate credible commitments. Data on ninety-nine cases of post-1945 economic sanctions show that costly measures coincide with high levels of international cooperation.

Time is of the essence: Explaining the duration of European Union lawmaking under the co-decision procedure

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110364
Author(s):  
Adam Kirpsza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
European Parliament Elections

The article explores factors affecting the duration of the co-decision procedure (currently the ordinary legislative procedure), the main procedure for adopting legislation in the European Union. Drawing from rational choice institutionalism, it expects the speed of co-decision to be determined by three attributes: the impatience of legislators, issue linkage and the characteristics of Council and European Parliament negotiators ( relais actors). The hypotheses are tested using survival analysis on a dataset of 599 controversial legislative acts submitted and enacted under co-decision between 1999 and 2009. The results show that co-decision proposals are decided faster when they are urgent, negotiated prior to the European Parliament elections and concluded through single proposal logrolls. By contrast, multi-proposal packages and the ideological distance between relais actors prolong decision-making. Overall, the article contributes to the literature by showing that the impatience of legislators, package deals and the properties of negotiators are relevant drivers of co-decision duration.

Linkage Politics

2019 ◽  
pp. 290-316
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Cross Domain ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
The Cold War

Most discussions of cross-domain deterrence focus on variation in the means of coercion, but variation in political ends can be just as consequential. Cross-domain deterrence in the context of linkage politics, in which disparate political interests are tied together to create incentives for favorable outcomes, gives potential adversaries the opportunity to avoid confrontational meeting engagements by playing for time to clarify interests and choosing the means most suited to achieving new goals. A broader diplomatic conception of cross-domain deterrence can also highlight the potential of using financial, institutional, or other nonmilitary actions that render the threat or use of force less attractive. This chapter draws on newly available archival evidence to examine issue linkage politics in the context of changing strategic interests in the case of U.S. efforts to deter Soviet repression in Poland and East Germany at the end of the Cold War. In both cases, U.S. policymakers used diplomatic reassurance and threats of isolation to shape Soviet policy as the United States pressed its new-found political interests in Eastern Europe rather than its traditional preoccupation with military affairs.

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