The impact of heterogeneous investments on the evolution of cooperation in public goods game with exclusion

2020 ◽  
Vol 372 ◽  
pp. 124960
Author(s):  
Shaojie Lv ◽  
Xianjia Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game

2019 ◽  
Vol 475 (2227) ◽  
pp. 20190349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinhai Fang ◽  
Tina P. Benko ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Haiyan Xu ◽  
Qingmei Tan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Synergistic Effects ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
The Third ◽  
Individual Incentive ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.

Group preferential selection promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 1450062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Bin Zhang ◽  
Hong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Preferential Selection ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Public Goods Games

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable preferential parameter. Our results highlight that the learning interactions is not solely confined to the restricted connection among players, but co-players of wealthy groups have the opportunity to be as a role model in the promotion of cooperative evolution. Moreover, we also find the size of learning affects the choice of distant players, cooperators (defectors) having more paths to exploit the phalanx of opponents to survive when the value of preferential parameter is small. Besides, the extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.

scholarly journals CLASSROOM EXPERIMENT AS A TEACHING METHOD IN NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS COURSE EKSPERIMEN KELAS SEBAGAI METODE PEMBELAJARAN DALAM MATA AJAR EKONOMI SUMBER DAYA ALAM DAN LINGKUNGAN

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
ALIN HALIMATUSSADIAH
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Teaching Method ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Classroom Experiment ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The use of classroom experiment as teaching method in economic courses is increasing overtime. However, it is not widely used in developing world. In the experiment, students can learn using their own experience how economic agents behave and how they make decisions in a certain situation setting. This paper aims to describe the advantage of the method, practical issues in conducting classroom experiment, and examples of two classrooms experimental games in natural resource and environmental economics course: a public goods game and a CPR (common pool resource) game. In the games we introduce different rules of the game to give an understanding the impact of different rules of the game to the result of the game. We also discussed the relation between individual characteristics and his/her decision in the game.   Keywords: classroom experiment, public goods game, CPR (common-pool resource) game, natural resource and environmental economics

scholarly journals The study on the role of dedicators on promoting cooperation in public goods game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. e0257475
Author(s):  
Zhenghong Wu ◽  
Huan Huang ◽  
Qinghu Liao
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Care Group ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Emotional Effect ◽  
Spring Festival ◽  
Willingness To Donate ◽  
Negative Effect

In daily life, some people are always seen dedicating available resources to support collective activities. In this paper, we call these people who care group goals more than individual goals dedicators. Inspired by this phenomenon, we studied the role of dedicators on the evolution of cooperation in public goods game (PGG) based on a Chinese Folk Spring Festival Gala. Three types of agents were introduced into our PGG model including cooperators, defectors and dedicators. Dedicators tried to donate when the Gala was short of funds. Cooperators and defectors imitated the strategy of the highest-payoff neighbor based on the rational mechanism. And their imitating probability was modified on account of the emotional mechanism for positive effect of the dedicator’s donating behavior and negative effect of continuous poor performance. Through numerical simulations, we found that the existence of dedicators can indeed promote cooperation in PGG. It should be noted that dedicators’ willingness to donate was more important than their donation quantity in facilitating cooperation. And the stronger the emotional effect intensity of dedicators’ donating behavior was, the better. So, the selfless dedication of participants should be praised to promote cooperation by improving their emotional effect intensity. Last but not least, a reasonable activity budget was needed to sustain the highest level of cooperation.

scholarly journals Sympathy and Punishment: Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Game

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hang Ye ◽  
Fei Tan ◽  
Mei Ding ◽  
Yongmin Jia ◽  
Yefeng Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game
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