From the Great Depression to the Great Inflation: Path dependence and monetary policy

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 (5) ◽  
pp. 375-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark V. Siegler ◽  
Kristin A. Van Gaasbeck
2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julio J Rotemberg

This paper considers some of the large changes in the Federal Reserve's approach to monetary policy. It shows that, in some important cases, critics who were successful in arguing that past Fed approaches were responsible for mistakes that caused harm succeeded in making the Fed averse to these approaches. This can explain why the Fed stopped basing monetary policy on the quality of new bank loans, why it stopped being willing to cause recessions to deal with inflation, and why it was temporarily unwilling to maintain stable interest rates in the period 1979–1982. It can also contribute to explaining why monetary policy was tight during the Great Depression. The paper shows that the evolution of policy was much more gradual and flexible after the Volcker disinflation, when the Fed was not generally deemed to have made an error.


2000 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Stauffer

This paper explains how the shift of deposits from nonmember banks and country banks to larger member banks increased the average or “effective” reserve requirement in the 1929–1936 period. The result was an inappropriate tightening of monetary conditions, along with liquidity problems for those banks most susceptible to failure. A basic money multiplier model is developed to help clarify the possible impact of increases in effective reserve requirements. The resulting perspective strengthens the usual charges against the Federal Reserve of monetary policy malfeasance during the Great Depression.


Author(s):  
John Kenneth Galbraith ◽  
James K. Galbraith

This chapter examines the lessons of World War II with respect to money and monetary policy. World War I exposed the fragility of the monetary structure that had gold as its foundation, the great boom of the 1920s showed how futile monetary policy was as an instrument of restraint, and the Great Depression highlighted the ineffectuality of monetary policy for rescuing the country from a slump—for breaking out of the underemployment equilibrium once this had been fully and firmly established. On the part of John Maynard Keynes, the lesson was that only fiscal policy ensured not just that money was available to be borrowed but that it would be borrowed and would be spent. The chapter considers the experiences of Britain, Germany, and the United States with a lesson of World War II: that general measures for restraining demand do not prevent inflation in an economy that is operating at or near capacity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (7) ◽  
pp. 1727-1749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Damette ◽  
Antoine Parent

The October 1929 crash led to a complete freeze of New York open markets. Studying the Fed monetary policy conduct in a nonlinear framework, using credit spreads between open market rates and the Fed's instrument rates as a proxy for liquidity risk, we present econometric evidence that the Fed was well aware of such risks as early as 1930, reacted to the financial stress and altered its monetary policy in consequence. Our outcomes revisit conventional wisdom about the presumed passivity of the Fed throughout the 30s.


2010 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 871-897 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Eichengreen ◽  
Douglas A. Irwin

The Great Depression was marked by a severe outbreak of protectionist trade policies. But contrary to the presumption that all countries scrambled to raise trade barriers, there was substantial cross-country variation in the movement to protectionism. Specifically, countries that remained on the gold standard resorted to tariffs, import quotas, and exchange controls to a greater extent than countries that went off gold. Just as the gold standard constraint on monetary policy is critical to understanding macroeconomic developments in this period, exchange rate policies help explain changes in trade policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 176-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Wendy Carlin

We make the case for a shift in what students learn in a first economics course, taking as our exemplar Paul Samuelson’s paradigm-setting 1948 text. In the shadow of the Great Depression, Samuelson made Keynesian economics an essential component of what every economics student should know. By contrast, leading textbooks today were written in the glow of the Great Moderation and the tamed cyclical fluctuations in the two decades prior to 2007. Here, using topic modeling, we document Samuelson’s novelty and the evolution of the content of introductory textbooks since, and we put forward three propositions. First, as was the case in the aftermath of the Great Depression, new problems now challenge the content of our introductory courses; these include mounting inequalities, climate change, concerns about the future of work, and financial instability. Second, the tools required to address these problems, including strategic interaction, limited information, principal–agent models, new behavioral foundations, and dynamic processes including instability and path dependence, are available (indeed widely taught in PhD programs). And third, as we will illustrate by reference to a new open access introductory text, a course integrating these tools into a new benchmark model can be accessible, engaging, coherent and, as a result, successfully taught to first-year students. Deployed to address the new problems, following Samuelson’s example, the new benchmark provides the basis for integrating not only micro- and macroeconomics but also the analysis of both market failures and the limits of government interventions. ( JEL A22, D00, E00).


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