scholarly journals Systematically comparing COVID-19 with the 2009 influenza pandemic for hospitalized patients

2021 ◽  
Vol 102 ◽  
pp. 375-380
Author(s):  
Pengfei Li ◽  
Yining Wang ◽  
Maikel P. Peppelenbosch ◽  
Zhongren Ma ◽  
Qiuwei Pan
Epidemics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 86-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Kissler ◽  
Julia R. Gog ◽  
Cécile Viboud ◽  
Vivek Charu ◽  
Ottar N. Bjørnstad ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (15) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danuta M Skowronski ◽  
Siobhan Leir ◽  
Gaston De Serres ◽  
Michelle Murti ◽  
James A Dickinson ◽  
...  

Introduction Findings from the community-based Canadian Sentinel Practitioner Surveillance Network (SPSN) suggest children were more affected by the 2018/19 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 epidemic. Aim To compare the age distribution of A(H1N1)pdm09 cases in 2018/19 to prior seasonal influenza epidemics in Canada. Methods The age distribution of unvaccinated influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases and test-negative controls were compared across A(H1N1)pdm09-dominant epidemics in 2018/19, 2015/16 and 2013/14 and with the general population of SPSN provinces. Similar comparisons were undertaken for influenza A(H3N2)-dominant epidemics. Results In 2018/19, more influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases were under 10 years old than controls (29% vs 16%; p < 0.001). In particular, children aged 5–9 years comprised 14% of cases, greater than their contribution to controls (4%) or the general population (5%) and at least twice their contribution in 2015/16 (7%; p < 0.001) or 2013/14 (5%; p < 0.001). Conversely, children aged 10–19 years (11% of the population) were under-represented among A(H1N1)pdm09 cases versus controls in 2018/19 (7% vs 12%; p < 0.001), 2015/16 (7% vs 13%; p < 0.001) and 2013/14 (9% vs 12%; p = 0.12). Conclusion Children under 10 years old contributed more to outpatient A(H1N1)pdm09 medical visits in 2018/19 than prior seasonal epidemics in Canada. In 2018/19, all children under 10 years old were born after the 2009 A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic and therefore lacked pandemic-induced immunity. In addition, more than half those born after 2009 now attend school (i.e. 5–9-year-olds), a socio-behavioural context that may enhance transmission and did not apply during prior A(H1N1)pdm09 epidemics.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Braunack-Mayer ◽  
Rebecca Tooher ◽  
Joanne E Collins ◽  
Jackie M Street ◽  
Helen Marshall

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Cauchemez ◽  
Maria D Van Kerkhove ◽  
Brett N Archer ◽  
Martin Cetron ◽  
Benjamin J Cowling ◽  
...  

PLoS ONE ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. e12658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hossein Khiabanian ◽  
Antony B. Holmes ◽  
Brendan J. Kelly ◽  
Mrinalini Gururaj ◽  
George Hripcsak ◽  
...  

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (S6) ◽  
Author(s):  
A Iten ◽  
N Vernaz ◽  
M Descombes ◽  
C Posfay Barbe ◽  
B Martinez De Tejeda Weber ◽  
...  

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S1) ◽  
pp. s124-s125
Author(s):  
M. Devnani ◽  
A.K. Gupta ◽  
S. Goel

India has witnessed many major infectious public health emergencies (PHE) during 21st century. They include outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 2002–03, avian flu in 2006, chikungunya in 2006–07, and the H1N1 pandemic in 2009. Periodic dengue and Japanese Encephalitis epidemics also are common. The premier institute of the country, PGIMER Chandigarh, always has received a huge inflow of patients from North India during such emergencies. These patients pose special challenges to hospital administration in terms of effective and efficient management of crisis situation, and require special measures. The authors' experience has shown that the major challenges faced are allocation of scares resources, capacity building, motivation of employees, infection control, and inter-sectoral coordination. The response during the initial phase is erratic due to a lack of clear guidelines and prior preparedness. Learning from these experiences, a contingency plan was prepared after consultation with all stakeholders. It was implemented during 2009 influenza pandemic. The contingency plan identifies: (1) area responsibilities; (2) disaster and screening areas for the handling of patients; (3) isolation and critical care facilities; (4) deployment of manpower; (5) allocation of drugs, consumables, equipment, and sterile supplies; (6) communication and reporting system; (7) awareness, education, and training; and (8) decision-making hierarchy and effective inter-sectoral collaboration. Also, a disaster plan has been prepared that includes standard operating procedures (SOPs) to be followed during infectious PHEs. A hospital infection control manual also has been prepared to address the issue of hospital acquired infections. The contingency plan and SOPs were effective during recent 2009 influenza pandemic in streamlining the response.ConclusionA well-documented contingency plan prepared in consultation with concerned stakeholders and implemented by a motivated and committed administration is essential in ensuring uninterrupted services during PHEs. It emphasizes that sound PHE plan is never an accident; it is always a result of high intentions, sincere efforts, intelligent direction, and skillful execution.


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