scholarly journals Automatic imitation does not predict levels of prosocial behaviour in a modified dictator game

2020 ◽  
Vol 204 ◽  
pp. 103022
Author(s):  
Carl Michael Galang ◽  
Sukhvinder S. Obhi
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Michael Orquiola Galang ◽  
Sukhvinder S. Obhi

Automatic imitation refers to the automatic tendency to imitate observed actions. Previous research on automatic imitation has linked it to a wide variety of social cognitive processes and functions, although the evidence is mixed and suggestive. However, no study to date has looked at the downstream behavioural effects of automatic imitation. The current research addresses this gap in the literature by exploring the possible relationship between trait-levels of automatic imitation, as measured by the automatic imitation task (AIT), and explicit prosocial behaviours, as measured by a modified dictator game (DG). Contrary to our expectations, AIT effects did not correlate with DG scores. This conclusion is supported by both equivalence tests and Bayesian analysis. However, we discuss a number of alternative explanations for our results, and caution against strong interpretations from a single study. We further discuss the implications of this finding in relation to the widespread notion that automatic imitation, and self-other control more generally, underlie social cognitive functions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-352
Author(s):  
Mauricio Salgado ◽  
Alejandra Vásquez ◽  
Alejandra Yáñez

Moral decisions – that is, decisions that consider the consequences for the welfare of others – can be highly inconsistent across contexts. Here, we explore whether the altruism of young people is related to their willingness to cooperate with others, even in groups comprising non-reciprocating peers. Using the distinction between normative and cognitive expectations, we address this topic conducting several lab-in-the-field experiments with high-school students who played the dictator and linear public good games. We found that the altruism of young people in the dictator game and cooperation in the public good game were related, but only in the first rounds of the public good game. This indicates that young people orient their prosocial behaviour based on cognitive expectations, that is, they consider the information they receive regarding the free riding behaviour of peers and adapt their own. Nonetheless, young people who demonstrated high altruism tended to cooperate unconditionally, regardless of whether they belonged to a cooperative or uncooperative group, and despite disappointments. Finally, self-regarding young people were less likely to defect among cooperative peers. Therefore, group characteristics provide the boundary conditions for the consistency of the prosocial behaviour of young people. Some conceptual and policy implications are discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (8) ◽  
pp. 170238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Billingsley ◽  
Cristina M. Gomes ◽  
Michael E. McCullough

Does religion promote prosocial behaviour? Despite numerous publications that seem to answer this question affirmatively, divergent results from recent meta-analyses and pre-registered replication efforts suggest that the issue is not yet settled. Uncertainty lingers around (i) whether the effects of religious cognition on prosocial behaviour were obtained through implicit cognitive processes, explicit cognitive processes or both and (ii) whether religious cognition increases generosity only among people disinclined to share with anonymous strangers. Here, we report two experiments designed to address these concerns. In Experiment 1, we sought to replicate Shariff and Norenzayan's demonstration of the effects of implicit religious priming on Dictator Game transfers to anonymous strangers; unlike Shariff and Norenzayan, however, we used an online environment where anonymity was virtually assured. In Experiment 2, we introduced a ‘taking’ option to allow greater expression of baseline selfishness. In both experiments, we sought to activate religious cognition implicitly and explicitly, and we investigated the possibility that religious priming depends on the extent to which subjects view God as a punishing, authoritarian figure. Results indicated that in both experiments, religious subjects transferred more money on average than did non-religious subjects. Bayesian analyses supported the null hypothesis that implicit religious priming did not increase Dictator Game transfers in either experiment, even among religious subjects. Collectively, the two experiments furnished support for a small but reliable effect of explicit priming, though among religious subjects only. Neither experiment supported the hypothesis that the effect of religious priming depends on viewing God as a punishing figure. Finally, in a meta-analysis of relevant studies, we found that the overall effect of implicit religious priming on Dictator Game transfers was small and did not statistically differ from zero.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. McCullough ◽  
Joseph Billingsley ◽  
Cristina Gomes

