Avoiding Punishment? Electoral Accountability for Local Fee Increases

2021 ◽  
pp. 107808742199211
Author(s):  
Katy Hansen ◽  
Shadi Eskaf ◽  
Megan Mullin

Do voters punish incumbent legislators for raising service costs? Concern about electoral punishment is considered a leading obstacle to increasing taxes and fees to fund service provision, but empirical evidence of such backlash is surprisingly sparse. This paper examines whether voters hold local elected officials accountable for raising water service costs. Using 10 years of panel data on municipal elections and water rates in North Carolina, we find rate increases do not reduce incumbent city council members’ vote shares. Local politicians may overestimate their electoral risk from raising taxes and fees to fund public services.

Author(s):  
Michal Struk ◽  
Eduard Bakoš

Intermunicipal cooperation offers an interesting alternative in cases when municipalities are too small to individually provide public services at an efficient cost level but are reluctant to form a municipal amalgamation in order to benefit from economies of scale. Forming a body consisting of multiple municipalities with a specific focus provides a way to reduce costs on service provision while maintaining municipal sovereignty in other areas. In our paper, we quantify the cost benefits of utilizing intermunicipal cooperation in the field of municipal solid waste management. We examine this using data from a 10-year period from municipalities in the South Moravian Region in the Czech Republic, where high municipal fragmentation results in many dominantly small municipalities that often are not able to provide public services at reasonable costs. This analysis contributes to the literature by conducting a long-term study of the effects of intermunicipal cooperation on public service provision costs. Our results suggest that municipalities participating in intermunicipal cooperation focused on waste management experienced annual cost savings of approximately 13.5% for provision of this service throughout the examined period of 2010–2019 when compared to municipalities that did not cooperate. These long-term results show how beneficial intermunicipal cooperation can be in reducing service costs. In addition to the direct financial benefits, municipal representatives stated that intermunicipal cooperation often brings other qualitative and non-financial benefits such as better service quality, the possibility to share infrastructure, and relief from administrative and managerial burdens through the utilization of professional management, which was especially appreciated by the smallest municipalities with limited administrative staff.


2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Bauhr ◽  
Nicholas Charron

While democratic accountability is widely expected to reduce corruption, citizens to a surprisingly large extent opt to forgo their right to protest and voice complaints, and refrain from using their electoral right to punish corrupt politicians. This article examines how grand corruption and elite collusion influence electoral accountability, in particular citizens’ willingness to punish corrupt incumbents. Using new regional-level data across 21 European countries, we provide clear empirical evidence that the level of societal grand corruption in which a voter finds herself systematically affects how she responds to a political corruption scandal. Grand corruption increases loyalty to corrupt politicians, demobilizes the citizenry, and crafts a deep divide between insiders, or potential beneficiaries of the system, and outsiders, left on the sidelines of the distribution of benefits. This explains why outsiders fail to channel their discontent into effective electoral punishment, and thereby how corruption undermines democratic accountability.


Author(s):  
Pandelani H. Munzhedzi

Accountability and oversight are constitutional requirements in all the spheres of government in the Republic of South Africa and their foundation is in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. All spheres of government are charged with the constitutional mandate of providing public services. The level of responsibility and public services provision also goes with the level of capacity of a particular sphere. However, most of the direct and visible services that the public receives are at the local sphere of government. As such, enormous resources are channelled towards this sphere of government so that the said public services could be provided. It is imperative that the three spheres of government account for the huge expenditures during the public service provision processes. The parliaments of national and provincial governments exercise oversight and accountability over their executives and administrations through the Public Accounts Committees, while the local sphere of government relies on the Municipal Public Accounts Committees. This article is theoretical in nature, and it seeks to explore the current state of public accountability in South Africa and to evaluate possible measures so as to enhance public accountability. The article argues that the current public accountability mechanisms are not efficient and effective. It is recommended that these mechanisms ought to be enhanced by inter alia capacitating the legislative bodies at national, provincial and local spheres of the government.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 723-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zélia Serrasqueiro ◽  
Paulo Maçãs Nunes ◽  
Jacinto Vidigal da Silva

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