Substantive issue-linkage and the politics of migration

2010 ◽  
pp. 105-120
2021 ◽  
pp. 147309522110011
Author(s):  
Esin Özdemir

In this article, I readdress the issue of rationality, which has been so far considered in western liberal democracies and in planning theory as procedural, and more recently as post-political in the post-foundational approach, aiming to show how it can gain a substantive and politicising character. I first discuss the problems and limits of the treatment of rational thinking as well as rational consensus-seeking as merely procedural and post-political. Secondly, utilising the notion of Realrationalität of Flyvbjerg, I discuss how rationality attains a politicising role due to its strong relationship with power. Using the concept of planning rationality aiming at public interest, I present the general position and actions of professional organisations in Turkey, focusing on the Chamber of City Planners, as an example illustrative of my argument. I finally argue that rationality becomes a substantive issue that politicizes planning, when it is put forward as an alternative to authoritarian market logic. In doing so, I adopt the Rancièrian definition of the political, defined as disclosure of a wrong and staging of equality. In conclusion, I first emphasize the importance of avoiding quick rejections of the concepts of rationality and consensus in the framework of planning activity and planning theory and secondly, call for a broader definition of the political; the political that is not confined to conflict but is open to rational thinking and rational consensus.


2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Poast

AbstractThough scholars widely claim that issue linkage—the simultaneous negotiation of multiple issues for joint settlement—can help states conclude international agreements, there exist some notable skeptics. Resolving this debate requires empirical evidence. However, beyond a few case studies, there exists no direct and systematic evidence that issue linkages actually increase the probability of agreement. I address this lack of direct and systematic evidence by combing original data on failed alliance negotiations with data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) database. Using matching techniques, I find that, for alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945, offers of trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement. Besides confirming issue linkage's ability to help clinch an agreement, this article's research design and evidence have far-reaching implications for the study of negotiations and alliances. The research design illustrates the value of considering the “dogs that didn't bark” as it identifies both successful and failed negotiations. The article's evidence explains the high rate of alliance compliance identified by previous scholars and highlights a need to rethink the alliance formation process.


2016 ◽  
pp. 513-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Maggi
Keyword(s):  

Politica ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 417-439
Author(s):  
Henrik Jepsen
Keyword(s):  

Issue linkage betegner en simultan forhandling om flere issues med henblik på en samlet aftale. På den ene side gør issue linkage det muligt at opnå større aftaler gennem udveksling af indrømmelser på tværs af issues. På den anden side indebærer issue linkage en risiko for, at en hårdknude på ét issue kommer til at blokere for fremskridt på andre issues. Min analyse viser, at issue linkage i de seneste runder af klimaforhandlingerne har bidraget til aftaler om teknologi, skovrydning, tilpasning og finansiering, men i mindre grad til en aftale om reduktion af drivhusgasudledninger.


1993 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa L. Martin

The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on the credibility of these issue-linkages. The use of high-cost sanctions and international institutions raises the potential for high audience costs if the leading sender reneges. These policies thus indicate credible commitments. Data on ninety-nine cases of post-1945 economic sanctions show that costly measures coincide with high levels of international cooperation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110364
Author(s):  
Adam Kirpsza

The article explores factors affecting the duration of the co-decision procedure (currently the ordinary legislative procedure), the main procedure for adopting legislation in the European Union. Drawing from rational choice institutionalism, it expects the speed of co-decision to be determined by three attributes: the impatience of legislators, issue linkage and the characteristics of Council and European Parliament negotiators ( relais actors). The hypotheses are tested using survival analysis on a dataset of 599 controversial legislative acts submitted and enacted under co-decision between 1999 and 2009. The results show that co-decision proposals are decided faster when they are urgent, negotiated prior to the European Parliament elections and concluded through single proposal logrolls. By contrast, multi-proposal packages and the ideological distance between relais actors prolong decision-making. Overall, the article contributes to the literature by showing that the impatience of legislators, package deals and the properties of negotiators are relevant drivers of co-decision duration.


Author(s):  
Caroline Naômé

The appeal is a form of action by which a party claims that the Court of Justice should set aside a decision of the General Court for infringement of a rule of law. It must be directed against a decision of the GCEU. In the context of the ECJ and its case-law, it is difficult to identify what constitutes a ‘decision’ of the General Court. The object of the appeal must be the setting aside of that decision and not a re-assessment of the substantive issue, a decision on a new claim or an amendment of the grounds of the decision. The appellant must submit a criticism of the decision under appeal. Accordingly, a new plea relating to the substance of the dispute is inadmissible, unless it concerns a matter of public policy. The Court of Justice does not review assessments of fact made by the General Court.


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