scholarly journals Sociality, Socialities and Sociality as a Causal Force

2017 ◽  
pp. 124-140
Author(s):  
Michael Carrithers
Keyword(s):  
2001 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-174
Author(s):  
Edmund Leach

I must start with a personal disavowal. This essay employs an explicitly Lévi-Straussian procedure but it is not intended as a guide to wider aspects of Lévi-Strauss thought. Although I feel reasonably safe with Lévi-Strauss's concept of structure, I am quite out of my depth when it comes to the related but subtler notion of esprit. Lévi-Strauss's esprit appears in sundry guises. In 1952, originally in English, he/it was a personalized “human mind”, an uninvited guest who took his place around the conference table among a group of American linguists and anthropologists (I); in the earlier chapters of La pensée sauvage he is perhaps the bricoleur—handiman—who is busy contriving culture from the junk of history and anything else that comes to hand (2); at the conclusion of Le cru et le cuit (3), in more abstract and more serious vein, esprit seems to be a kind of limiting characteristic of the human brain mechanism and appears as part of an extremely involved interchange relationship in which it (esprit) is the causal force producing myths of which its own structure is a precipitate. Elsewhere again (4) esprit seems to correspond to that very mysterious something which is a mediator between “praxis et pratiques” and which is described as « le schème conceptuel par l'opération duquel une matière et une forme, dépourvues l'une et l'autre d'existence indépendante, s'accomplissent comme structures, c'est-à-dire comme êtres à la fois empiriques et intelligibles ».


Author(s):  
Derek Partridge

The decade from 1844 to 1854 in which Charles Darwin first published two books and then studied barnacles for the final eight years has long been a puzzling digression from the development of his theory of evolution. This essay proposes that it was a conjunction of two quite different activities: a three-year pause initiated to assess and hopefully finalize the editorial completion of his 1844 Essay for publication, followed by a step-change decision to redirect his primary research activity in late 1847. A disenchantment hypothesis is proposed; it presents the step-change decision as a consequence of weighing up the accumulated unencouraging prospects for species-theory development in competition with the emergence of promising projections associated with a broad study of marine invertebrates. Recognition of the triumph, as Darwin initially saw it, of his Essay, followed by years of hostile inputs, opens this new route to understanding this decade. Within it Joseph Hooker emerges as a significant causal force. Many of the customary ‘postponement’ explanations of this digression can be integrated with this pause-and-step-change explanation, whereas explanation of the interval as a gap due to a pre-planned activity cannot, and is revealed to be seriously faulty.


1966 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edmund Leach

I must start with a personal disavowal. This essay employs an explicitly Lévi-Straussian procedure but it is not intended as a guide to wider aspects of Lévi-Strauss thought. Although I feel reasonably safe with Lévi-Strauss's concept of structure, I am quite out of my depth when it comes to the related but subtler notion of esprit. Lévi-Strauss's esprit appears in sundry guises. In 1952, originally in English, he/it was a personalized “human mind”, an uninvited guest who took his place around the conference table among a group of American linguists and anthropologists (1); in the earlier chapters of La pensée sauvage he is perhaps the bricoleur—handiman—who is busy contriving culture from the junk of history and anything else that comes to hand (2); at the conclusion of Le cru et le cuit (3), in more abstract and more serious vein, esprit seems to be a kind of limiting characteristic of the human brain mechanism and appears as part of an extremely involved interchange relationship in which it (esprit) is the causal force producing myths of which its own structure is a precipitate. Elsewhere again (4) esprit seems to correspond to that very mysterious something which is a mediator between “praxis et pratiques” and which is described as « le schème conceptuel par l'opération duquel une matière et une forme, dépourvues l'une et l'autre d'existence indépendante, s'accomplissent comme structures, c'est-à-dire comme êtres à la fois empiriques et intelligibles ».


