EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS IN FAKE-BARN THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Colaço ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Stephen Stich ◽  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
General Public ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Clear Cases ◽  
Fake Barn ◽  
Public Share

AbstractIn epistemology, fake-barn thought experiments are often taken to be intuitively clear cases in which a justified true belief does not qualify as knowledge. We report a study designed to determine whether members of the general public share this intuition. The data suggest that while participants are less inclined to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases than in unproblematic cases of knowledge, they nonetheless do attribute knowledge to protagonists in fake-barn cases. Moreover, the intuition that fake-barn cases do count as knowledge is negatively correlated with age; older participants are less likely than younger participants to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases. We also found that increasing the number of defeaters (fakes) does not decrease the inclination to attribute knowledge.

Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Colaço ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Stephen Stich
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Fake Barn

Further Insights on Fake-Barn Cases and Intuition Variation

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Carsten Bergenholtz ◽  
Jacob Busch ◽  
Sara Kier Praëm
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Underlying Factor ◽  
Demographic Group ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Group Variation ◽  
Fake Barn

Abstract Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaço et al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by Colaço et al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers.

Intuitions

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Ichikawa ◽  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Hypothetical Case ◽  
Belief Theory ◽  
Contemporary Work

Philosophy often proceeds via appeals to intuition. In a prototypical instance, a theory is rejected on the basis of its counterintuitive verdict about a real or hypothetical case. A famous example is Edmund Gettier’s rejection of the justified “true belief” theory of knowledge; the dominant view was that knowledge was equivalent to justified true belief, but Gettier provided thought experiments involving subjects with beliefs derived from justified falsehoods, which happened by luck to be true—these thought experiments generally gave rise to intuitions to the effect that they described cases of justified true belief without knowledge. And on this basis, 20th-century epistemologists generally rejected the justified true belief theory. In recent decades, significant metaphilosophical attention has turned to such uses of intuitions in philosophy. What are intuitions? In what sense do arguments such as Gettier’s rely on the use of intuitions? Why should we trust them? What can they show us? This entry focuses on contemporary work on these and related topics.

Perceptions of Family Violence: Are Companion Animals in the Picture?

1997 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol D. Raupp ◽  
Judith A. Oliver ◽  
Mary Barlow
Keyword(s):  
Family Violence ◽  
General Public ◽  
Companion Animals ◽  
Companion Animal ◽  
Violence Against Children ◽  
The Family ◽  
Public Share

AbstractService and education organizations such as the ASPCA claim a connection between family violence against children and companion animals, but to what extent does the general public share this perception? Sixty-three undergraduates rated their certainty about perceiving family violence using 60 pictures with differing potential targets of family violence. Participants showed stronger certainty when the target was a child than when the target was a companion animal, but ratings for companion animals averaged above the midpoint of the scale used. Interview questions were used to obtain information about childhood recollections of joint discipline situations in which children received punishment for what companion animals did, or vice versa. Thirty-four participants recalled such situations, some of which resulted in the death or discarding of a family's companion animal. The majority of participants affirmed a connection between violence against children and companion animals in the family, with some giving credit for that insight to their taking part in the study.

scholarly journals Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-individualism, and Knowledge-First Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Kallestrup ◽  
Emma C. Gordon ◽  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Environmental Properties

This chapter investigates connections between Knowledge-First epistemology and a meta-epistemological thesis defended elsewhere by the authors (and in opposition to robust forms of virtue epistemology) under the description of epistemic anti-individualism. Epistemic anti-individualism is a denial of the epistemic individualist’s claim that warrant—i.e. what converts true belief into knowledge—supervenes on internal physical properties of individuals, perhaps in conjunction with local environmental properties. The chapter has two central aims. First, it argues that ‘epistemic twin earth’ thought experiments which reveal robust virtue epistemology (RVE) are problematically committed to epistemic individualism also show that evidentialist mentalism is likewise committed to individualism. Second, it argues that, even though a knowledge-first approach in epistemology is in principle (unlike RVE and evidentialist mentalism) consistent with epistemic anti-individualism, this approach fails to offer a plausible account of epistemic supervenience. The chapter suggests this point is a reason to pursue epistemic anti-individualism outside the knowledge-first framework.

