scholarly journals Campaign finance and corporate governance: The case of Brazil

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-136
Author(s):  
Andre Carvalhal da Silva ◽  
Flavia Mourao Graminho
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Ownership Rights ◽  
And Control

Corporate governance mechanisms, such as transparency, accounting standards, responsibility, accountability, fairness, business ethics, efficient shareholder controls, and ownership rights are key tools in combating corruption. This paper investigates on a firm-level basis the relation between corporate governance practices and campaign finance in Brazil. We interpret campaign finance as a proxy for political influence by interest groups. Our results indicate that family-owned firms contribute significantly more for political campaigns, both in terms of proportion of firms and total amount spent to finance the candidates. Higher concentration of capital and the separation of ownership and control are positively related to campaign donations, while better corporate governance is negatively related to political contributions.

scholarly journals Does better corporate governance attract foreign equity ownership? Evidence from Malaysian listed companies

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 118-125
Author(s):  
Yap Voon Choong ◽  
Chan Kok Thim ◽  
John Stanley Murugesu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Insider Ownership ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Equity Ownership

This study examines the effect of firm-level corporate governance variables on foreign equity ownership (FEO) in Malaysia. Foreign equity ownership can be an important source of capital for companies to fund their expansion and growth. To attract FEO, good corporate governance practices are vital because these practices are used to reduce or mitigate agency cost. Based on a sample of listed firms on Bursa Malaysia and employing multiple regression analysis, the study finds that a number of corporate governance mechanisms significantly improve the ability of companies to attract foreign equity ownership, especially, Insider Ownership, Government Ownership, Firm Size, Dividend Yield and Tobin’s Q. The results of the study indicate that firm-level efforts for better corporate governance sends positive signals and confidence to foreign investors.

scholarly journals Governance and risk interdependencies among family owned firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 390-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramanathan Geeta ◽  
Krishna Prasanna
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Excess Risk ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Variable Approach ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices

The paper examines the role and impact of corporate governance mechanisms upon the operating risks of Indian listed firms. The recent global financial crisis was primarily attributed to excess risk–taking. This turmoil in the financial markets had a widespread effect on all industries and raised pertinent questions on the effectiveness of firm level governance practices. Impact of corporate governance practices, vide a constructed board governance index, has been examined on the risk taking behaviour of firms. Utilising a sample of 377 firms with yearly data for 6 years from 2006 to 2012, 2262 firm year observations have been analysed. Results confirm that firms with good corporate governance practices are effective in constraining excess risk taking. An instrumental variable approach is adopted to control for endogeneity, which also supports and substantiates the results.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon ◽  
Bernard Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
Resource Misallocation ◽  
Property Rights Protection

Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance—affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.

Does board gender diversity affect the transparency of corporate political disclosure?

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.G. DeBoskey ◽  
Yan Luo ◽  
Jeff Wang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ethics Research ◽  
Board Gender Diversity

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of board gender diversity on the transparency of corporate political disclosure (CPD). Design/methodology/approach Two empirical proxies, CPD transparency and policy transparency, are constructed from a data set jointly produced by the Center of Political Activity and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research. The CPD transparency score measures the level of transparency in voluntary corporate disclosure of the amount of political contributions and the identity of the recipients as well as the titles and names of the executives who authorize the political spending. The policy transparency score measures the level of transparency in the voluntary disclosure of the policies governing corporate political spending. Board gender diversity is measured by the percentage of women on the board of directors. Findings Higher proportions of female directors are associated with more transparent disclosure of political contributions after controlling for a set of corporate governance and firm-level variables. Originality/value This study is the first to examine whether and how gender-diversified boards enhance the transparency of CPD. It contributes to the literature by providing evidence that gender-diversified boards enhance corporate governance.

scholarly journals Downward wage rigidity in American technology firms

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4-1) ◽  
pp. 181-190
Author(s):  
Xiaoying Chen ◽  
Jasmine Yur-Austin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Business Leaders ◽  
Wage Rigidity ◽  
Venture Capitalists ◽  
Technology Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
And Control ◽  
Dot Com

This study reviews the role of various corporate governance mechanisms to pay for performance in American technology firms. Compared to traditional business leaders, CEOs in technology firms possess stronger power for negotiating with shareholders; such power theoretically lowers the chance of interest conflicts between management and control but may increase CEOs’ wage rigidity during business downturns, especially in firms with poor corporate governance. We evaluate ownership structure; board composition; and the existence of independent compensation committees throughout the dot-com bubble and bubble-burst periods. We aim to examine during the business downturn period whether these CEOs cut their compensation effectively or exercise their negotiation power to protect their own benefit. Our empirical results provide strong evidence that given poor firm performance, CEOs with weak corporate governance negotiate higher cash-based pay rather than reduce their compensations. However, we find that venture capitalists play an important role in monitoring CEOs and revising compensation.

scholarly journals Corporate governance, ownership and control: A review of recent scholarly research

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Kostyuk ◽  
Yaroslav Mozghovyi ◽  
Dmytro Govorun
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Existing Problems ◽  
The Past ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Recent Trends ◽  
Performance Auditing ◽  
And Control

