scholarly journals Skewed information transmission: The effect of complementarities in a multi-dimensional cheap talk game

2019 ◽  
Vol 161 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Stéphan Sémirat
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Cheap Talk

scholarly journals Cheap Talk and Editorial Control

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Newton
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Simple Models

AbstractThis paper analyzes simple models of editorial control. Starting from the framework developed by Krishna and Morgan (2001a), we analyze two-sender models of cheap talk where one or more of the senders has the power to veto messages before they reach the receiver. A characterization of the most informative equilibria of such models is given. It is shown that editorial control never aids communication and that for small biases in the senders’ preferences relative to those of the receiver, necessary and sufficient conditions for information transmission to be adversely affected are (i) that the senders have opposed preferences relative to the receiver and (ii) that both senders have powers of editorial control. It is shown that the addition of further senders beyond two weakly decreases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are anonymous, and weakly increases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are observed.

scholarly journals MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 145-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRÉDÉRIC KOESSLER ◽  
FRANÇOISE FORGES
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Strategic Information Transmission ◽  
Bounded Number

We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision maker. We state characterization results for the sets of equilibrium payoffs, with and without verifiable types. We then show that multistage, bilateral communication enables the players to achieve new equilibrium outcomes, even if types are verifiable. We also propose complete characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs that are achievable with a bounded number of communication rounds.

scholarly journals Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gülen Karakoç
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information Transmission ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Second Opinion ◽  
Choice Under Uncertainty ◽  
Multiple Experts

Abstract A decision maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision maker, which is their private information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share their private information with the decision maker and analyze the resulting effects on information transmission. I show that it may be optimal to consult a single expert rather than two experts if the decision maker is sufficiently concerned about taking advice from extremely biased experts. In contrast to what may be expected, this result suggests that getting a second opinion may not always be helpful for decision making.

Information Transmission under the Shadow of the Future: An Experiment

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alistair J. Wilson ◽  
Emanuel Vespa
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
The Future ◽  
Ongoing Relationship ◽  
Information Rent ◽  
The One

We experimentally examine how information transmission functions in an ongoing relationship. Where the one-shot cheap-talk literature documents substantial overcommunication and preferences for honesty, the outcomes in our repeated setting are more consistent with uninformative babbling outcomes. This is particularly surprising, as honest revelation is supportable as an equilibrium outcome in our repeated setting. We show that inefficient outcomes are driven by a coordination failure on how to distribute the gains from information sharing. However, when agents can coordinate on the payment of an “information rent,” honest revelation emerges. (JEL C92, D83)

Electoral Endorsements and Campaign Contributions

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Panova
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Electoral Campaign

Abstract This paper models information transmission in an electoral campaign. The voters have conflicting policy interests, but they are congruent in their desire to elect a competent politician. They hold private information about the candidates for office, and they use endorsements and campaign contributions to signal their information, so as to advertise their most preferred candidates. Endorsements are cheap talk, but campaign contributions are costly, hence, contributions are stronger signals than endorsements. Therefore, contributions help to transmit information when voter interests are relatively divergent (however, not so much that campaigning is useless).

scholarly journals Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Esra E. Bayindir ◽  
Mehmet Y. Gurdal ◽  
Ayca Ozdogan ◽  
Ismail Saglam
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Information Transmission ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
The Third ◽  
Logistic Regressions ◽  
Cheap Talk Games ◽  
The One ◽  
High Payoff

This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first, sequential in the second and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. However, as to the excessive trust of the receiver, our results are not distinguished from those in the one-sender model. Regarding the Choice Game, our logistic regressions on experimental results suggest that the receiver is more likely to select simultaneous play if the previous play was simultaneous and the receiver earned the high payoff and much more likely to select simultaneous play if the messages were nonconflicting.

scholarly journals Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 1203-1235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Meyer ◽  
Inés Moreno de Barreda ◽  
Julia Nafziger
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Geometric Condition ◽  
Policy Space ◽  
Policy Rule ◽  
Small Deviations ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Fully Revealing Equilibrium ◽  
Full Revelation

This paper studies information transmission in a two‐sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver, and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium that fully reveals the state, there exists a robust fully revealing equilibrium (FRE), i.e., one in which small deviations result in only small punishments. We provide a geometric condition—the local deterrence condition—that relates the cones of the biases to the frontier of the policy space, which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a FRE. We also construct a specific policy rule for the receiver—the min rule—that supports a robust FRE whenever one exists.

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