scholarly journals Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Prato ◽  
Stephane Wolton
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
Electoral Process ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Constituency Service ◽  
Campaign Cost

The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their platform. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low. However, when partisan imbalance is high, a higher campaign cost is associated with a higher expected level of constituency service. More costly campaigns can thus have a rebalancing effect that improves electoral accountability. We discuss the implications of our findings for campaign finance regulation and present empirical evidence consistent with our key predictions.

Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral Accountability

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Bauhr ◽  
Nicholas Charron
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Political Corruption ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Level Data

While democratic accountability is widely expected to reduce corruption, citizens to a surprisingly large extent opt to forgo their right to protest and voice complaints, and refrain from using their electoral right to punish corrupt politicians. This article examines how grand corruption and elite collusion influence electoral accountability, in particular citizens’ willingness to punish corrupt incumbents. Using new regional-level data across 21 European countries, we provide clear empirical evidence that the level of societal grand corruption in which a voter finds herself systematically affects how she responds to a political corruption scandal. Grand corruption increases loyalty to corrupt politicians, demobilizes the citizenry, and crafts a deep divide between insiders, or potential beneficiaries of the system, and outsiders, left on the sidelines of the distribution of benefits. This explains why outsiders fail to channel their discontent into effective electoral punishment, and thereby how corruption undermines democratic accountability.

Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 639-656 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth R. Gerber ◽  
John E. Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Bayesian Model ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Electoral Process ◽  
Endogenous Preferences ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Adaptive Preferences ◽  
Rights Issues

The assumption that individual preferences, or attitudes, are fixed and exogenously determined is central to many studies of political and economic institutions, such as markets and elections. We present a Bayesian model of adaptive preferences and empirical evidence consistent with that model to argue that preferences are not always exogenous and fixed. The changing relationships between partisanship and preferences on civil rights issues between 1956 and 1964 and on the Vietnam War issue between 1968 and 1972 coincide with significant changes in the major parties' positions on these issues, suggesting that preferences are endogenous to the electoral process. We conclude with a discussion of the positive and normative implications of endogenous preferences.

Money in the 2014 Congressional Elections: Institutionalizing a Broken Regulatory System

The Forum ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond J. La Raja
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Party System ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
Campaign Strategy ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Finance System ◽  
Campaign Activity

AbstractThe campaign finance system has fragmented campaign activity in response to rules that are unworkable in a strong party system. The 2014 congressional elections illustrate how party coalitions have adapted to practices that enable them to raise and spend money outside this formal regulatory framework. For several election cycles, partisan interest groups have used outside campaign organizations to circumvent rules that constrain candidate and party committees. The 2014 elections illustrate how party leaders in Congress and these candidates have now embraced the outside campaign strategy to wrest some control from other elements of the party. Recent changes to campaign finance rules may shift additional money toward traditional committees, but outside groups like Super PACs are now established features of US political campaigns.

scholarly journals Campaign finance and corporate governance: The case of Brazil

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-136
Author(s):  
Andre Carvalhal da Silva ◽  
Flavia Mourao Graminho
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Ownership Rights ◽  
And Control

Corporate governance mechanisms, such as transparency, accounting standards, responsibility, accountability, fairness, business ethics, efficient shareholder controls, and ownership rights are key tools in combating corruption. This paper investigates on a firm-level basis the relation between corporate governance practices and campaign finance in Brazil. We interpret campaign finance as a proxy for political influence by interest groups. Our results indicate that family-owned firms contribute significantly more for political campaigns, both in terms of proportion of firms and total amount spent to finance the candidates. Higher concentration of capital and the separation of ownership and control are positively related to campaign donations, while better corporate governance is negatively related to political contributions.

Rational Voters and Political Advertising

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Prat
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Political Advertising ◽  
Informative Advertising ◽  
Expenditure Function

This article studies political advertising, starting with non-directly informative advertising and directly informative advertising. It then tries to determine how a microfounded model of campaign finance can be used to reinterpret the available empirical evidence. The expenditure function is also discussed in this article.

scholarly journals Information and Extremism in Elections

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael Boleslavsky ◽  
Christopher Cotton
Keyword(s):  
Media Coverage ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Finance Reform ◽  
Political Extremism ◽  
Campaign Finance Reform ◽  
Policy Competition ◽  
Candidate Quality

We model an election in which parties nominate candidates with observable policy preferences prior to a campaign that produces information about candidate quality, a characteristic independent of policy. Informative campaigns lead to greater differentiation in expected candidate quality, which undermines policy competition. In equilibrium, as campaigns become more informative, candidates become more extreme. We identify conditions under which the costs associated with extremism dominate the benefits of campaign information. Informative political campaigns increase political extremism and can decrease voter welfare. Our results have implications for media coverage, the number of debates, and campaign finance reform. (JEL D72, D83)

Do Institutions and Rules Influence Electoral Accessibility and Competitiveness? Considering the 2014 Toronto Ward Elections

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 210-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zack Taylor ◽  
Sandra McEleney
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Electoral Process ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Candidate Characteristics ◽  
The City ◽  
Electoral Competitiveness ◽  
Candidate Entry

Electoral and campaign finance reforms are believed to improve the competitiveness of elections and the accessibility of the electoral process; however, the interaction between electoral institutions and competitiveness and accessibility in nonpartisan municipal elections remains understudied. This article examines the City of Toronto, which exemplifies many of the reforms proposed in the American context, including a strict campaign finance regime and low barriers to candidate entry. Analysis of campaign finance disclosure data and candidate characteristics for Toronto’s 2014 ward elections reveals that electoral and campaign finance rules increase electoral accessibility while doing little to limit incumbency advantage. We argue that crowded nonpartisan races are low-information environments in which candidates, donors, and voters cannot assess challenger quality, which reinforces incumbent name recognition and access to campaign resources. The Toronto case highlights the limits of institutional and regulatory change as a means of increasing local electoral competitiveness and accessibility.

Avoiding Punishment? Electoral Accountability for Local Fee Increases

2021 ◽  
pp. 107808742199211
Author(s):  
Katy Hansen ◽  
Shadi Eskaf ◽  
Megan Mullin
Keyword(s):  
North Carolina ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Service Provision ◽  
Public Services ◽  
City Council ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Water Rates ◽  
Local Politicians

Do voters punish incumbent legislators for raising service costs? Concern about electoral punishment is considered a leading obstacle to increasing taxes and fees to fund service provision, but empirical evidence of such backlash is surprisingly sparse. This paper examines whether voters hold local elected officials accountable for raising water service costs. Using 10 years of panel data on municipal elections and water rates in North Carolina, we find rate increases do not reduce incumbent city council members’ vote shares. Local politicians may overestimate their electoral risk from raising taxes and fees to fund public services.

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