Omission bias in children’s and adults’ moral judgments of lies

Action and Inaction in Moral Judgments and Decisions: Meta-Analysis of Omission Bias Omission-Commission Asymmetries

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin ◽

10.1177/01461672211042315 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 014616722110423

Author(s):

Siu Kit Yeung ◽

Tijen Yay ◽

Gilad Feldman

Keyword(s):

Confidence Interval ◽

Low Power ◽

Publication Bias ◽

Study Design ◽

Meta Analysis ◽

Real Life ◽

Small Sample ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Omission Bias ◽

Outcome Type

Omission bias is people’s tendency to evaluate harm done through omission as less morally wrong and less blameworthy than commission when there is harm. However, findings are inconsistent. We conducted a preregistered meta-analysis, with 21 samples (13 articles, 49 effects) on omission-commission asymmetries in judgments and decisions. We found an overall effect of g = 0.45, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.14, 0.77], with stronger effects for morality and blame than for decisions. Publication bias tests produced mixed results with some indication for publication bias, though effects persisted even after most publication bias adjustments. The small sample of studies included limited our ability to draw definite conclusions regarding moderators, with inconclusive findings when applying different models. After compensating for low power, we found indication for moderation by role responsibility, perspective (self vs. others), outcome type, and study design. We hope this meta-analysis will inspire research on this phenomenon and applications to real-life, especially given the raging pandemic. Materials, data, and code are available on https://osf.io/9fcqm/ .

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Small-scale utilitarianism: High acceptance of utilitarian solutions to Trolley Problems among a horticultural population in Nicaragua

PLoS ONE ◽

10.1371/journal.pone.0249345 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 16 (4) ◽

pp. e0249345

Author(s):

Jeffrey Winking ◽

Jeremy Koster

Keyword(s):

Direct Action ◽

Moral Dilemmas ◽

Cross Cultural ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Small Scale ◽

Trolley Problem ◽

Cultural Research ◽

Harm To Others ◽

Omission Bias ◽

Trolley Problems

Researchers often use moral dilemmas to investigate the specific factors that influence participants’ judgments of the appropriateness of different actions. A common construction of such a dilemma is the Trolley Problem, which pits an obvious utilitarian solution against a common deontological dictum to not do harm to others. Cross-cultural studies have validated the robustness of numerous contextual biases, such as judging utilitarian decisions more negatively if they require contact with other individuals (contact bias), they force others to serve as a means to an end (means bias), and if they require direct action rather than inaction (omission bias). However, such cross-cultural research is largely limited to studies of industrialized, nation-state populations. Previous research has suggested that the more intimate community relationships that characterize small-scale populations might lead to important differences, such as an absence of an omission bias. Here we contribute to this literature by investigating perceptions of Trolley Problem solutions among a Mayangna/Miskito community, a small-scale indigenous population in Nicaragua. Compared to previously sampled populations, the Mayangna/Miskito participants report higher levels of acceptance of utilitarian solutions and do not exhibit an omission bias. We also examine the justifications participants offered to explore how Mayangna/Miskito culture might influence moral judgments.

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Judicial Decision-Making

Behavioral Law and Economics ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190901349.003.0016 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Eyal Zamir ◽

Doron Teichman

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Hindsight Bias ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Contrast Effects ◽

Judicial Decision ◽

Judicial Decision Making ◽

Inadmissible Evidence ◽

The Rich ◽

Omission Bias ◽

The Impact

This chapter discusses the rich behavioral research on judicial decision-making. It opens with general theories of the cognitive process of judicial decision-making, focusing on the story model and coherence-based reasoning. It examines how various heuristics and biases—such as the compromise and contrast effects, hindsight bias, omission bias, and anchoring—are reflected in judicial decision-making. Special attention is given to the limited ability of fact-finders to disregard inadmissible evidence, the interactions between race and judicial decision-making, the role of non-consequentialist moral judgments in judicial decision-making, and the impact of the choice between rules and standards on the predictability of judgments. Finally, the chapter discusses two fundamental questions in the behavioral analysis of judicial decision-making: group decision-making, and decision-making by judges (as opposed to laypersons).

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Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18002613 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 42 ◽

Author(s):

Justin F. Landy

Keyword(s):

Moral Knowledge ◽

Moral Judgments

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

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Neuroscience and Ethics

Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie) ◽

10.1027/1618-3169/a000352 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 64 (2) ◽

pp. 82-92 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

S. Matthew Liao

Keyword(s):

Empirical Evidence ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Empirical Results ◽

Joshua Greene

Abstract. A number of people believe that results from neuroscience have the potential to settle seemingly intractable debates concerning the nature, practice, and reliability of moral judgments. In particular, Joshua Greene has argued that evidence from neuroscience can be used to advance the long-standing debate between consequentialism and deontology. This paper first argues that charitably interpreted, Greene’s neuroscientific evidence can contribute to substantive ethical discussions by being part of an epistemic debunking argument. It then argues that taken as an epistemic debunking argument, Greene’s argument falls short in undermining deontological judgments. Lastly, it proposes that accepting Greene’s methodology at face value, neuroimaging results may in fact call into question the reliability of consequentialist judgments. The upshot is that Greene’s empirical results do not undermine deontology and that Greene’s project points toward a way by which empirical evidence such as neuroscientific evidence can play a role in normative debates.

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Why People With High Alexithymia Make More Utilitarian Judgments

Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie) ◽

10.1027/1618-3169/a000474 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 67 (1) ◽

pp. 23-30

Author(s):

Xiangyi Zhang ◽

Zhihui Wu ◽

Shenglan Li ◽

Ji Lai ◽

Meng Han ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Empathic Concern ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Affective Processing ◽

Process Dissociation ◽

The Difference

Abstract. Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.

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