Pricing decisions in a decentralized biofuel supply chain with RIN mechanism considering environmental impacts

2021 ◽  
Vol 150 ◽  
pp. 106090
Author(s):  
Ghazaleh Allameh ◽  
Mohammad Saidi-Mehrabad
2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 254-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ghazaleh Allameh ◽  
Mohammad Saidi Mehrabad ◽  
Seyed Jafar Sadjadi

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohsen Rezaei

Abstract In the biofuel supply chain, there may be various and hybrid uncertainties that, if ignored, can lead to inefficient network design. In this study, a multi-objective robust fuzzy stochastic programming (MORFSP) model is proposed for designing biodiesel supply chain network (BSCN) under different and hybrid uncertainties. This model simultaneously minimizes total cost of the BSCN and total environmental impacts of activities of the network. Fixed costs and environmental impact of opening facilities are described as fuzzy variables. Demands, supplies, other costs and environmental impacts are considered as fuzzy scenario based variables. The proposed MORFSP model considers different risks, including possibilistic variability and scenario variability related to economic and environmental objective functions, and unsatisfied demand costs. This model is applied in a real case study to design a BSCN in Iran. Waste cooking oil (WCO), and some non-edible plants like Salvia lerifolia (SL) and Jatropha Curcas L. (JCL) are considered as sources of producing biodiesel. The proposed approach used for designing a four-echelon, multi-period, and multi-product, of BSCN. The results show the effectiveness of the proposed model for designing the BSCN under hybrid uncertainties.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1309
Author(s):  
Jiali Qu ◽  
Benyong Hu ◽  
Chao Meng

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.


2015 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 291-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niklas von der Assen ◽  
André Sternberg ◽  
Arne Kätelhön ◽  
André Bardow

Potential environmental benefits have been identified for the utilization of carbon dioxide (CO2) as a feedstock for polyurethanes (PUR). CO2 can be utilized in the PUR supply chain in a wide variety of ways ranging from direct CO2 utilization for polyols as a PUR precursor, to indirect CO2 utilization for basic chemicals in the PUR supply chain. In this paper, we present a systematic exploration and environmental evaluation of all direct and indirect CO2 utilization options for flexible and rigid PUR foams. The analysis is based on an LCA-based PUR supply chain optimization model using linear programming to identify PUR production with minimal environmental impacts. The direct utilization of CO2 for polyols allows for large specific impact reductions of up to 4 kg CO2-eq. and 2 kg oil-eq. per kg CO2 utilized, but the amounts of CO2 that can be utilized are limited to 0.30 kg CO2 per kg PUR. The amount of CO2 utilized can be increased to up to 1.7 kg CO2 per kg PUR by indirect CO2 utilization in the PUR supply chain. Indirect CO2 utilization requires hydrogen (H2). The environmental impacts of H2 production strongly affect the impact of indirect CO2 utilization in PUR. To achieve optimal environmental performance under the current fossil-based H2 generation, PUR production can only utilize much less CO2 than theoretically possible. Thus, utilizing as much CO2 in the PUR supply chain as possible is not always environmentally optimal. Clean H2 production is required to exploit the full CO2 utilization potential for environmental impact reduction in PUR production.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqiu Yu ◽  
Xiaoxue Ren

This paper considers the price conflict problem between the online channel of a food processing factory and the offline channel of the food retailers in food supply chains by analyzing the pricing decisions and coordination mechanisms between the food processing factory and food retailers under the influence of a food quality information service. First, the Stackelberg game method and the Bertrand game method are used to optimize the pricing decisions with the goal of maximizing the profits of the food processing factory and retailer. The analysis shows that the food quality information service level is positively correlated with the price of the factory’s own channel, and the influence of the food quality information service level on the price of the food processing factory’s or the food retailer’s own channel is stronger than its influence on the price of a competitor’s channel. Second, the food supply chain members’ pricing decisions are analyzed using the case analysis method by considering practical problems in the food supply chain. The results indicate that the food processing factory should use the Stackelberg game to make pricing decisions. However, it is optimal for the food retailer to make pricing decisions under the Bertrand game, and the total profit of the food supply chain is optimized under centralized decision making. Finally, we use both the quantitative discount mechanism and the Stackelberg game method to analyze the profits obtained by the food processing factory and retailer. The results indicate that the food processing factory should implement a quantitative discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is greater than 0.4, and the retailer should implement a quantity discount mechanism when the quantity discount coefficient is in the range of 0.25 to 0.4.


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