scholarly journals Judicial Independence at International Courts and Tribunals

2021 ◽  
pp. 51-88
Author(s):  
Rishi Gulati
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Independence ◽  
International Courts

scholarly journals Independence and Impartiality in The Judicial Trilemma

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 344-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Keller ◽  
Severin Meier
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Holistic View ◽  
International Courts ◽  
The Past ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Transparency And Accountability ◽  
Judicial Systems

Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack's article is an important and very welcome contribution to the discussion about judicial values. The authors argue that with respect to judicial independence, transparency, and accountability “judicial systems face inherent trade-offs, such that any given court can maximize two, but not all three, of these features.” In our eyes, the article's most important contribution is its holistic view: it shows why these three judicial values can only be understood in their interconnectedness. It is, for instance, not meaningful to make a statement about the correlation between transparency and independence without also taking accountability into the equation. This is because the effect of transparency on independence can only be understood if information about judicial accountability is at one's disposal. In the past, these judicial values have often been analyzed in an isolated manner, thereby leading to wrong conclusions. The Judicial Trilemma will hopefully help in shifting the discourse from isolated to holistic views on independence, transparency, and accountability. Moreover, Dunoff and Pollack lay the groundwork for a meaningful normative discussion of these three judicial values. Any debate about how to structure (international) courts should henceforth take Dunoff and Pollack's holistic view as a basis for discussion.

scholarly journals From judicial independence to interdependence in the international sphere

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 462-483
Author(s):  
Aida Torres Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Undue Influence ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Optimal Degree

The goal of this article is to develop an analytical framework for the conceptualization of international judicial independence. First, it will be argued that judicial independence is not to be conceived as an end in itself but rather as a condition for the legitimacy of international courts (ICs). Also, independence is not a monolithic concept, but one of degree and the optimal degree of independence might vary according to the function and type of ICs. Second, I will provide a taxonomy of judicial independence in the international sphere and identify and systematize the relevant actors and variables. While studies about international judicial independence tend to focus on the mechanisms available to state governments, this work will take into account a broader set of actors and variables. Finally, a notion of interdependence will be advanced as a framework for institutional design that combines the need to enable adjudication free from undue influence or pressure with mechanisms to counterbalance judicial power. Forms of interdependence on the grounds of the principles of accountability and checks and balances might contribute to the overall legitimacy of ICs.

Inside and Outside the EFTA Court: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the EFTA Court Through its Structures

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-93
Author(s):  
Thorbjörn Björnsson
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
System Approach ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Qualitative Assessment ◽  
Rational System ◽  
International Courts ◽  
International Adjudication ◽  
Public Organisations

The article attempts to examine the structures of the EFTA Court in order to gain insights into its effectiveness. For this purpose the article relies on a rational system approach developed within social sciences to improve understanding the performance of public organisations and calibrated to examine international courts by the ERC Project Researching Conditions for Effective International Adjudication. Under the conceptual and analytical framework advanced by the Effectiveness Project the article, therefore, examines the main structures of the EFTA Court: for example, the Court's budget, jurisdictional rules, judicial independence and main legal doctrines. The article will also, in relation to some aspects, attempt to conduct a qualitative assessment of how some of these features relate to the effectiveness of the Court.

The Judicial Trilemma

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L. Dunoff ◽  
Mark A. Pollack
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
International Court ◽  
The World

AbstractInternational tribunals confront a “Judicial Trilemma.” More specifically the states that design, and the judges that serve on, international courts face an interlocking series of tradeoffs among three core values: (1) judicial independence, the freedom of judges to decide cases on the facts and the law; (2) judicial accountability, structural checks on judicial authority found most prominently in international courts in reappointment and reelection processes; and (3) judicial transparency, mechanisms that permit the identification of individual judicial positions (such as through individual opinions and dissents). The Trilemma is that it is possible to maximize, at most, two of these three values. Drawing on interviews with current and former judges at leading international courts, this article unpacks the logic underlying the Judicial Trilemma, and traces the varied ways in which this logic manifests itself in the design and operation of the International Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights, Court of Justice of the European Union, and the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body. The Judicial Trilemma does not identify an “ideal” court design. Rather it provides a framework that enables international actors to understand the inevitable tradeoffs that international courts confront, and thereby helps to ensure that these tradeoffs are made deliberately and with a richer appreciation of their implications.

Reappointment to International Courts and the Case of the EFTA Court

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-149
Author(s):  
Allan F. Tatham
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Detailed Case

Abstract The independence of judges sitting on international courts is constrained in part by their accountability to the states that appoint them. The interaction between these two principles is particularly stark where judges are able to have their terms of office on the bench renewed, subject to the agreement of states to re-nominate and reappoint them. The present article seeks to examine this interaction, initially in the context more generally of international judicial decision-making bodies, while also considering options designed to reduce the likelihood of the reoccurrence of problems with respect to reappointments. It then provides a more detailed case study of the Norwegian reappointment saga at the EFTA Court and suggests possible ways forward designed to enhance judicial independence in this procedure.

scholarly journals The Motivations of Individual Judges and How They Act as a Group

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 2165-2188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shai Dothan
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Significant Influence ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Judicial Behavior ◽  
Judicial Selection ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Practical Possibility ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractStates have a significant influence on the selection of judges to international courts. This raises the concern that judges will be biased in favor of their home states, a concern backed by some empirical research. To counter that danger, international courts usually sit in large and diverse panels. Scholars have argued that this gives judges only rare occasions to tip the balance in favor of their home states. The problem begins, however, when judges start forming coalitions among themselves, giving judges with national biases a practical possibility to change the result of cases. To assess the magnitude of this threat to judicial independence, the paper draws on decades of scholarship in the field of judicial behavior. By understanding how judges behave, scholars can come closer to deciphering the true impact of judicial selection to international courts on international judgments.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document