Rescuing Ontological Individualism
Abstract Standard defences of ontological individualism are challenged by arguments that exploit the dependence of social facts on material facts – i.e. facts that are not about human individuals. In this paper I discuss Brian Epstein’s “materialism” in The Ant Trap: granting Epstein’s strict definition of individualism, I show that his arguments depend crucially on a generous conception of social properties and social facts. Individualists however are only committed to the claim that projectible properties are individualistically realized, and materialists have not undermined this claim.
1914 ◽
Vol 90
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pp. 41-45
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2021 ◽
Vol 10
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pp. 4020
1997 ◽
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pp. 118-119
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2013 ◽
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2010 ◽
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2014 ◽
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1988 ◽
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2004 ◽
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