scholarly journals Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Killoren
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
Important Exception

There is an ancient, yet still lively, debate in moral epistemology about the epistemic significance of disagreement. One of the important questions in that debate is whether, and to what extent, the prevalence and persistence of disagreement between our moral intuitions causes problems for those who seek to rely on intuitions in order to make moral decisions, issue moral judgments, and craft moral theories. Meanwhile, in general epistemology, there is a relatively young, and very lively, debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. A central question in that debate concerns peer disagreement: When I am confronted with an epistemic peer with whom I disagree, how should my confidence in my beliefs change (if at all)? The disagreement debate in moral epistemology has not been brought into much contact with the disagreement debate in general epistemology (though McGrath [2007] is an important exception). A purpose of this paper is to increase the area of contact between these two debates. In Section 1, I try to clarify the question I want to ask in this paper – this is the question whether we have any reasons to believe what I shall call “anti-intuitivism.” In Section 2, I argue that anti-intuitivism cannot be supported solely by investigating the mechanisms that produce our intuitions. In Section 3, I discuss an anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement which relies on the so-called “Equal Weight View.” In Section 4, I pause to clarify the notion of epistemic parity and to explain how it ought to be understood in the epistemology of moral intuition. In Section 5, I return to the anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement and explain how an apparently-vulnerable premise of that argument may be quite resilient. In Section 6, I introduce a novel objection against the Equal Weight View in order to show how I think we can successfully resist the anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement.

Moral epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Factual Proposition ◽  
The Way

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral propositions. Some discussions of moral epistemology interpret the category of ‘moral propositions’ broadly, to encompass all propositions that can be expressed with terms like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘ought’. Other discussions have focused on a narrower category of moral propositions – such as propositions about what rights people have, or about what we owe to each other. According to so-called noncognitivists, one cannot strictly speaking know (or be justified in believing) a moral proposition in the same sense in which one can know (or be justified in believing) an ordinary factual proposition. Other philosophers defend a cognitivist position, according to which it is possible to know or be justified in believing moral propositions in the very same sense as factual propositions. If one does know any moral propositions, they must presumably be true; and the way in which one knows those moral truths must provide access to them. This has led to a debate about whether one could ever know moral truths if a realist conception of these truths – according to which moral truths are not in any interesting sense of our making – were correct. Many philosophers agree that one way of obtaining justified moral beliefs involves seeking ‘reflective equilibrium’ – that is, roughly, considering theories, and adjusting one’s judgments to make them as systematic and coherent as possible. According to some philosophers, however, seeking reflective equilibrium is not enough: justified moral beliefs need to be supported by moral ‘intuitions’. Some hold that such moral intuitions are a priori, akin to our intuitions of the self-evident truths of mathematics. Others hold that these intuitions are closely related to emotions or sentiments; some theorists claim that empirical studies of moral psychology strongly support this ‘sentimentalist’ interpretation. Finally, moral thinking seems different from other areas of thought in two respects. First, there is particularly widespread disagreement about moral questions; and one rarely responds to such moral disagreement by retreating to a state of uncertainty as one does on other questions. Secondly, one rarely defers to other people’s moral judgments in the way in which one defers to experts about ordinary factual questions. These two puzzling features of moral thinking seem to demand explanation – which is a further problem that moral epistemology has to solve.

intuitions, heuristics, and utilitarianism

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 560-561 ◽  
Author(s):  
peter singer
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Common Objection

a common objection to utilitarianism is that it clashes with our common moral intuitions. understanding the role that heuristics play in moral judgments undermines this objection. it also indicates why we should not use john rawls' model of reflective equilibrium as the basis for testing normative moral theories.

PEER DISAGREEMENT AND THE DUNNING-KRUGER EFFECT

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Wiland
Keyword(s):  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Epistemic Peer

ABSTRACTI argue that recent evidence about our self-serving biases has radical implications for the epistemology of peer disagreement. I conclude that much of the time when you are disagreeing with someone you regard as your epistemic peer, you should not merely move halfway to her judgment, as The Equal Weight View has it. That is not conciliatory enough. Surprisingly often, you should be at least weakly confident that you are wrong, and that your disputant is right.

scholarly journals A HIGHER-ORDER APPROACH TO DISAGREEMENT

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Skipper Rasmussen ◽  
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen ◽  
Jens Christian Bjerring
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Desirable Feature ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

