Theory and Practice of Corporate Governance

Purpose The traditional form of legal research with its predominant emphasis on doctrinal and theoretical analysis is now increasingly augmented by empirical research that seeks to document actions and decisions and draw broader conclusions. This relatively new research tradition is arguably making a positive contribution to legal theory and practice, particularly in the USA [for a general discussion see SJ Lubben, “Do Empricial Bankruptcy Studies Matter?” (2012) 20 ABI L Rev 715]. The paper aims to report on the use of empirical research to examine corporate governance in the context of financially distressed UK public companies. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses statutory corporate filings and mandatory stock exchange reports to document the process of informal debt resolution prior to the company’s entry into administration or Company Voluntary Arrangement. The findings are presented in an innovative way as a series of case studies focusing on process, participants and outcomes of informal debt resolution. Findings The paper concludes that it is possible to use case study research as a means to explore corporate governance in the context of financially distressed companies. Although such an approach is challenging in various ways, there are some advantages that complement more traditional research approaches. The findings show how directors’ attention shifts away from shareholders’ interests to those of creditors at times of financial distress and challenges conventional models of governance that stress shareholder value. Originality/value The distinctive features of the research are the development of a case-study based approach that draws on publicly available data sources, a process based analysis and a synthesis of corporate governance and law.

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Editorial: Scholarly communications and corporate governance research

Corporate Ownership and Control ◽

10.22495/cocv17i1si_editorial ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 162-164

Author(s):

Alexander Kostyuk

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

American Economic Review ◽

Theory And Practice ◽

Final Approval ◽

Critical Commentary ◽

Scholarly Communications ◽

The Mean ◽

And Control ◽

To Receive

The role of scholarly conferences as a method of scholarly communications cannot be overestimated. Thus, Torgler and Piatti (2013) found that in 1974, only 19 per cent of papers published in American Economic Review had been presented at one or more conferences, workshops or seminars, for critical commentary prior to publication. On average, the number of presentations was 0.24 per paper. Twenty-five years later, 73 percent of the papers accepted for publication have been previously presented, and the mean number of pre-publication presentations was 4.73. Personal editorial and reviewing experience give a right to conclude that papers previously presented at the conferences have more serious scholarly content, solid empirical fundamentals and relevance. Scholarly journal reviewers are more favourable about such papers and it takes less time to receive the final approval of the reviewers for further publishing. Discussing the papers in an open manner at the conferences is welcome both by the authors of the papers as well as the commenting scholars adding more enthusiasm for further research. International conference "New Challenges in Corporate Governance: Theory and Practice"1 took place in Naples on October 3-4, 2019.2 About 80 experts from America, Europe, Asia, Africa and Oceania gathered at the conference venue to discuss relevant issues of corporate governance, ownership and control, share their most recent research and come up with the solutions of the existing corporate governance research.

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Human Resource Management At The Crossroads

International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER) ◽

10.19030/iber.v10i8.5375 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 10 (8) ◽

pp. 23 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Narayan Krishna Prabhu

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Management Practices ◽

Management Practice ◽

Theory And Practice ◽

Theory Building ◽

Management Theory ◽

Choice Making ◽

Is Management ◽

Financial Scandals ◽

Work Done

Getting work done through other people is management; heterogeneities and complexities are managerial issues. Studies in management in 20th and 21st centuries focused on principles of management and management practices. The management theory jungle continues to be dense and impenetrable. Pessimism rules the roast with organizations perceived as insensitive. There is a divide between theory and practice. Epistemology of management practice and management theory building needs to be understood. HRM processes have to be evaluated along with choice making. Theories have to be self fulfilling by changing conditions under which they work. A number of failure stories have been analyzed, impacting several role holders. Searching for evidence for the various failures have provided live instances of actual situations which have caused trauma to the role holders. Financial scandals along with issues of corporate governance have generated conflict. Reviewing practices one perceives repeat errors perpetuated by managers; they are engaged in handling symptoms rather than curative aspects. Grand exits follow. Managers do not consider it safe and seem to work under such constraints. How long will they wait.

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Theory And Practice In CEO Pay: A Course Module And Integrative Case Based On Boeing Inc.