Elenchos ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-98
Author(s):  
Michele Alessandrelli

AbstractTwo literal quotations from Chrysippus’ On Possibles, preserved in Plutarch’s On the Contradictions of the Stoics, seem to contradict the Stoic thesis of the isotropy of the void. According to this thesis the void is an infinite undifferentiated expanse (a wide continuous area) whose center is marked by, and coincides with, the position of the world. Since there is nothing else outside the world, the cohesive force that pervades it is sufficient on its own to guarantee the quasi–indestructibility of the trans–cyclical διακόσμησις (i.e the fact that in the new cosmic cycle the διακόσμησις returns in a form identical to the one it had in the previous cosmic cycle) and the eternity of the οὐσία. Conversely, in these two quotations Chrysippus maintains that there is a central διαφορά equipped with causal force. This seems to imply the anisotropy of the void. Chrysippus’s view here is also at odds with another official Stoic thesis, i.e. that the incorporeal is causally inert. In this paper it will be argued that there is in fact no contradiction, because, in those two quotations, Chrysippus consciously develops a cosmological hypothesis in order to resolve a difficulty concerning the role of fire during the universal conflagration. Chrysippus’ solution to this difficulty belongs to modal logic and consists in distinguishing between the actual universe and the possible ones.


2019 ◽  
pp. 181-229
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Friedman

The premier technocrats of our age, neoclassical economists, are poorly equipped to balance homogenizing forces against heterogeneous ideas, as economists altogether ignore agents’ ideas. They do so by attributing to agents the automatic ability to act optimally, effacing the agents’ need to interpret their circumstances and thus the possibility that the ideas on which their interpretations are based will be mistaken. An error-free agent—meaning, for practical purposes, one whose interpretation of her circumstances matches that of the economist—is an agent whose actions the economist can conveniently predict. Similarly, attempts by economists of information and behavioral economists to render economics more realistic overlook ideational heterogeneity and the fact that ideas must form interpretations before they can guide actions. Thus, the agent depicted by these types of economist remains predictable despite the information asymmetries and putative irrationality identified in these literature. Even the recent shift toward empiricism in economics relies on an undertheorized positivism that, again, ignores the causal force of ideational heterogeneity. Nontechnocratic research in social psychology, however, suggests that the neglect of people’s ideas is not unique to economists, posing a wider cultural problem for technocracy—but also the hope that ideational changes might lead to a judicious form of technocratic governance.


Apeiron ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 302-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brooke Holmes

Abstract The difference between ancient Greek medicine and ancient Greek philosophy has often been seen by scholars in terms of two targets of expertise: the body and the soul. In this paper, I argue that we can better understand the boundaries between medicine and philosophy in antiquity by focusing instead on the difference between causes and motivations (or causes and desires). The reason is this. It is not the case that the writers of the Hippocratic Corpus are uninterested in the soul (psychē). They are, however, reluctant to address their therapies to expressions of the patient’s own agency, despite tacitly acknowledging such agency as a causal force that cannot be reduced to the automatic behavior of the body. I go on to show how thinkers like Plato and Democritus zero in on the problem of perverted desires as part of a strategy of establishing a new domain of therapy, a domain that comes to be classified as the therapy of the soul.


Kant-Studien ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-238
Author(s):  
Rachel Siow Robertson

Abstract In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant claims that perception of force through touch is fundamental to our knowledge of substance in space. However, he also holds that perception cannot have modal content. Causation is a modal notion, so how can Kant allow perception of causal force? In response to this puzzle, I provide a new reading of Kant’s theory of touch. Touch does not involve perception of the necessity of a cause, but it does involve awareness of the activity of our body in relation to other bodies. Human embodied activity has a hitherto unrecognized central role in Kant’s accounts of empirical cognition of substance in space, the science of such a substance, and the irreducibility of its causal forces.


2008 ◽  
Vol 67 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 545-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Pryor
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 98 (5) ◽  
pp. 683-701 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Faro ◽  
Ann L. McGill ◽  
Reid Hastie

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