scholarly journals Flexing dual-systems models: How variable cognitive control in children informs our understanding of risk-taking across development

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Li
2021 ◽  
pp. 096372142110145
Author(s):  
Kathleen D. Vohs ◽  
Alex R. Piquero

Adolescence is a developmental period characterized by heightened attraction to rewards and risk-taking propensities. Dual-systems models portray the adolescent brain in terms of a maturational mismatch whereby brain systems involved in sensitivity to incentives become potentiated before impulse-control systems have matured. That perspective implies that relying on impulse inhibition to overcome temptation is likely to yield uneven success during adolescence. Using the analogy of practice driving a race car, we propose another process that leads to achieving healthy outcomes: steering aimed at limiting or preventing motivational conflict and thereby lessening reliance on impulse control (termed braking). The focal idea is that the more adolescents can avoid troublesome contexts, the less they will need to depend on their relatively weak impulse-control abilities to avert problems and danger. Recent work links dispositional differences in self-control to indicators of steering, such as situation selection, habit cultivation, and proactive responding. Steering to curb or avoid motivational conflict could be key to promoting healthy outcomes during adolescence, a developmental period characterized by vulnerability to risk, and could have lasting importance given that enduring patterns of unhealthy, dangerous, and self-defeating behaviors often start during this period.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathy T. Do ◽  
Paul B. Sharp ◽  
Eva H. Telzer

Heightened risk taking in adolescence has long been attributed to valuation systems overwhelming the deployment of cognitive control. However, this explanation of why adolescents engage in risk taking is insufficient given increasing evidence that risk-taking behavior can be strategic and involve elevated cognitive control. We argue that applying the expected-value-of-control computational model to adolescent risk taking can clarify under what conditions control is elevated or diminished during risky decision-making. Through this lens, we review research examining when adolescent risk taking might be due to—rather than a failure of—effective cognitive control and suggest compelling ways to test such hypotheses. This effort can resolve when risk taking arises from an immaturity of the control system itself, as opposed to arising from differences in what adolescents value relative to adults. It can also identify promising avenues for channeling cognitive control toward adaptive outcomes in adolescence.


2018 ◽  
Vol 374 (1766) ◽  
pp. 20180139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Y. Hayden

Self-control refers to the ability to deliberately reject tempting options and instead select ones that produce greater long-term benefits. Although some apparent failures of self-control are, on closer inspection, reward maximizing, at least some self-control failures are clearly disadvantageous and non-strategic. The existence of poor self-control presents an important evolutionary puzzle because there is no obvious reason why good self-control should be more costly than poor self-control. After all, a rock is infinitely patient. I propose that self-control failures result from cases in which well-learned (and thus routinized) decision-making strategies yield suboptimal choices. These mappings persist in the decision-makers’ repertoire because they result from learning processes that are adaptive in the broader context, either on the timescale of learning or of evolution. Self-control, then, is a form of cognitive control and the subjective feeling of effort likely reflects the true costs of cognitive control. Poor self-control, in this view, is ultimately a result of bounded optimality. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 20-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikki C. Lee ◽  
Wouter D. Weeda ◽  
Catherine Insel ◽  
Leah H. Somerville ◽  
Lydia Krabbendam ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
João F. Guassi Moreira ◽  
Adriana S. Méndez Leal ◽  
Yael H. Waizman ◽  
Natalie Saragosa-Harris ◽  
Emilia Ninova ◽  
...  

AbstractSystem-based theories are a popular approach to explaining the psychology of human decision making. Such theories posit that decision-making is governed by interactions between different psychological processes that arbitrate amongst each other for control over behavior. To date, system-based theories have received inconsistent support at the neural level, leading some to question their veracity. Here we examine the possibility that prior attempts to evaluate system-based theories have been limited by their reliance on predicting brain activity from behavior, and seek to advance evaluations of system-based models through modeling approaches that predict behavior from brain activity. Using within-subject decision-level modeling of fMRI data from a risk-taking task in a sample of over 2000 decisions across 51 adolescents—a population in which decision-making processes are particularly dynamic and consequential—we find support for system-based theories of decision-making. In particular, neural activity in lateral prefrontal cortex and a multivariate pattern of cognitive control both predicted a reduced likelihood of making a risky decision, whereas increased activity in the ventral striatum—a region typically associated with valuation processes—predicted a greater likelihood of engaging in risk-taking. These results comprise the first formalized within-subjects neuroimaging test of system-based theories, garnering support for the notion that competing systems drive decision behaviors.Significance StatementDecision making is central to adaptive behavior. While dominant psychological theories of decision-making behavior have found empirical support, their neuroscientific implementations have received inconsistent support. This may in part be due to statistical approaches employed by prior neuroimaging studies of system-based theories. Here we use brain modeling—an approach that predicts behavior from brain activity—of univariate and multivariate neural activity metrics to better understand how neural components of psychological systems guide decision behavior. We found broad support for system-based theories such that that neural systems involved in cognitive control predicted a reduced likelihood to make risky decisions, whereas value-based systems predicted greater risk-taking propensity.


Author(s):  
C. Renn Upchurch Sweeney ◽  
J. Rick Turner ◽  
J. Rick Turner ◽  
Chad Barrett ◽  
Ana Victoria Soto ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher N. Cascio ◽  
Joshua Carp ◽  
Matthew Brook O'Donnell ◽  
Francis J. Tinney ◽  
C. Raymond Bingham ◽  
...  

Adolescence is a period characterized by increased sensitivity to social cues, as well as increased risk-taking in the presence of peers. For example, automobile crashes are the leading cause of death for adolescents, and driving with peers increases the risk of a fatal crash. Growing evidence points to an interaction between neural systems implicated in cognitive control and social and emotional context in predicting adolescent risk. We tested such a relationship in recently licensed teen drivers. Participants completed an fMRI session in which neural activity was measured during a response inhibition task, followed by a separate driving simulator session 1 week later. Participants drove alone and with a peer who was randomly assigned to express risk-promoting or risk-averse social norms. The experimentally manipulated social context during the simulated drive moderated the relationship between individual differences in neural activity in the hypothesized cognitive control network (right inferior frontal gyrus, BG) and risk-taking in the driving context a week later. Increased activity in the response inhibition network was not associated with risk-taking in the presence of a risky peer but was significantly predictive of safer driving in the presence of a cautious peer, above and beyond self-reported susceptibility to peer pressure. Individual differences in recruitment of the response inhibition network may allow those with stronger inhibitory control to override risky tendencies when in the presence of cautious peers. This relationship between social context and individual differences in brain function expands our understanding of neural systems involved in top–down cognitive control during adolescent development.


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