scholarly journals Geographic transmission hubs of the 2009 influenza pandemic in the United States

Epidemics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 86-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Kissler ◽  
Julia R. Gog ◽  
Cécile Viboud ◽  
Vivek Charu ◽  
Ottar N. Bjørnstad ◽  
...  
2011 ◽  
Vol 205 (3) ◽  
pp. 458-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Weinberger ◽  
Lone Simonsen ◽  
Richard Jordan ◽  
Claudia Steiner ◽  
Mark Miller ◽  
...  

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Chertow ◽  
Rongman Cai ◽  
Junfeng Sun ◽  
John Grantham ◽  
Jeffery K. Taubenberger ◽  
...  

Abstract Background.  Surveillance for respiratory diseases in domestic National Army and National Guard training camps began after the United States’ entry into World War I, 17 months before the “Spanish influenza” pandemic appeared. Methods.  Morbidity, mortality, and case-fatality data from 605 625 admissions and 18 258 deaths recorded for 7 diagnostic categories of respiratory diseases, including influenza and pneumonia, were examined over prepandemic and pandemic periods. Results.  High pandemic influenza mortality was primarily due to increased incidence of, but not increased severity of, secondary bacterial pneumonias. Conclusions.  Two prepandemic incidence peaks of probable influenza, in December 1917–January 1918 and in March–April 1918, differed markedly from the September–October 1918 pandemic onset peak in their clinical-epidemiologic features, and they may have been caused by seasonal or endemic viruses. Nevertheless, rising proportions of very low incidence postinfluenza bronchopneumonia (diagnosed at the time as influenza and bronchopneumonia) in early 1918 could have reflected circulation of the pandemic virus 5 months before it emerged in pandemic form. In this study, we discuss the possibility of detecting pandemic viruses before they emerge, by surveillance of special populations.


2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Sandro Cinti, MD ◽  
Gerald Blackburn, DO

The outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza in Asia raises serious concerns about an influenza pandemic of the kind seen in 1918. In addition, the recent federal response to Hurricane Katrina highlights the need for advanced local preparation for biological disasters. It is clear that there will not be enough vaccine early in an influenza pandemic. Without vaccine, the role of antivirals, especially oseltamivir (Tamiflu™), in treatment and prophylaxis becomes of paramount importance. It is unlikely that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) will be able to stockpile enough oseltamivir to protect every first responder in the United States. Thus, it is important that local governments and hospitals consider stockpiling oseltamivir for the treatment and/or prophylaxis of local first responders.


2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (suppl_1) ◽  
pp. S42-S51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Carias ◽  
Gabriel Rainisch ◽  
Manjunath Shankar ◽  
Bishwa B. Adhikari ◽  
David L. Swerdlow ◽  
...  

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (41) ◽  
Author(s):  
S Towers ◽  
Z Feng

We use data on confirmed cases of pandemic influenza A(H1N1), disseminated by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(US CDC), to fit the parameters of a seasonally forced Susceptible, Infective, Recovered (SIR) model. We use the resulting model to predict the course of the H1N1 influenza pandemic in autumn 2009, and we assess the efficacy of the planned CDC H1N1 vaccination campaign. The model predicts that there will be a significant wave in autumn, with 63% of the population being infected, and that this wave will peak so early that the planned CDC vaccination campaign will likely not have a large effect on the total number of people ultimately infected by the pandemic H1N1 influenza virus.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Eiermann ◽  
Elizabeth Wrigley-Field ◽  
James J. Feigenbaum ◽  
Jonas Helgertz ◽  
Elaine Hernandez ◽  
...  

The 1918 influenza pandemic stands out because of the unusual age pattern of high mortality. In the United States, another feature merits scientific scrutiny: against a historical backdrop of extreme racial health inequality, the pandemic produced strikingly small ratios of nonwhite to white influenza and pneumonia mortality. We provide the most complete account to date of these racial disparities in 1918, showing that, across U.S. cities, they were almost uniformly small. We examine four potential explanations for this unexpected result, including [1] socio-demographic factors like segregation, [2] city-level implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), [3] exposure to the milder spring 1918 “herald wave,” and [4] early-life exposures to other influenza strains resulting in differential immunological vulnerability to the 1918 flu. While we find little evidence for 1-3, we offer suggestive evidence that racial variation in early-life exposure to the 1889-1892 influenza pandemic shrunk racial disparities during the 1918 pandemic. We also raise the possibility that differential behavioral responses to the herald wave may have protected nonwhite urban populations. By providing a comprehensive description and careful examination of the potential drivers of racial inequality in mortality during the 1918 pandemic, our study provides a framework to consider interactions between the natural history of particular microbial agents and the social histories of the populations they infect.


2020 ◽  
pp. e1-e8
Author(s):  
Alfredo Morabia

Between November 20, 1918, and March 12, 1919, the US Public Health Service carried out a vast population-based survey to assess the incidence rate and mortality of the influenza pandemic among 146 203 persons in 18 localities across the United States. The survey attempted to retrospectively assess all self-reported or diagnosed cases of influenza since August 1, 1918. It indicated that the cumulative incidence of symptomatic influenza over 6 months had been 29.4% (range = 15% in Louisville, KY, to 53.3% in San Antonio, TX). The overall case fatality rate (CFR) was 1.70%, and it ranged from 0.78% in San Antonio to 3.14% in New London, Connecticut. Localities with high cumulative incidence were not necessarily those with high CFR. Overall, assuming the survey missed asymptomatic cases, between August 1, 1918, and February 21, 1919, maybe more than 50% of the population was infected, and about 1% of the infected died. Eight months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States has not yet launched a survey that would provide population-based estimates of incidence and CFRs analogous to those generated by the 1918 US Public Health Service house-to-house canvass survey of influenza. Published online ahead of print December 8, 2020: 1–8. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.306025 )


2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-36
Author(s):  
Diane M. T. North

The 1918–1920 influenza pandemic remains the deadliest influenza pandemic in recorded history. It started in the midst of World War I and killed an estimated 50–100 million people worldwide, many from complications of pneumonia. Approximately 500 million, or one-third of the world's population, became infected. In the United States, an estimated 850,000 died. The exceptionally contagious, unknown strain of influenza virus spread rapidly and attacked all ages, but it especially targeted young adults (ages twenty to forty-four). This essay examines the evolution of four waves of the 1918–1920 influenza pandemic, emphasizes the role of the U.S. Navy and sea travel as the initial transmitters of the virus in the United States, and focuses on California communities and military installations as a case study in the response to the crisis. Although the world war, limited medical science, and the unknown nature of the virus made it extremely difficult to fight the disease, the responses of national, state, and community leaders to the 1918–1920 influenza pandemic can provide useful lessons in 2020, as the onslaught of COVID-19 forces people worldwide to confront a terrible illness and death.


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