ABSTRACTWhile many philosophers have agreed that evidence of disagreement is a kind of higher-order evidence, this has not yet resulted in formally precise higher-order approaches to the problem of disagreement. In this paper, we outline a simple formal framework for determining the epistemic significance of a body of higher-order evidence, and use this framework to motivate a novel interpretation of the popular “equal weight view” of peer disagreement – we call it the Variably Equal Weight View (VEW). We show that VEW differs from the standard Split the Difference (SD) interpretation of the equal weight view in almost all cases of peer disagreement, and use our formal framework to explain why SD has seemed attractive but is in fact misguided. A desirable feature of VEW, we argue, is that it gives rise to plausible instances of synergy – an effect whereby the parties to a disagreement should become more (or less) confident in the disputed proposition than any of them were prior to disagreement. Lastly, we show how VEW may be generalized to cases of non-peer disagreement.

scholarly journals A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View

Episteme ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomas Bogardus
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
Epistemic Peers

ABSTRACTSome philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples–cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party's assessment. To defuse these apparent counterexamples, an advocate of the View might try to explain how they are not genuine cases of peer disagreement. I examine David Christensen's and Adam Elga's explanations and find them wanting. I then offer a novel explanation, which turns on a distinction between knowledge from reports and knowledge from direct acquaintance. Finally, I extend my explanation to provide a handy and satisfying response to the charge of self-defeat.

scholarly journals An earlier role for intent in children’s partner choice versus punishment

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Martin ◽  
Kyleigh Leddy ◽  
Liane Young ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Developmental Trajectories ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Behavioral Differences ◽  
The Many ◽  
Insight Into

Among the many factors that influence our moral judgments, two are especially important: whether the person caused a bad outcome and whether they intended for it to happen. Notably, the weight accorded to these factors in adulthood varies by the type of judgment being made. For punishment decisions, intentions and outcomes carry relatively equal weight; for partner choice decisions (i.e., deciding whether or not to interact with someone again), intentions are weighted much more heavily. These behavioral differences in punishment and partner choice judgments may also reflect more fundamental differences in the cognitive processes supporting these decisions. Exploring how punishment and partner choice emerge in development provides important and unique insight into these processes as they emerge and mature. Here, we explore the developmental emergence of punishment and partner choice decisions in 4- to 9-year-old children. Given the importance of intentions for partner choice decisions¬–from both theoretical and empirical perspectives–we targeted the sensitivity of these two responses to others’ intentions as well as outcomes caused. Our punishment results replicate past work: young children are more focused on outcomes caused and become increasingly sensitive to intentions with age. In contrast, partner choice judgments exhibit sensitivity to intentions at an earlier age than punishment judgments, manifesting as earlier partner choice in cases of attempted violations. These results reveal distinct developmental trajectories for punishment and partner choice judgments, with implications for our understanding of the processes underlying these two responses as well as the development of moral judgment more broadly.

Advances in Research on the Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars (MIME)

2021 ◽  
pp. 230-249
Author(s):  
Allison Eden ◽  
Ron Tamborini ◽  
Melinda Aley ◽  
Henry Goble
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Selective Exposure ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Social Perceptions ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Process Perspective

This chapter describes the model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME), which examines connections between moral judgment and exposure to narrative media. The MIME explicates distinct, a priori–defined domains of moral intuitions that cut across cultural boundaries and identifies underlying processes that shape related social perceptions to describe how media and moral judgment are intertwined. The model’s dual-process perspective suggests some moral judgments are determined by quick gut reflexes and others by reflective deliberation. The MIME’s multistage process contains short-term and long-term components. The short-term component describes how exemplars that prime moral intuitions affect the appraisal of media content, which then prompts selective exposure to media that upholds primed intuitions. The long-term component describes how aggregate patterns of exposure to media that upholds primed intuitions encourages further (mass) production of content featuring those intuitions. This reciprocal process describes how media systems and audiences influence the salience of one another’s moral intuitions.

scholarly journals Moral Understanding, Testimony, and Moral Exemplarity

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Croce
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Theories

AbstractWhile possessing moral understanding is agreed to be a core epistemic and moral value, it remains a matter of dispute whether it can be acquired via testimony and whether it involves an ability to engage in moral reasoning. This paper addresses both issues with the aim of contributing to the current debates on moral understanding in moral epistemology and virtue ethics. It is argued that moral epistemologists should stop appealing to the argument from the transmissibility of moral understanding to make a case for their favorite view of moral understanding. It is also argued that proponents of exemplarist moral theories cannot remain neutral on whether the ability to engage in moral reasoning is a necessary component of moral understanding.

scholarly journals What is the “Equal Weight View”?

Episteme ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Jehle ◽  
Branden Fitelson
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Equal Weight View

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we investigate various possible (Bayesian) precisifications of the (somewhat vague) statements of “the equal weight view” (EWV) that have appeared in the recent literature on disagreement. We will show that the renditions of (EWV) that immediately suggest themselves are untenable from a Bayesian point of view. In the end, we will propose some tenable (but not necessarily desirable) interpretations of (EWV). Our aim here will not be to defend any particular Bayesian precisification of (EWV), but rather to raise awareness about some of the difficulties inherent in formulating such precisifications.

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