NOC NOC, Who's There? A New Ontological Category (NOC) for Social Robots

Author(s):  
Peter H. Kahn ◽  
Solace Shen
Author(s):  
Peter Remmers

Effects of anthropomorphism or zoomorphism in social robotics motivate two opposing tendencies in the philosophy and ethics of robots: a ‘rational’ tendency that discourages excessive anthropomorphism because it is based on an illusion and a ‘visionary’ tendency that promotes the relational reality of human-robot interaction. I argue for two claims: First, the opposition between these tendencies cannot be resolved and leads to a kind of technological antinomy. Second, we can deal with this antinomy by way of an analogy between our treatment of robots as social interactors and the perception of objects in pictures according to a phenomenological theory of image perception. Following this analogy, human- or animal-likeness in social robots is interpreted neither as a psychological illusion, nor as a relational reality. Instead, robots belong to a special ontological category shaped by perception and interaction, similar to objects in images.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara de Jong ◽  
Rinaldo Kühne ◽  
Jochen Peter ◽  
Caroline L. van Straten ◽  
Alex Barco
Keyword(s):  

In the article the analysis of nonsense, absurdity and paradox from the standpoint of linguistics is giv-en. Different points of view on these categories in relation to the meaning are considered. An attempt is made to reveal the commonality and specificity of nonsense, absurdity and paradox. Some researchers consider nonsense and paradox as a kind of absurdity. There is a dichotomous point of view on nonsense as one of the components of absurdity. However, there are works where these categories are differentiat-ed, for example, absurdity is understood as an ontological category, and nonsense as an epistemological category. There is a view of these categories through the allocation of "non-sense", "out-sense" and 136 "counter-sense" there is also a view that in the case of nonsense we are talking about the incompatibility of representations, and in the case of absurdity-the incompatibility of objects. If there are criteria that allow us to consider the presence of this phenomenon as natural, absurdity ceases to exist. Consequently, the view is expressed that nonsense, absurdity and paradox are different categories of thinking. Paradox is a contradiction arising from the presence of two or more common sense. The absurdity can be seen as a" counter-sense» opposing common sense and putting forward the concept of active impossibility of the latter's existence. As for nonsense, it is the meaning of metaphysical level – a meaning that goes beyond the ordinary meaning and creates new meanings. It is concluded that nonsense, absurdity and paradox are independent categories of human thinking, which is a manifestation of the cognitive function of hu-man consciousness.


Author(s):  
Alistair M. C. Isaac ◽  
Will Bridewell

It is easy to see that social robots will need the ability to detect and evaluate deceptive speech; otherwise they will be vulnerable to manipulation by malevolent humans. More surprisingly, we argue that effective social robots must also be able to produce deceptive speech. Many forms of technically deceptive speech perform a positive pro-social function, and the social integration of artificial agents will be possible only if they participate in this market of constructive deceit. We demonstrate that a crucial condition for detecting and producing deceptive speech is possession of a theory of mind. Furthermore, strategic reasoning about deception requires identifying a type of goal distinguished by its priority over the norms of conversation, which we call an ulterior motive. We argue that this goal is the appropriate target for ethical evaluation, not the veridicality of speech per se. Consequently, deception-capable robots are compatible with the most prominent programs to ensure that robots behave ethically.


Author(s):  
Martin Haspelmath

This chapter examines formal and functional types of indefinite pronoun. It first presents some examples of different indefinite pronoun series in a variety of languages, focusing on a formal element shared by all members of an indefinite pronoun series, such as some and any in English. This element is called indefiniteness marker, an affix or a particle which stands next to the pronoun stem. The chapter proceeds by discussing two main types of derivational bases from which indefinite pronouns are derived in the world's languages: interrogative pronouns and generic ontological category nouns like person, thing or place. It also looks at the main functional types of indefinite pronoun, namely: negative indefinite pronouns and negative polarity (or scale reversal). Finally, it analyses some alternatives to indefinite pronouns, including generic nouns, existential sentences, non-specific free relative clauses, and universal quantifiers.


Author(s):  
Anouk van Maris ◽  
Alexander Sutherland ◽  
Alexandre Mazel ◽  
Sanja Dogramadzi ◽  
Nancy Zook ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

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