Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral Accountability

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Bauhr ◽  
Nicholas Charron
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Political Corruption ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Level Data

While democratic accountability is widely expected to reduce corruption, citizens to a surprisingly large extent opt to forgo their right to protest and voice complaints, and refrain from using their electoral right to punish corrupt politicians. This article examines how grand corruption and elite collusion influence electoral accountability, in particular citizens’ willingness to punish corrupt incumbents. Using new regional-level data across 21 European countries, we provide clear empirical evidence that the level of societal grand corruption in which a voter finds herself systematically affects how she responds to a political corruption scandal. Grand corruption increases loyalty to corrupt politicians, demobilizes the citizenry, and crafts a deep divide between insiders, or potential beneficiaries of the system, and outsiders, left on the sidelines of the distribution of benefits. This explains why outsiders fail to channel their discontent into effective electoral punishment, and thereby how corruption undermines democratic accountability.

INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN 19TH-CENTURY SPAIN (VALENCIA), 1841-1870

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-46
Author(s):  
Carlos Santiago-Caballero
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Occupational Mobility ◽  
International Markets ◽  
International Perspective ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Downward Mobility ◽  
Agrarian Capitalism

ABSTRACT This paper sheds light on a crucial period of Spanish economic history, analysing changes in intergenerational occupational mobility. We use newly collected empirical evidence from Valencia, a region that followed a path of growth based on agrarian capitalism focused on international markets. We show that occupational mobility improved between 1841 and 1850, but that this situation reversed during the following decades. The opportunities offered to individuals from poorer families quickly disappeared. Put in international perspective, occupational mobility in Valencia was far lower than in other European countries, where both downward and especially upward mobility were considerably higher. By 1870, Valencia had become a polarised society, where the lowest part of the income distribution suffered increasing pauperisation and downward mobility.

scholarly journals Paranoid styles and innumeracy: implications of a conspiracy mindset on Europeans' misperceptions about immigrants

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Sergio Martini ◽  
Mattia Guidi ◽  
Francesco Olmastroni ◽  
Linda Basile ◽  
Rossella Borri ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Demographic Factors ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Common Phenomenon ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
The Public ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Socio Demographic Factors ◽  
Influence Perceptions ◽  
Western Democracies

Abstract Innumeracy, that is, the inability to deal with numbers and provide correct estimates about political issues, is reported to be widespread among the public. Yet, despite the recognition that a conspiracy mindset is an increasingly common phenomenon in Western democracies, this has not been considered as a potential correlate of innumeracy. Using data from an online sample of respondents across 10 European countries, we show that those with a higher propensity to hold a conspiracy worldview tend to overestimate the actual share of the immigrant population living in their own country. This association holds true when accounting for country heterogeneity and other cognitive, affective and socio-demographic factors. Employing a comparative design and refined measurements, the article contributes to our understanding of how a conspiracy mentality may influence perceptions of relevant political facts, questioning basic processes of democratic accountability.

When Marriage Gets Hard: Intra-Coalition Conflict and Electoral Accountability

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110243
Author(s):  
Carolina Plescia ◽  
Sylvia Kritzinger
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Economic Evaluations ◽  
Responsibility Attribution ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Level Data ◽  
European Election ◽  
Election Studies

Combining individual-level with event-level data across 25 European countries and three sets of European Election Studies, this study examines the effect of conflict between parties in coalition government on electoral accountability and responsibility attribution. We find that conflict increases punishment for poor economic performance precisely because it helps clarify to voters parties’ actions and responsibilities while in office. The results indicate that under conditions of conflict, the punishment is equal for all coalition partners when they share responsibility for poor economic performance. When there is no conflict within a government, the effect of poor economic evaluations on vote choice is rather low, with slightly more punishment targeted to the prime minister’s party. These findings have important implications for our understanding of electoral accountability and political representation in coalition governments.

The Element of Surprise: Election Timing and Opposition Preparedness

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402199717
Author(s):  
Charles T. McClean
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Alternative Mechanism ◽  
Election Campaigns ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Fixed Effects Models ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Election Timing

How can incumbent governments benefit when they control the timing of elections? The conventional wisdom is that incumbents gain an advantage by timing elections to coincide with favorable economic conditions. An alternative mechanism that has received less attention is the element of surprise: the incumbent’s ability to exploit the opposition’s lack of election preparedness. I theorize and empirically test this surprise mechanism using candidate-level data from Japanese House of Representatives elections (1955–2017). The results show that in surprise elections, opposition parties recruit fewer, lower-quality candidates, spend less money campaigning, coordinate their candidates less effectively, and ultimately receive fewer votes and seats. Evidence from fixed effects models and exogenously timed by-elections further suggest that surprise matters more in shorter, competitive election campaigns and helps incumbents more with confronting inter-party as opposed to intra-party electoral competition. These findings add to our understanding of how strategic election timing can undermine electoral accountability.

scholarly journals Individual and Regional-level Factors Contributing to Variation in Length of Stay After Cerebral Infarction in Six European Countries

2015 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 38-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikko Peltola ◽  
Timo T. Seppälä ◽  
Antti Malmivaara ◽  
Éva Belicza ◽  
Dino Numerato ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Length Of Stay ◽  
Cerebral Infarction ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
European Countries

scholarly journals Betrayed by the Elites: How Corruption Amplifies the Political Effects of Recessions

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110474
Author(s):  
Carlos Sanz ◽  
Albert Solé-Ollé ◽  
Pilar Sorribas-Navarro
Keyword(s):  
Great Recession ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Political Corruption ◽  
The Political ◽  
Difference In Difference ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Political Effects ◽  
History Of ◽  
Municipal Level

We investigate whether corruption amplifies the political effects of economic crises. Using Spanish municipal-level data and a difference-in-difference strategy, we find that local unemployment shocks experienced during the Great Recession (2008–2015) increased political fragmentation. This effect was four times larger in municipalities exposed to malfeasance than in municipalities without a history of political corruption. We bolster this evidence by showing that, conditional on province and population strata fixed effects, there is no evidence of differential pre-trends. We also find that the interaction of unemployment and corruption harms the two traditional main parties and benefits especially the new party on the left ( Podemos).

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