Chapel Hill Expert Survey trend file, 1999–2019

2022 ◽  
Vol 75 ◽  
pp. 102420
Author(s):  
Seth Jolly ◽  
Ryan Bakker ◽  
Liesbet Hooghe ◽  
Gary Marks ◽  
Jonathan Polk ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
pp. 19-54
Author(s):  
Duncan McDonnell ◽  
Annika Werner

This chapter first discusses in depth the book’s core concept of “radical right populist”, before examining the history of co-operation (and mostly non-cooperation) between radical right populists in the European Parliament. It sets out the main theories, in particular policy congruence, which have been used to explain why parties form groups in the European Parliament. It then looks at how these theories might apply to radical right populist parties. Finally, the chapter presents the data and methods used in the study. These include Chapel Hill Expert Survey data, EP group finance and voting behaviour data, as well as interviews conducted with representatives and officials from a wide range of radical right populist parties and their allies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316802091445
Author(s):  
Steffen Hurka ◽  
Constantin Kaplaner

The standing committees of the European Parliament perform crucial policy-making functions and, accordingly, the question of how they are composed assumes great relevance. Unlike previous studies, which primarily looked at committee assignments from the perspective of individual MEPs, we assess the representativeness of entire committees by comparing their preference distributions with those we find in the plenary on the left/right and pro/anti EU dimension. For our analysis, we combine new data on committee memberships in the ninth European Parliament with data on policy preferences of national parties from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. In order to assess committee representativeness, we calculate the extent to which the preference distributions of committees and the plenary overlap. We show that committee representativeness is a function of committee popularity and power. Committee popularity provides party groups with a larger pool of applicants to choose from and since popular committees are often also quite large, the formation of representative committees is facilitated. Moreover, the party groups of the European Parliament have stronger incentives to form balanced committee contingents for powerful committees, resulting in higher committee representativeness. However, this latter finding is qualified by two outliers and we only find the hypothesized relationship to hold on the pro/anti EU dimension.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 413-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurits J Meijers

This article examines whether the support for Eurosceptic challenger parties influences mainstream party position change on European integration in Western Europe. The key finding is that Eurosceptic challenger support is capable of influencing mainstream position shifts on European integration provided that, on average, EU issues are regarded as important by the Eurosceptic challengers. Moreover, the centre-left is more affected by Eurosceptic contagion since it is influenced by both radical right and radical left Eurosceptic success, whereas the centre-right is only susceptible to radical right success. The empirical analyses are based on panel regression analysis employing expert survey data provided by Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The findings presented in this article have important implications for the study of party positioning on European integration as well as for the study of party competition in general.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-196
Author(s):  
Constantin Colonescu

Populism is a fuzzy concept in world politics; it can take many shapes and colors, thus evading rigorous definition. Using expert evaluations provided in Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2017 data, we try to identify features that predict populism and to characterize various European parties on a populism scale. As a byproduct, we find that experts have often diverging opinions on a party’s stance on various issues. Keywords: populism, CHES 2017, EU politics


2020 ◽  
pp. 55-92
Author(s):  
Duncan McDonnell ◽  
Annika Werner

This chapter focuses on the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, which in 2014 accepted the radical right populists of the Danish People’s Party and the Finns Party, alongside more moderate centre-right parties such as the UK Conservatives. To analyse the reasons behind the group’s composition, it uses Chapel Hill Expert Survey data on party positions in addition to interviews with leading figures from the main ECR parties. The chapter proposes the “respectable radicals” theory of group formation. In other words, radical parties like the Danish People’s Party and the Finns Party play a two-level game in which they value perceived domestic “office” and “votes” benefits of European alliances more than “policy congruence”. In particular, being seen to sit with the UK Conservatives was considered advantageous by the Danish and Finnish parties while, for the UK Conservatives, these parties’ lack of extreme right historical baggage made them acceptable allies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316801668691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Polk ◽  
Jan Rovny ◽  
Ryan Bakker ◽  
Erica Edwards ◽  
Liesbet Hooghe ◽  
...  

This article addresses the variation of anti-corruption and anti-elite salience in party positioning across Europe. It demonstrates that while anti-corruption salience is primarily related to the (regional) context in which a party operates, anti-elite salience is primarily a function of party ideology. Extreme left and extreme conservative (TAN) parties are significantly more likely to emphasize anti-elite views. Through its use of the new 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey wave, this article also introduces the dataset.


Author(s):  
Armin Schäfer

Abstract This book review examines the theory of populism advanced by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart in Cultural Backlash. The authors offer a distinct explanation of the rise of authoritarian populism in advanced democracies. As societies become more liberal over time, older, more conservative cohorts feel under threat of losing majority status and allegedly turn towards authoritarian-populist parties that promise to stop the tide of liberalism. However, this theory of populism finds little empirical support. In contrast to what the authors argue, there is no polarization of attitudes between younger and older cohorts, and younger cohorts are more likely to vote for authoritarian-populist parties. To substantiate this claim, I replicate many of the analyses in Cultural Backlash and add additional ones with the newest wave of the European Social Survey and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. I conclude by observing that while the cultural backlash theory of populism does not hold, this does not invalidate cultural approaches more generally.


2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212097288
Author(s):  
Michael Minkenberg ◽  
Anca Florian ◽  
Zsuzsanna Végh ◽  
Malisa Zobel

Radical right parties’ calls for a strong and illiberal nation-state have travelled across the political spectrum into the mainstream in Eastern Europe since the 2000s, contributing to a rightward shift in the region’s politics. The mechanisms behind such influences in Eastern Europe are not yet fully understood. Focusing on the strength of radical right parties and mainstream parties’ strategic reactions to them, this study explores how and under what circumstances radical right parties exert influence on mainstream parties’ general political positions and on their positions concerning ethnic and national minorities – a group frequently targeted by radical right intolerance in the region. Shifts in parties’ positions are analyzed using comparative data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and the authors’ own Viadrina Expert Survey. The study finds that where mainstream parties formally or informally cooperated with radical right parties or coopted their agenda, lasting rightward position shifts are observable. Consequently, the authors argue that by contributing to rightward shifts, especially on positions concerning minorities, radical right parties play a role in undermining liberal democratic values, thus contributing to the ‘depletion of democracy’.


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