American Journal of Business Education (AJBE) ◽

10.19030/ajbe.v5i3.6995 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 5 (3) ◽

pp. 245-260

Author(s):

John F. Boschen ◽

Kimberly J. Smith

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Ceo Compensation ◽

Business Students ◽

Theory And Practice ◽

Financial Statement ◽

Executive Pay ◽

Capstone Course ◽

Ceo Pay ◽

Over Time ◽

Case Based

Business students may dream of receiving pay packages like that of Michael Eisner at Disney. However, many of them will work for the compensation consultant who determines the economics of the pay arrangements, for the valuation consultant who values the different components of the pay arrangements, for the accountant who must audit the financial statement impacts of the pay arrangements, or as a manager in the company whose employees respond to the incentives provided by the pay arrangements. No matter their eventual role, it is critical that every student understands these various aspects of executive pay arrangements, and how these practices have evolved over time. The course module presented herein is designed to effectively integrate these perspectives in as few as five or as many as nine 80-minute sessions that could be a substantive component of an MBA or Master of Accounting capstone course, or a component of a corporate governance elective. A case based on the CEO compensation of Boeing Inc. over the last 60 years provides a series of assignments that effectively integrate the module.

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Institutional investors and cost of capital: The moderating effect of ownership structure

PLoS ONE ◽

10.1371/journal.pone.0249963 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 16 (4) ◽

pp. e0249963

Author(s):

Xiaoping Huo ◽

Hongying Lin ◽

Yanan Meng ◽

Peter Woods

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Ownership Structure ◽

Capital Market ◽

Institutional Investors ◽

Cost Of Capital ◽

Listed Companies ◽

Moderating Effect ◽

Theory And Practice ◽

The Cost ◽

The Relationship

Guiding institutional investors to actively participate in corporate governance is a hot issue to improve the internal governance of China’s listed companies. This study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the mechanism that underlies the governance effects of the heterogeneity of institutional investors on the cost of capital, and the influence of ownership structure on the relationship between them. Using an unbalanced panel data on A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen in China’s capital market during the 2014–2019 period, this study reveals how institutional investors with longer holding period and higher shareholding ratio are negatively associated with the cost of capital in China’s capital market. Furthermore, this study successfully confirms the moderating effect of ownership structure in the relationship between institutional investors and the cost of capital. China’s state-owned enterprises are more likely to introduce improvements at the corporate governance level, and ownership concentration weakens the negative influence of institutional investors on the cost of capital. The research contributes to a deeper understanding of the impacts of institutional investor’s heterogeneity and ownership structure on the cost of capital in China. In the process, the study yields useful implications for the theory and practice of corporate governance.

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Corporate Governance in Business and Management

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Business and Management ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190224851.013.29 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Erik E. Lehmann

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

Adverse Selection ◽

Theory And Practice ◽

Political Systems ◽

Exogenous Shock ◽

Specific Investments ◽

Academic Fields ◽

Relevant Stakeholder ◽

Interdisciplinary Concept

Corporate governance is a recent concept that encompasses the costs caused by managerial misbehavior. It is concerned with how organizations in general, and corporations in particular, produce value and how that value is distributed among the members of the corporation, its stakeholders. The interrelation of value production and value distribution links the ubiquitous technological aspect (the production of value) with the moral and ethical dimension (the distribution of value). Corporate governance is concerned with this link in general, but more specifically with the moral and ethical dimensions of distributing the generated value among the stakeholders. Value in firms is created by firm-specific investments, and the motivation and coordination of value-enhancing activities and investment is protected by the power concentrated at the pyramidal top of the organization. In modern companies, it is the CEO and the top management who decide how to create value and how to distribute it among the relevant stakeholders. Due to asymmetric information and the imperfect nature of markets and contracts, adverse selection and moral hazard problems occur, where delegated (selected) managers could act in their own interest at the costs of other relevant stakeholders. Corporate governance can be understood as a two-tailed concept. The first aspect is about identifying the (most) relevant stakeholder(s), separating theory and practice into two different and conflicting streams: the stakeholder value approach and the shareholder value approach. The second aspect of the concept is about providing and analyzing different mechanisms, reducing the costs induced by moral hazard and adverse selection effects, and balancing out the motivation and coordination problems of the relevant stakeholders. Corporate governance is an interdisciplinary concept encompassing academic fields such as finance, economics, accounting, law, taxation, and psychology, among others. As countries differ according to their institutions (i.e., legal and political systems, norms, and rules), firms differ according to their size, age, dominant shareholders, or industries. Thus, concepts in corporate governance differ along these dimensions as well. And while the underlying characteristics vary in time, continuously or as a result of an exogenous shock, concepts in corporate governance are dynamic and static, offering a challenging field of interest for academics, policymakers, and firm managers.

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