Human dignity and vulnerable agency: An ethical framework for forensic practice

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Ward ◽  
Kendra Syversen
European View ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Leveringhaus

This article discusses the need for an ethical framework for emerging robotic technologies. The temptation, arguably driven by sci-fi treatments of artificial intelligence, is to ask whether future robots should be considered quasi-humans. This article argues that such sci-fi scenarios have little relevance for current technological developments in robotics, nor for ethical approaches to the subject: for the foreseeable future robots will merely be useful tools. In response to emerging robotic technologies, this article proposes an ethical framework that makes a commitment to human rights, human dignity and responsibility a central priority for those developing robots. At a policy level, this entails (1) assessing whether the use of particular robots would result in human rights violations and (2) creating adequate institutions through which human individuals can be held responsible for what robots do.


Author(s):  
Duncan MacIntosh

Setting aside the military advantages offered by Autonomous Weapons Systems for a moment, international debate continues to feature the argument that the use of lethal force by “killer robots” inherently violates human dignity. The purpose of this chapter is to refute this assumption of inherent immorality and demonstrate situations in which deploying autonomous systems would be strategically, morally, and rationally appropriate. The second part of this chapter objects to the argument that the use of robots in warfare is somehow inherently offensive to human dignity. Overall, this chapter will demonstrate that, contrary to arguments made by some within civil society, moral employment of force is possible, even without proximate human decision-making. As discussions continue to swirl around autonomous weapons systems, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that fire-and-forget weapons are not morally exceptional or inherently evil. If an engagement complied with the established ethical framework, it is not inherently morally invalidated by the absence of a human at the point of violence. As this chapter argues, the decision to employ lethal force becomes problematic when a more thorough consideration would have demanded restraint. Assuming a legitimate target, therefore, the importance of the distance between human agency in the target authorization process and force delivery is separated by degrees. A morally justifiable decision to engage a target with rifle fire would not be ethically invalidated simply because the lethal force was delivered by a commander-authorized robotic carrier.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 441-443
Author(s):  
Rajesh Maheshwari ◽  
Yvonne Skinner

Objective: In inpatient forensic settings, a psychiatrist is expected to wear ‘Two Hats’, as a treating physician and as an expert to provide risk assessments and expert advice to the judicial authorities for leave and release decisions. Although dual roles have long been accepted as an inevitable part of independent forensic practice, there are additional ethical challenges for the treating psychiatrist to provide an expert opinion. This paper examines the specific ethical ambiguities for a treating psychiatrist at the interface of legal process related to leave and release decisions in the treatment of forensic patients. Conclusions: While respect for justice is the prevailing ethical paradigm for court-related forensic work, the medical paradigm should remain the key ethical framework for psychiatrists in treatment settings. Thus, psychiatrist should be aware of possible adverse consequences in acting as forensic experts for their patients. A conscientious adherence to clinical facts and awareness of the ‘Two Hats’ ethical pitfall can serve as important reference points in framing the psychiatric evidence in the decision-making process and safeguard treating psychiatrist’s role.


2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Louw

The theological discourse mostly focuses on the moral and ethical framework for human rights and human dignity. In order to give theological justification to the value and dignity of human beings, most theologians point to the imago Dei as theological starting point for the design of an anthropology on human dignity. Within the paradigmatic framework of democracy, human dignity and human rights have become interchangeable concepts. This article aimed to focus not on ethics but on aesthetics: man as homo aestheticus, as well as the praxis question regarding the quality of human dignity within the network of human relationships. It was argued that human dignity is more fundamental than human rights. Dignity as an anthropological construct should not reside in the first place in the imago Dei and its relationship to Christology and incarnation theology. Human dignity, human rights and human identity are embedded in the basic human quest for meaning (teleology). As such, human dignity should, in a practical theological approach to anthropology, be dealt with from the aesthetic perspective of charisma, thus the option for inhabitational theology. As an anthropological category, human dignity should be viewed from the perspective of pneumatology within the networking framework of a �spiritual humanism�. In this regard, the theology of the Dutch theologian A.A. van Ruler, and especially his seminal 1968 work Ik geloof, should be revisited by a pneumatic anthropology within the parameters of practical theology.


1991 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian L. Wilcox ◽  
Hedwin Nalmark

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (5) ◽  
pp. 264-271
Author(s):  
Rachel E. López

The elderly prison population continues to rise along with higher rates of dementia behind bars. To maintain the detention of this elderly population, federal and state prisons are creating long-term care units, which in turn carry a heavy financial burden. Prisons are thus gearing up to become nursing homes, but without the proper trained staff and adequate financial support. The costs both to taxpayers and to human dignity are only now becoming clear. This article squarely addresses the second dimension of this carceral practice, that is the cost to human dignity. Namely, it sets out why indefinitely incarcerating someone with dementia or other neurocognitive disorders violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. This conclusion derives from the confluence of two lines of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. First, in Madison v. Alabama, the Court recently held that executing someone (in Madison’s case someone with dementia) who cannot rationally understand their sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Second, in line with Miller v. Alabama, which puts life without parole (LWOP) sentences in the same class as death sentences due to their irrevocability, this holding should be extended to LWOP sentences. Put another way, this article explains why being condemned to life is equivalent to death for someone whose neurodegenerative disease is so severe that they cannot rationally understand their punishment.


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