Alignment between chain quality management and chain governance in EU pork supply chains: A Transaction-Cost-Economics perspective

Meat Science ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Wever ◽  
Nel Wognum ◽  
Jacques Trienekens ◽  
Onno Omta
Keyword(s):  
Quality Management ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics

Managing transaction risks in interdependent supply chains: an extended transaction cost economics perspective

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Wever ◽  
Nel Wognum ◽  
Jacques Trienekens ◽  
Onno Omta
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Risk Minimization ◽  
Risk Management Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain Orientation

The present study examines the management of transaction risks in supply chains. Risk management studies often ignore the wider supply chain context in which individual transactions take place. However, risk management strategies which are suitable to use when only a single transaction is considered may be inappropriate when other transactions in the supply chain are taken into account. This study addresses this issue by examining: (1) how risks arise as a result of interdependencies between the various transactions making up the supply chain; and (2) what types of contractual-based strategies actors can use to manage their risk exposure. To realize these aims, the study applies an extended Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework with a supply chain orientation. The framework illustrates how different types of interdependencies - pooled, sequential and reciprocal - expose companies to different sources of risk. Three strategies companies can use when facing barriers to risk minimization in sequentially interdependent supply chains are analyzed: risk transferring, risk altering and risk sharing. Examples from the agri-food sector are discussed to demonstrate the functioning of these strategies.

E-Lance Enabled Network Exchanges within Supply Chains

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Robert E. Hooker ◽  
Carmen C. Lewis ◽  
Molly M. Wasko ◽  
James L. Worrell ◽  
Tom Yoon
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Network Governance ◽  
Global Supply Chains ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Social Controls

E-business based e-lance networks can impact the coordination and completion of work within organizations and improve efficiencies in global supply chains. This may be particularly true for organizations mitigating sudden demand spikes, or lacking internal expertise and bandwidth. However, little is known about what governance and social control mechanisms impact network success. Utilizing data from 14,644 projects, this research tests a theory of network governance specific to this new emerging e-lance economy by integrating transaction cost economics with the concepts of social controls. For transaction costs, findings indicate that higher average project values lead to more projects and more money being exchanged, but more bids leads to less monetary exchange. For social controls, restricting access by sealing bids and not disclosing budget amounts leads to less bidding, but not disclosing budgets is associated with more projects being posted. The authors further find that the best predictor of e-lance success across all measures is the number of projects posted in the prior time period.

From transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the frictional paradigm

2020 ◽  
pp. 51-81
Author(s):  
D. P. Frolov
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Cost Minimization ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Transactional Analysis ◽  
Transaction Sector ◽  
Transaction Value

The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.

Governance of supplier-customer relations: An empirical review

2007 ◽  
Vol 158 (12) ◽  
pp. 406-416
Author(s):  
Jon Bingen Sande
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Customer Relations ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Forest Industry ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Relational Exchange ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Relational Exchange Theory

The forest industry is riddled with exchange relationships. The parties to exchanges may have diverging goals and interests, but still depend upon each other due to non-redeployable specific assets. Formal and relational contracts may be used to deal with the resulting cooperation problems. This paper proposes a framework based on transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory, and examines to what extent empirical research has found formal and relational contracts to deal with three different governance problems. To that end, I review the results from 32 studies in a range of settings. These studies generally support the view that exchanges characterized by high degrees of specific assets should be supported by formal and relational contracts.

Ronald Coase and the Difference between Markets and Firms

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham A. Singer
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Tabular Form ◽  
Specific Investment ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Marginal Revolution ◽  
The Way

This chapter reviews the development of transaction cost economics and unpacks its theory of the firm. The chapter begins with the marginal revolution in economics and how it altered the way economists understood the corporation. It then reviews the work of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, explaining how they provided a novel account of firms. Transaction cost economics emphasizes how firms use hierarchy and bureaucracy to overcome problems of opportunism and asset-specific investment to coordinate some types of economic activity more efficiently than markets can. The transaction cost account of the corporation’s productivity component is shown in tabular form in comparison with its historical forerunners reviewed in the previous chapter.

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