Does religious cognition motivate generosity toward strangers? Divergent results from recent meta-analyses and pre-registered replication efforts suggest the issue is not yet settled. Additional uncertainty lingers around whether (a) the effects of religious cognition on prosocial behaviour obtain through implicit cognitive processes, explicit cognitive processes, or both; (b) whether religious cognition might increase generosity only among religious people; and (c) whether religious cognition might increase generosity only among people otherwise disinclined to share with anonymous strangers. Here we report the results of two experiments designed to address these concerns. In Experiment 1 we sought to replicate the classic demonstration of the effect of implicit religious priming on Dictator Game transfers, but in an online environment that maximises anonymity. In Experiment 2, we gave subjects the option to take as well as to give money, allowing greater expression of baseline selfishness. In both experiments, we sought to activate religious cognition implicitly and explicitly, and we investigated the possibility that religious priming depends upon the extent to which subjects view God as a punishing, authoritarian figure. Bayesian statistical methods supported the null hypothesis that implicit religious priming did not increase Dictator Game transfers in either experiment, even among religious subjects. Collectively, the two experiments provided support for a small but reliable effect of explicit priming, though among religious subjects only. Neither experiment offered strong evidence to support the hypothesis that the effect of religious priming depends upon viewing God as a punishing figure. Finally, in a random-effects meta-analysis of relevant studies, we found that the overall effect of implicit religious priming on Dictator Game transfers was small and not statistically different from zero.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110503
Author(s):  
Kathryn Emma Buchanan ◽  
Jonathan James Rolison ◽  
Isadora Jinga ◽  
Jessica Thompson ◽  
Riccardo Russo

The present research was motivated by a prior study, where several wallets, each containing a photo of either a baby, a puppy, a family, or an elderly couple, were scattered across a city in the United Kingdom (Wiseman, 2009). Most of the wallets containing a photo of a baby were returned compared to less than a third of wallets containing a photo of an elderly couple. To investigate further, in a series of three studies we examined, using a pseudo online version of the dictator game, possible subtle cues supporting prosocial behaviour by manipulating the type of avatar used by the recipient of the donation made by the ‘dictator’. Overall, it emerged that participants showed significantly higher levels of generosity towards babies, and older people, supporting the notion that perceptions of vulnerability and need drive prosocial behaviour.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nichola Raihani ◽  
Redouan Bshary

Evidence for the effect of eye images on prosocial behavior is mixed: some studies have found that images of eyes enhance cooperative behavior while others have not replicated this effect. In a recent meta-analysis, Nettle et al. (2013) argued that previous null results have occurred because data have been analysed incorrectly. Specifically, the authors predicted that eye images either (i) reduce variance in donation amount by reducing the likelihood that the Dictator will keep the entire endowment or (ii) increase compliance with cooperative norms. Since several previous studies have only looked at the effect of eye images on mean donation amount, they have not tested these predictions. We test both hypotheses here using a Dictator Game (n = 779) conducted over Amazon Mechanical Turk, a setup that has previously yielded negative results. We provided players with two types of descriptive norm information, by telling them how much others typically give in this setting. We compared donations under the norm treatments with decisions made under control conditions, where no norm information was supplied. In each setting, subjects were additionally shown images of eyes or a control image (flowers) so that any additional effect of eye images on prosocial behavior could be examined. Eye images did not increase Dictator Game giving, regardless of whether 'giving' was defined as mean donation or simply the tendency to make a non-zero donation. Furthermore, eye images did not increase compliance with a descriptive norm in this setting. Due to these negative results, we conclude that the conditions and underlying mechanisms that lead to positive effects of eyes on prosocial behaviour remain elusive.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bennett I. Bertenthal ◽  
Ty W. Boyer
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Margoni ◽  
Elena Nava ◽  
Luca Surian

Most cooperative interactions involve the expectation of mutual reciprocation and are based on interpersonal trust. Thus, understanding when and how humans acquire interpersonal trust can help unveiling the origins and development of children’s cooperative behavior. Here, we investigated whether prior socio-moral information about trading partners modulates the choice of preschool- (4-5 years) and school-age children (7-8 years) to share their own goods in a child-friendly version of the Trust Game. In this game, the trustee partner can repay the child’s initial investment or keep everything and betray the trustor. In two studies, we addressed whether trust is modulated by trustees exhibiting prosocial versus antisocial behaviors (Study 1, ‘helpers and hinderers’), or respect-based versus fear-based power (Study 2, ‘leaders and bullies’). Preschoolers trusted the leader more than the bully, and trusted the hinderer less than a neutral agent, but did not yet trust the helper more than the hinderer. The tendency to trust helpers more than hinderers increased with age as a result of the increased propensity to trust the prosocial agent. In Study 3, a group of preschoolers played the Dictator Game, a measure of pure generosity, with the same agents used for Study 1. Sharing rates were reliably lower than in Study 1, suggesting that the rates of investment in the trust game cannot be due solely to altruistic or indirect reciprocity motives. Overall, these findings indicate that, by age five, children understand complex cooperative exchanges and start relying on socio-moral information when deciding whom to trust.


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