The Climate Change Dilemma: How Cooperation Beliefs Influence Energy Conservation Behavior

Despite widespread belief in anthropogenic climate change and high levels of concern about its consequences, behavioral changes necessary to adequately address climate change appear difficult to achieve. This concern–behavior gap is often explained by the public goods character of climate change mitigation, which is associated with a high individual incentive to take a free ride when possible. This paper examines cooperation beliefs and their impact on individuals’ energy conservation behavior. Analyzing data from the European Social Survey, it appears that cooperation beliefs are rather low in Europe and that most people do not expect others to limit their energy use to help mitigate climate change. This low trust contrasts with individuals’ reported level of energy conservation behavior and the general high level of energy conservation in most European countries. This trust gap has important implications for pro-environmental behavior as high trust in others’ pro-environmental behavior fosters individuals’ attempts to save energy.

A Noncooperative Game Analysis for Controlling COVID-19 Outbreak

COVID-19 is a global epidemic. Till now, there is no remedy for this epidemic. However, isolation and social distancing are seemed to be effective to control this pandemic. In this paper, we provide an analytical model on the effectiveness of the sustainable lockdown policy that accommodates both isolation and social distancing features of the individuals. To promote social distancing, we analyze a noncooperative game environment that provides an incentive for maintaining social distancing. Furthermore, the sustainability of the lockdown policy is also interpreted with the help of a game-theoretic incentive model for maintaining social distancing. Finally, an extensive numerical analysis is provided to study the impact of maintaining a social-distancing measure to prevent the Covid-19 outbreak. Numerical results show that the individual incentive increases more than 85% with an increasing percentage of home isolation from 25% to 100% for all considered scenarios. The numerical results also demonstrate that in a particular percentage of home isolation, the individual incentive decreases with an increasing number of individuals.

Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.

Políticas de inclusión educativa en Chile: Tres nudos críticos

Having achieved the coverage challenges following compulsory policies and a financing system via demand subsidy conditioned to enrollment and attendance, but faced with the scenario of school segregation, Chile has set itself the goal of advancing towards the right to an inclusive education and of quality. In this article we identify and analyze three critical nodes that affect the possibilities of achieving this goal: a) a tension between the logic of integration and educational inclusion, b) a market-based model that does not consider public values, and c) a new educational architecture, based on the logic of individual accountability, which places the possibility of educational improvement in individual incentive systems tied to the achievement of high performance tests. We discuss the need to address and unlock these nodes through transdisciplinary research.

Individual Incentive Based Reward Policy for an Ad Exchange to Mitigate the Threat of Ad Blocking

This article investigates the fairness of the existing business model of advertisement blocking and ad exchange companies by using exchange frameworks and equity theory. It then provides an individual-centric approach for an ad exchange, which aims to provide a fair compensation to individuals in exchange for their information and effort in the targeting and viewing/filtering of online advertisements. In this article, it is shown that by providing a higher value proposition to individuals in an online advertisement ecosystem, the ad exchange can not only increase individuals' equity in the system, but it can also mitigate the threat of ad blocking for publisher websites and advertisers. An efficient algorithm that estimates the monetary impact of the proposed approach and determines a fair monetary incentive—compensation—for individuals' personal information and actions—engagement—is presented in this article.

Performance pay and enterprise productivity: the details matter

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide novel and rigorous evidence on the productivity effect of varying attributes of performance-related pay (PRP) and shows that the details of PRP indeed matter. Design/methodology/approach In doing so, the authors exploit the panel nature of the Finnish Linked Employer–Employee Data on the details of PRP. Findings The authors first establish that the omitted variable bias is serious, which makes the cross-sectional estimates on the productivity effect of the details of PRP biased upward substantially. Relying on the fixed effect estimates that account for such bias, the authors find: (first, group incentive PRP is more potent in boosting enterprise productivity than individual incentive PRP; second, group incentive PRP with profitability as a performance measure is especially powerful in raising firm productivity; third, when a narrow measure (such as cost reduction) is already used, adding another narrow measure (such as quality improvement) yields no additional productivity gain; and fourth, PRP with greater power of incentives (the share of PRP in total compensation) results in greater productivity gains, and returns to power of incentives diminishes very slowly. Originality/value Much of the empirical literature on PRP focuses on a question of whether the firm can increase firm performance in general and enterprise productivity in particular by introducing PRP and if so, how much. However, not all PRP programs are created equal and PRP programs vary significantly in a variety of attributes. This paper provides novel and rigorous evidence on the productivity effect of varying attributes of PRP and shows that the details of PRP indeed matter.

The productivity effects of multiple pay incentives

Drawing on recent incentive theory and the growing use of multiple incentives by firms, this article examines the effects of combining incentives on workplace labour productivity. Utilizing data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey, the article explores whether multiple incentives are more effective than single incentives. It is found that the productivity effects of individualized incentives are enhanced by profit sharing though not by collective payment by result schemes (PBR). Profit sharing also enhances the effect of collective PBR, and it is found that two group incentives are more effective than a single individual incentive. However there are limits on the number of incentive schemes that can be combined effectively. The effects of mixed incentives tend to be greater in workplaces with worker discretion and task variety, thereby providing support for a contingency perspective.

Raising the Dead without a Red Sea-Dead Sea project? Hydro-economics and governance

Seven decades of extractions have dramatically reduced Jordan River flows, lowered the Dead Sea level, opened sink holes, and caused other environmental problems. The fix Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians propose would build an expensive multipurpose conveyance project from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea that would also generate hydropower and desalinate water. This paper compares the Red-Dead project to alternatives that may also raise the Dead Sea level. Hydro-economic model results for the Jordan-Israel-Palestinian inter-tied water systems show two restoration alternatives are more economically viable than the proposed Red-Dead project. Many decentralized new supply, wastewater reuse, conveyance, conservation, and leak reduction projects and programs in each country can together increase economic benefits and reliably deliver up to 900 MCM yr−1 to the Dead Sea. Similarly, a smaller Red-Dead project that only generates hydropower can deliver large flows to the Dead Sea when the sale price of generated electricity is sufficiently high. However, for all restoration options, net benefits fall and water scarcity rises as flows to the Dead Sea increase. This finding suggests (i) each country has no individual incentive to return water to the Dead Sea, and (ii) outside institutions that seek to raise the Dead must also offer countries direct incentives to deliver water to the Sea besides building the countries new infrastructure.

Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement: Welfare vs. redistribution

With flexible (variable) retirement every individual determines his optimal retirement age, depending on a common benefit-retirement age schedule and his life expectancy. The government maximises the average expected lifetime utility minus a scalar multiple of the variance of the lifetime pension balances to achieve harmony between the maximisation of welfare and the minimisation of redistribution. Since the government cannot identify types by life expectancy, it must take the individual incentive compatibility constraints into account. Second-best schedules strongly reduce the variances of benefits and of retirement ages of the so-called actuarially fair system, thus achieving higher social welfare and lower redistribution.