scholarly journals Some Implications of the Agency-Cost Theory of the Nonprofit Firm

Author(s):  
Benjamin Moses Leff
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Teguh Prasetyo

This research aims to test of agency theory in Indonesian Stock Exchange as proxy variables within agency conflict mechanism for firm performance. It is used secondary data from Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) and OSIRIS include all industry manufacture, exclude insurance and finace service sector. It's appropriate sampling criteria's and listing in Indonesian Stock Exchange. Then, using pooled data with observation period 2004th round to 2010th. Variables used in this study is the first Asset Utility as agency cost as dependent variabel. The second variabels is dividen, leverage, institutional ownership as mechanism variables to agency conflict as independent variable. Then, the control variable used firm size. The method of analysis used in this study is multiple regression of pooled data analysis. The results of this study is a positive effect dividend to company's performace of the first. Then, the second is a positive impact leverage to company's performace. The last is a positive impact institutional ownership to company's performace. With the result that, mechanism varibles of agency conflict has been play function of binding and oversight of agency conflict.


Author(s):  
Raudhatul Hidayah

The main purpose of the research was to know partially the influence of institutional ownership, collateralizable assets, debt to total assets and firm size on dividend payout ratio in firms that listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange of 2010–2011 period. The other purpose is to know simultaneously the influence of institutional ownership, collateralizable assets, debt to total assets and firm size on dividend payout ratio in firms that listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange of 2010–2011 period. The population of this research was all the firms that listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange of 2010-2011 period namely, 136 in number. The sample, 27 firms, was taken by the use of purposive sampling method. The technique of data collection used was documentation.  The data analysis made use of multiple linear regression method. The results showed that partially institutional ownership had a positive and significant effect to dividend policy. Collateralizable assets, debt to total assets and firm size partially was not significant to dividend policy. Simultaneously institutional ownership, collateralizable assets, debt to total assets and firm size had a positive and significant effect to dividend payout ratio.


Author(s):  
Raudhatul Hidayah

The main purpose of the research was to know partially the influence of institutional ownership, collateralizable assets, debt to total assets and firm size on dividend payout ratio in firms that listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange of 2010-2011 period. The other purpose is to know simultaneously the influence of institutional ownership, collateralizable assets, debt to total assets and firm size on dividend payout ratio in firms that listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange of 2010-2011 period. The population of this research was all the firms that listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange of 2010-2011 period namely, 136 in number. The sample, 27 firms, was taken by the use of purposive sampling method. The technique of data collection used was documentation. The data analysis made use of multiple linear regression method. The results showed that partially institutional ownership had a positive and significant effect to dividend policy. Collateralizable assets, debt to total assets and firm size partially was not significant to dividend policy. Simultaneously institutional ownership, collateralizable assets, debt to total assets and firm size had a positive and significant effect to dividend payout ratio.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Lau ◽  
Joern H. Block

This research investigates whether the presence of controlling founders and families has significant impact on the level of cash holdings, and their implications on firm value. The agency cost of cash holdings in founder firms is arguably less severe than family firms, due to founders’ economic incentives, strong psychological commitment and superior knowledge, whereas family firms are exposed to adverse selection and moral hazard as a result of altruism. Results indicate that founder firms hold a significantly higher level of cash holdings than family firms. In addition, there is a positive interaction effect between founder management and cash holdings on firm value, suggesting the presence of founders as managers helps to mitigate the agency costs of cash holdings.


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