Experimental investigation of the role of frictional yarn pull-out and windowing on the probabilistic impact response of kevlar fabrics

2015 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 215-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaurav Nilakantan ◽  
Richard L. Merrill ◽  
Michael Keefe ◽  
John W. Gillespie ◽  
Eric D. Wetzel
2000 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald R. King ◽  
Rachel Schwartz

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how legal regimes affect social welfare. We investigate four legal regimes, each consisting of a liability rule (strict or negligence) and a damage measure (out-of-pocket or independent-of-investment). The results of the experiment are for the most part consistent with the qualitative predictions of Schwartz's (1997) model; however, subjects' actual choices deviate from the point predictions of the model. We explore whether these deviations arise because: (1) subjects form faulty anticipations of their counterparts' actions and/or (2) subjects do not choose the optimal responses given their anticipations. We find that subjects behave differently under the four regimes in terms of anticipation errors and departures from best responses. For example, subjects playing the role of auditors anticipate investments most accurately under the regime with strict liability combined with out-of-pocket damages, but are least likely to choose the optimal response given their anticipations. This finding implies that noneconomic factors likely play a role in determining subjects' choices.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangcong Fan ◽  
Zechun Ying ◽  
Yuemei Yuan ◽  
Xinchao Zhang ◽  
Bin Xu

Abstract Corrupt deals are commonly arranged by intermediaries. However, attempts to deter corruption pay little attention to the role of intermediaries in corrupt deals. This paper reports a laboratory bribery experiment on corruption designed to investigate how intermediaries with information about the lowest bribe that the official is willing to accept in a briber-initiated corrupt deal affect the effectiveness of the four-eyes-principle (FEP) on deterring corruption. We find that the introduction of the FEP significantly decreases the corruption level by increasing uncertainty. However, the presence of intermediaries with information completely offsets the positive effect of introducing the FEP on preventing corruption. Our findings suggest that further research on corruption should allow a more active role of intermediaries, and legislators should take the role of intermediaries into account when designing anti-corruption mechanisms.


1986 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Gustafson

An experiment was performed testing whether aggressive cues are necessary or only facilitative in increasing aggression to a frustration and whether their role is to “pull out” aggression directly or to add to the experience of displeasure. 20 subjects participated and a modified version of the Buss' “aggression machine” was used in which frustration was manipulated within subjects and aggressive cues between subjects. Frustration was of an arbitrary kind and aggression was defined to subjects to have instrumental value in overcoming the frustrative event Results indicated that (1) frustration alone is a weak antecedent of aggression, (2) at low frustration aggressive cues seem to be necessary for aggression to increase, and (3) aggressive cues apparently elicit aggression directly. Results were discussed in terms of Berkowitz' reformulation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.


2002 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 995-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.V. Gerasimov ◽  
Yu.P. Dikov ◽  
O.I. Yakovlev ◽  
F. Wlotzka

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document