Optimal innovation investment: the role of subsidy schemes and supply chain channel power structure

2021 ◽  
Vol 157 ◽  
pp. 107291
Author(s):  
Chaofan Li ◽  
Qiliang Liu ◽  
Pin Zhou ◽  
Hongjun Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Channel Power

scholarly journals The role of retailer's app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musen Xue
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Quality Decision ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

The role of retailer's ability to add app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures is investigated in this paper. Applying a game-theoretic approach, we find that, first, under certain conditions, retailer's ability to add app channel can induce the manufacturer to adjust the wholesale price and product quality in the opposite direction with the manufacturer being the leader. Second, for the manufacturer and the retailer, retailer's ability to add app channel can result in two distinct profit situations regardless of the power structure of supply chain: win-win and lose-win. Moreover, in a retailer-led supply chain, adding app channel will make the whole supply chain better off when the return cost is relatively low or high, while make the whole supply chain worse off when the return cost is moderate. Third, we identify a region of the return cost under which the manufacturer, the retailer, the supply chain and consumers can gain from adding app channel, leading to a Pareto improvement.

Remanufacturer–Manufacturer Collaboration in a Supply Chain: The Manufacturer Plays the Leader Role

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (05) ◽  
pp. 1550040 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Wang ◽  
Zhongkai Xiong ◽  
Yu Xiong ◽  
Wei Yan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Sales Volume ◽  
Market Position ◽  
Collaborative Model ◽  
Channel Power ◽  
Competitive Model ◽  
Leader Role

This paper adds to the growing remanufacturing literature by investigating a collaborative model in which the manufacturer serves as the remanufacturer's distributor while selling its own product. The paper extends the collaborative model that we have studied previously by characterizing it as a channel power structure under which the manufacturer plays the leader role in the collaboration. Furthermore, the paper compares this collaborative model with a competitive model in which the manufacturer competes with the remanufacturer in the market on pricing, sales volume and profit and finds that even if the manufacturer chooses to collaborate with the remanufacturer, it does not give up its market position; the manufacturer keeps the price of its product unchanged as the remanufactured product becomes increasingly acceptable to the consumer, and its product's sales volume remains unchanged in both models. Finally, this paper observes that the collaborative model benefits the manufacturer more than the competitive model, whereas the competitive model benefits the remanufacturer more than the collaborative model. Obviously, if collaboration benefits both of the manufacturer and remanufacturer, they will choose to collaborate, and the manufacturer will transfer part of its profit to the remanufacturer, but if competition brings them more profit, they will choose to compete in the market, and the remanufacturer will transfer part of its profit to the manufacturer.

scholarly journals Coordination of a Green Supply Chain with One Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers under Different Power Structures

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Wang ◽  
Xiujuan Liu ◽  
Wensi Zhang ◽  
Ge Gao ◽  
Hui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Relationship ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Operational Decisions ◽  
Conduct Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
The Impact

The main objective of this research is to examine the role of power relationship in a two-level green supply chain which is made up of one shared manufacturer and two competitive retailers. We develop six game theory-based models to explore the members’ operational decisions in a supply chain taking into account three vertical power structures (Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash) as well as two retailers’ horizontal power structure (Bertrand or Stackelberg competition). Then, we design a two-part tariff contract which can encourage the supply chain members to promote cooperation and eventually coordinate the decentralized green supply chain under each power structure. Lastly, to further discuss the impact of the green awareness of consumers and the greening cost on supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits, we employ some numerical examples to conduct sensitivity analysis. The main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the impact of power structure on the supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits mainly depends on the substitutability of the green products, the green awareness of consumers, and the greening cost for the manufacturer. Secondly, the more power the manufacturer has, the lower product greenness will be set. Thirdly, the consumer’s environmental awareness (the greening cost) positively (negatively) influences the manufacturer’s product greenness and wholesale price, the retailers’ sales prices, and the player’s profits under each power structure. Finally, the developed two-part tariff contract is practicable and beneficial for both the manufacturer and the two retailers.

The Role of Supply Chain Marketing in Enterprise Management

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-125
Author(s):  
Xiao Qingyun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Enterprise Management

The Role of Contracts in the Organic Supply Chain: 2004-2007

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn Dimitri ◽  
Lydia Oberholtzer ◽  
Michelle Wittenberger
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain
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