Economic Organization and Economic Knowledge, and Contingency, Complexity and the Theory of the Firm: Essays in Honour of Brian J. Loasby, Vols I and II.

2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-125
Author(s):  
Tim Wakeley
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Economic Knowledge

scholarly journals The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver E Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Organization Theory ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Choice Approach

The propositions that organization matters and that it is susceptible to analysis were long greeted by skepticism by economists. One reason why this message took a long time to register is that it is much easier to say that organization matters than it is to show how and why. The prevalence of the science of choice approach to economics has also been an obstacle. As developed herein, the lessons of organization theory for economics are both different and more consequential when examined through the lens of contract. This paper examines economic organization from a science of contract perspective, with special emphasis on the theory of the firm.

Firms versus corporations: a rebuttal of Simon Deakin, David Gindis, and Geoffrey M. Hodgson

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Robé
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Legal Institution ◽  
Large Firms ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Specific Concept ◽  
And Control

Abstract I share the view expressed by Simon Deakin, David Gindis, and Geoffrey Hodgson (‘DGH’) that social scientists need to consider the constitutive role of law in their disciplines. This is particularly the case for economists working on the theory of the firm and on institutions more generally. Their analyses are often built on assumptions about the legal system which do not correspond to reality. One major issue is the generalized confusion between the concepts of ‘corporation’ and ‘firm’. In day-to-day parlance, the two words are synonyms. But, when the constitutive role of law is considered, the word corporation corresponds to a specific legal device which should be clearly differentiated from a less-specific concept which can be called a ‘firm’ or an ‘enterprise’. The notion of firm usually corresponds to the economic organization of various resources via contracts to produce goods or services. The corporation is a legal institution with peculiar characteristics, including a potentially eternal legal personality, an asset partitioning effect, and several layers of separations of ownership and control. Corporations are often used to legally structure large firms because they are very efficient legal devices to concentrate capital. But, firms are practically and conceptually different from the corporation(s) used to structure them. DGH consider that the understanding of what a firm is should not go against general, day-to-day understanding. In their view, although not all firms are corporations, all corporations are firms. I disagree. Only by clearly explaining that corporations are not firms can lawyers help social scientists consider the constitutive role of the law of corporations in the structuring of our present-day economy.

Economic Organization: Towards Theoretical Synthesis

2006 ◽  
pp. 99-115
Author(s):  
P. Luksha ◽  
M. Belousenko
Keyword(s):  
Social Interactions ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Specific Productivity ◽  
Synthetic Approach ◽  
Synthetic Theory ◽  
Specific Knowledge ◽  
Theoretical Synthesis ◽  
Constructive Criticism

Constructive criticism of new institutional and resource-based approaches in the theory of the firm is conducted in the article, allowing to outline elements of the synthetic approach to the studies of economic organization. In the course of market replacement by the firm, novel and unique qualities arise, organization-specific knowledge and particular system of social relationships in the first turn. Necessary elements of the synthetic theory should include the analysis of specific productivity, specific social interactions within the firm, and organization-specific knowledge.

Intelligent firm as a new kind of economic organization

2021 ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Oleg Suharev
Keyword(s):  
Management Practices ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Daily Basis ◽  
Institutional Innovation ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Knowledge Intensive ◽  
A Company ◽  
Main Attribute ◽  
Made In

The article spotlights the features of the intellectual firm, which determine both a change in theoretical concepts of the classical theory of the firm, and changes in management practices. Though the classical firm possesses intelligence, it may not be considered as an intellectual firm, the main attribute of which is the ability to generate intelligence, and not just use it. The author shows the contingency in the development of the theory of the intellectual firm and examines the intellectual firm itself as an institutional innovation. He also identifies various modes of change in intelligence and knowledge that affect the possibility of describing a company from the standpoint of knowledge production and accumulation of intelligence. The ideas about the intelligence of the firm and the prospects of the theory of the intellectual firm, arising from the theory of the knowledge-intensive firm, are clarified. The future of the development of the theory of the intellectual firm is seen in linking the work of intelligence with alternative options for choosing decisions, tactical and strategic in nature, made in the firm on a daily basis.

The “Alternative” Theories of Knight and Coase, and the Modern Theory of the Firm

1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolai J. Foss
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Fiftieth Anniversary ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Modern Theory ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Risk Uncertainty ◽  
Alternative Theories

In his contribution to the 1987 conference that celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of Ronald Coase's “The Nature of the Firm” (1937), Harold Demsetz noted that from the birth of modern economics to 1970, “only two works seem to have been written about the theory of the firm that have altered the perspectives of the profession: Knight's Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921) and Coase's ‘The Nature of the Firm’” (Demsetz 1993, in Williamson and Winter 1993, p. 159). It is easy to feel uncomfortable with this observation. First, Coase's article was ignored for decades. Second, Knight's book did not receive much attention because of its theory of economic organization, but because of its statement of the theory of perfect competition (Stigler 1957; Machovec 1995), its distinction between risk and uncertainty, and its theory of profits (see, e.g., Boulding 1942 and Papandreou 1952).'

scholarly journals Praxeology and the firm: a contribution to the Austrian redefinition of the economic organization problem

2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (169) ◽  
pp. 143-165
Author(s):  
Ivan Jankovic
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Austrian School ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Transaction Cost Theory ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Dominant Component ◽  
Organization Problem ◽  
Uncertainty Information

The aim of this paper is to syntetize theory of entrepreneurship of the Austrian School of economics with the contractual theory of the firm. Transaction cost theory of Ronald Coase and his followers holds that the firm is the organization with dominant component of ordering, while market is defined by competition and rivalry. But, market also includes interdependency and cooperation, such as in the case of cartel. Therefore non-competitive forms of economic coordination are not specificity for the firm, and can be observed in the open market as well. Agency theory rejects the notion of the firm as a hierarchy, and it is based on completeness of knowledge and contract. Theory of entrepreneurship and monetary calculation of Austrian School enables us to integrate contractual theory into the theoretical setting characterized by uncertainty, information asymmetry and positive transaction costs.

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