5. Doing thought experiments

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-58
Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
To Come

Reasonable true belief without knowledge is possible, but knowledge is not only justified true belief—so what is it? ‘Doing thought experiments‘ explores how human beings use their imagination and intuition to solve philosophical problems in imaginary scenarios. Thought experiments have played a major role in recent moral philosophy. Sometimes thought experiments are enacted in real life, whereas some can only be imagined. The challenge is to come up with a scenario interesting enough to prove. Through imagining something fully, we know that it is possible, but imagination is not infallible. What if we all gave the same verdict on a thought experiment, but were wrong?

scholarly journals Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Gettier Case ◽  
Technical Term ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Deep Fault ◽  
Theoretical Literature ◽  
Fault Lines ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

AbstractThe term “Gettier Case” is a technical term frequently applied to a wide array of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology. What do these cases have in common? It is said that they all involve a justified true belief which, intuitively, is not knowledge, due to a form of luck called “Gettiering.” While this very broad characterization suffices for some purposes, it masks radical diversity. We argue that the extent of this diversity merits abandoning the notion of a “Gettier case” in a favour of more finely grained terminology. We propose such terminology, and use it to effectively sort the myriad Gettier cases from the theoretical literature in a way that charts deep fault lines in ordinary judgments about knowledge.

scholarly journals Gettier Cases

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Blouw ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Gettier Case ◽  
Technical Term ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Deep Fault ◽  
Theoretical Literature ◽  
Fault Lines ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The term ‘Gettier case’ is a technical term frequently applied to a wide array of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology. What do these cases have in common? It is said that they all involve a justified true belief which, intuitively, is not knowledge, due to a form of luck called ‘gettiering.’ While this very broad characterization suffices for some purposes, it masks radical diversity. We argue that the extent of this diversity merits abandoning the notion of a ‘Gettier case’ in favor of more finely grained terminology. We propose such terminology, and use it to effectively sort the myriad Gettier cases from the theoretical literature in a way that charts deep fault lines in ordinary judgments about knowledge.

scholarly journals The Radicalism of Truth-insensitive Epistemology: Truth's Profound Effect on the Evaluation of Belief

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Good Evidence ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Two Agents ◽  
Brain In A Vat ◽  
Brains In Vats

Many philosophers claim that interesting forms of epistemic evaluation are insensitive to truth in a very specific way. Suppose that two possible agents believe the same proposition based on the same evidence. Either both are justified or neither is; either both have good evidence for holding the belief or neither does. This does not change if, on this particular occasion, it turns out that only one of the two agents has a true belief. Epitomizing this line of thought are thought experiments about radically deceived “brains in vats.” It is widely and uncritically assumed that such a brain is equally justified as its normally embodied human “twin.” This “parity” intuition is the heart of truth-insensitive theories of core epistemological properties such as justification and rationality. Rejecting the parity intuition is considered radical and revisionist. In this paper, I show that exactly the opposite is true. The parity intuition is idiosyncratic and widely rejected. A brain in a vat is not justified and has worse evidence than its normally embodied counterpart. On nearly every ordinary way of evaluating beliefs, a false belief is significantly inferior to a true belief. Of all the evaluations studied here, only blamelessness is truth-insensitive.

scholarly journals A Comparative Analysis of Elitist and Public Opinion Evaluation of National Health Insurance Policy Performance

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 2206-2213
Author(s):  
Liu I-chun ◽  
Chen Chii-ching
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Health Insurance ◽  
National Health Insurance ◽  
National Health ◽  
General Public ◽  
Insurance Policy ◽  
Policy Delphi ◽  
Policy Performance ◽  
Democratic Principles ◽  
Public Share

This study discusses evaluation of National Health Insurance policy, using the policy Delphi method to obtain elite opinion on evaluation indicators of the policy and a telephone survey to collect general public opinion. Results indicated that the elite and the general public share a consensus on policy performance. The findings suggest that evaluations of NHI policy that incorporate elite and general public assessments may be preferable to evaluations based on assessments from just one sector of the population. Moreover, performance assessment should integrate the opinions of different representative sections of the population, as well as professional and democratic principles of decision-making. The study also provides evidence that public opinion and elite evaluation are correlated and shows considerable consistency in the evaluation of NHI policy regardless of the policy knowledge of the evaluators.

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