Option compensation, risky mortgage lending, and the financial crisis

2021 ◽  
pp. 102052
Author(s):  
Yongqiang Chu ◽  
Xinming Li ◽  
Tao Ma ◽  
Daxuan Zhao
2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Aikman ◽  
Jonathan Bridges ◽  
Anil Kashyap ◽  
Caspar Siegert

How well equipped are today’s macroprudential regimes to deal with a rerun of the factors that led to the global financial crisis? To address the factors that made the last crisis so severe, a macroprudential regulator would need to implement policies to tackle vulnerabilities from financial system leverage, fragile funding structures, and the build-up in household indebtedness. We specify and calibrate a package of policy interventions to address these vulnerabilities—policies that include implementing the countercyclical capital buffer, requiring that banks extend the maturity of their funding, and restricting mortgage lending at high loan-to-income multiples. We then assess how well placed are two prominent macroprudential regulators, set up since the crisis, to implement such a package. The US Financial Stability Oversight Council has not been designed to implement such measures and would therefore make little difference were we to experience a rerun of the factors that preceded the last crisis. A macroprudential regulator modeled on the UK’s Financial Policy Committee stands a better chance because it has many of the necessary powers. But it too would face challenges associated with spotting build-ups in risk with sufficient prescience, acting sufficiently aggressively, and maintaining political backing for its actions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 593-607
Author(s):  
L.S. Alexandrova ◽  
O.V. Zakharova ◽  
S.S. Matveevskii ◽  

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (155) ◽  
pp. i ◽  
Author(s):  
Jihad Dagher ◽  
Kazim Kazimov ◽  
◽  

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishnan Dandapani ◽  
Edward R. Lawrence ◽  
Fernando M. Patterson

Purpose The organizational form of financial institutions is related to their level of risk, leverage, liquidity and capitalization. High level of risk and leverage and lower levels of liquidity and capitalization are considered to be the root causes of the 2008 financial crisis. The purpose of this paper is to investigate if banks affiliated to holding company structure contributed more to the root causes of crisis than unaffiliated banks. Design/methodology/approach The paper isolates the effect of holding company association by restricting the sample to one-bank holding companies and individual banks. A comparative analysis of independent and holding company-affiliated banks is performed. Univariate analysis and multivariate regressions are used to compare the risk, leverage, liquidity and capitalization of affiliated and independent banks. Findings The paper finds that holding company affiliation is linked to several root causes of the 2008 financial crisis. Specifically, holding company affiliation results in higher levels of home mortgage loans underwritten and underperforming, higher leverage, lower liquidity and lower capitalization for the subsidiary bank. Practical implications The paper demonstrates that affiliated banks use their higher leveraged positions to engage in riskier home mortgage lending, sacrificing both liquidity and capital adequacy. These findings can help policy makers to focus on the group of banks that are part of holding company affiliation and implement such policies and regulations so as to avoid any re-occurrence of financial crisis. Originality/value This paper is the first to link the structural differences in banks to the root causes of financial crisis and to isolate the effect of holding company affiliation through sample selection. The paper will be valued to other researchers who try to isolate the effect of holding company affiliation and those studying the causes of the financial crisis of 2008.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Adelino ◽  
Antoinette Schoar ◽  
Felipe Severino

Ten years after the financial crisis of 2008, there is widespread agreement that the boom in mortgage lending and its subsequent reversal were at the core of the Great Recession. We survey the existing evidence, which suggests that inflated house-price expectations across the economy played a central role in driving both the demand for and the supply of mortgage credit before the crisis. The great misnomer of the 2008 crisis is that it was not a subprime crisis but rather a middle-class crisis. Inflated house-price expectations led households across all income groups, especially the middle class, to increase their demand for housing and mortgage leverage. Similarly, banks lent against increasing collateral values and underestimated the risk of defaults. We highlight how these emerging facts have essential implications for policy.


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