This manuscript is aimed at highlighting the most recent trends in corporate governance, ownership and control based on the manuscripts presented at the international conference “Corporate Governance, Ownership and Control” that took place in Rome on February 27, 2018. We have also used reputable papers published in the relevant academic journals in the past to support the arguments stated by the authors of the papers, presented at the conference. This paper covers a wide range of corporate governance topics in corporate ownership and control toward corporate governance mechanisms, such as board of directors, the board diversity, directors’ remuneration, firm performance, auditing and accounting, etc. We saw a growing interest of researchers to widen the scope of their major research to link it to corporate ownership and control issues. Currently, corporate governance research follows two major routs: classical empirical corporate governance research and multidisciplinary research aimed at findings non-conventional methods to solution of existing problems.

scholarly journals The Tink’s saga? Is it the Time for the Corporate Governance?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleandra Maria Prigol Meneghini ◽  
Ana Paula Pereira dos Passos ◽  
Jeferson Lana
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Corporate Management ◽  
Information Asymmetries ◽  
Teaching Case ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
And Control ◽  
Gains And Losses

Objective: To promote a discussion on the benefits and challenges of the process of implementing mechanisms and good corporate governance practices in a multifamily company. Method: the case was based on real problems of a privately held multifamily organization and fictitious narratives were developed for its construction. Originality/relevance: Multifamily companies potentialize the existence of conflicts between the main ones due to the plurality of partners regarding corporate management and control. In this teaching case, some of these dilemmas were presented and how corporate governance could avoid, mitigate or remedy them in order to find adequate alignment between family members. Results: Conflicts of interest and information asymmetries indicated the need for new solutions for business continuity. Among these solutions, there was the possibility of implementing mechanisms and good corporate governance practices. Theoretical/methodological contributions: It is expected that the student develops an understanding of the need to consider inherent gains and losses in decision making and the particularities of the organization, such as shareholder composition, maturity of the organization and protection of capital and property.

scholarly journals Corporate governance in the context of the recovery of distressed firms: A case study in Brazilian air transportation sector

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 621-627
Author(s):  
Vinicio de Souza Almeida ◽  
Patrícia Ribeiro Romano
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Transportation Sector ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Theoretical Evidence ◽  
The Cost ◽  
And Control

Corporate governance is a set of practices and processes of board and executives’ coordination and control that aims at protecting the interests of shareholders and others affected by the value of the company. The discussions and disputes involving shareholders in Brazil and a new corporate law aimed at improving governance practices in the country, reducing the cost of capital of the company and contributing to national economic growth. In this study, we compared the theoretical evidence on the governance structure of airlines with the reality of a large company in the sector in Brazil. The results indicate that a wrong architecture of ownership and control combined with the non-corporate governance system may result in financial distress for an organization.

scholarly journals Complexity and corporate governance: an analysis of companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (74) ◽  
pp. 213-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renata Rouquayrol Assunção ◽  
Márcia Martins Mendes De Luca ◽  
Alessandra Carvalho de Vasconcelos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Inverse Relationship ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Organizational Characteristics ◽  
Organizational Complexity ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

ABSTRACT In light of the need to develop mechanisms of control, protection, and transparency regarding the relationships between principal and agent, and with the aim of eliminating or reducing the agency problem, corporate governance has emerged. Based on Agency Theory, separation of ownership and control of activities derives from the complexity of organizations. In this context, this study aims to analyze the relationship between dimensions of complexity and corporate governance in companies listed on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA), in which contingency factors might influence organizational characteristics. The investigation gathers data from a sample of 162 companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA. The following statistical tests were used in the data analysis: Factor Analysis, Multiple Linear Regression, Correspondence Analysis, and Correlation Analysis. For measuring complexity, contingency variables such as age, size, diversification, and internationalization were adopted; and, to assess corporate governance, a representative index of the adoption of good governance practices was used. The results show that organizational complexity is explained by the size and diversification variables, whereas operational complexity is explained by the size, diversification, and internationalization variables. It was observed that in the two dimensions of complexity - organizational and operational - corporate governance was influenced by the diversification, internationalization, and age variables, with the latter involving an inverse relationship. It is concluded that companies displaying more complexity, in its two dimensions, record a higher level of corporate governance, which confirms the research hypothesis.

Governance of Financial Institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guler Aras
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Sustainable Economic Growth

Corporate governance is a central issue in business and economics. However, governance in financial institutions is more complicated than in other fields because of the nature of financial services and instruments. Financial organizations are similar to other businesses in terms of their purposes of establishment, but confidence in management and complex risk structures are more important in financial organizations than in other businesses. In financial institutions, there are various areas in which problems arise that are related to corporate governance, including the agency problem and stakeholder protection. The importance of good governance for sound performance of financial institutions was reconfirmed during the 2008 financial crisis, raising the need to understand the agency problems and the efficiency of various corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating them. International organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Basel Committee, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, have been working with regulators and policy makers to improve corporate governance practices both in nonfinancial and financial institutions. Corporate governance, especially in financial institutions, is essential in guaranteeing a sound financial system, capital markets, and sustainable economic growth. Governance weaknesses at financial institutions can result in the transmission of problems across the finance sector and the economy. Consequently, the effectiveness of governance mechanisms of financial institutions and capital markets after financial crises had significant importance in a period that witnessed an intensive discussion of corporate governance issues with new regulations and the related academic works.

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