scholarly journals Why economic reforms fail in the Soviet system: a property rights–based approach

1996 ◽  
pp. 63-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Winiecki
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
Soviet System ◽  
System A

scholarly journals The Museum System of Modern Kazakhstan: Classification and Typology of Museums

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Abay Satubaldin ◽  
Kunikey Sakhiyeva
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
District Level ◽  
Soviet System ◽  
Provincial Level ◽  
The Past ◽  
System A ◽  
The Subject ◽  
First Time

This article discusses the museum system of modern Kazakhstan and offers, for the first time ever, a classification and typology of the country’s museums.In recent years in independent Kazakhstan, on the basis of the Soviet system, a modern museum network has been formed which currently lists 250 museums. Among them are 17 national-level museums, 54 at the regional level, 73 at the provincial level, 103 branches of regional- and district-level museums and four private museums.The purpose of this article is to analyse the museum system of modern Kazakhstan and develop a classification and typology of the country’s museums.In the course of the study, conducted in 2017–2018, data was collected on the activities of museums at the national, regional and district levels over the past seven years. From the results of this investigation, the museums of Kazakhstan were systematized according to the subject or topic of the museum (e.g. history, art, scientific), its affiliation (national, regional district), and by size, measured by number of employees.

8. The Political Economy of Democracy

2018 ◽  
pp. 119-133
Author(s):  
Patrick Bernhagen
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Historical Overview ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
Key Points ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines the relationship between democratization and the economy. It first provides an historical overview of the emergence of capitalist democracy before discussing some general problems of the relationship between democracy and capitalism, highlighting the main areas in which the two systems condition each other. It then considers the role of business in democratizing countries, and more specifically the role of business actors in the transition to democracy. It also explores the intricacies of combining major political and economic reforms. Some key points are emphasized; for example, capitalism focuses on property rights while democracy focuses on personal rights. Furthermore, capitalism produces inequality, which can both stimulate and hamper democratization.

Stakhanovism and the soviet system: A review article

1989 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 484-487
Author(s):  
R. W. Davies
Keyword(s):  
Review Article ◽  
Soviet System ◽  
System A

8. Democracy, Business, and the Economy

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bernhagen
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Historical Overview ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
Key Points ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines the relationship between democratization and the economy. It first provides an historical overview of the emergence of capitalist democracy before discussing some general problems of the relationship between democracy and capitalism, highlighting the main areas in which the two systems condition each other. It then considers the role of business in democratizing countries, and more specifically the role of business actors in the transition to democracy. It also explores the intricacies of combining major political and economic reforms. Some key points are emphasized; for example, capitalism focuses on property rights while democracy focuses on personal rights. Furthermore, capitalism produces inequality, which can both stimulate and hamper democratization.

"Institutional Traps" of Post-privatisation Period in Russia

2004 ◽  
pp. 79-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Oleynik
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
Property Right ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Authority Relationships ◽  
Institutional Traps

Economic reforms in the post-Soviet countries have led to a number of unintended results. The explanation consists in not taking into consideration the institutional constraints existed in these countries, both formal and informal. In particular, the nature of authority relationship must be included in economic analysis. The unintended results of the privatization programs of the 1990s are discussed as an example. The emerged structure of property rights is far from being efficient (e.g., the corporative governance is weak) and socially just. However, the forced redistribution of property right will worsen the situation, as far as the nature of authority relationships — the imposed authority — remains constant.

The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China: A Neoinstitutional Perspective

1996 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven L. Solnick
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Local Field ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Central Planning ◽  
Soviet System ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Bank Run ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Authority Relations

Why did modest attempts to decentralize the centrally administered Soviet system lead to its collapse, while more far-reaching decentralization in China left central political and administrative hierarchies intact? This article analyzes the disintegration of centrally planned organizations in the context of a neoinstitutional model of the breakdown of authority within hierarchies. An agency model of hierarchy is presented that incorporates the ambiguous property rights, authority relations, and risk-sharing conditions that prevailed under central planning and then persist during postcommunist transitions. This model suggests that decentralizing reforms could trigger an organizational “bank run,” prompting local agents to seize organizational assets under their control. The article also considers reputation-preserving strategies that central authorities might use to avert disintegration.As an application of this model, the collapse of Soviet political, industrial, and state fiscal hierarchies are considered and compared with the experience of analogous sectors in China. Reforms in both states transferred significant autonomy from the center to local field agents. In the Soviet case these agents appropriated organizational assets with little interference from the center. In China, by contrast, the center preserved both its capacity for monitoring and its reputation for disciplining transgressions; and the rise of hybrid ownership forms made expropriation of state and Party assets far less attractive.

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