Real Exchange Rates and Competitiveness: The Political Economy of Skill Formation, Wage Compression, and Electoral Systems

2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (3) ◽  
pp. 601-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
TORBEN IVERSEN ◽  
DAVID SOSKICE

A major puzzle in the open economy literature is why some countries have persistently higher real exchange rates than others. Even more puzzling is the fact that countries with high real exchange rates are strong export performers. We solve both puzzles with a model that integrates two central debates in the comparative political economy of advanced economies: one linking wage bargaining, incomes policy, and competitiveness, and the other linking partisanship, political institutions, and redistribution. We bring the two together by emphasizing the role of skill formation. We argue that union centralization is necessary for wage restraint and training on a large scale, but this in turn requires a political coalition that subsidizes such training. When both are present, wage restraint generates external competitiveness, whereas wage compression pushes up sheltered prices and hence the real exchange rate, and vice versa. We test the argument on data on export performance and real exchange rates.

Author(s):  
M S Eichenbaum ◽  
B K Johannsen ◽  
S T Rebelo

Abstract This article studies how the monetary policy regime affects the relative importance of nominal exchange rates and inflation rates in shaping the response of real exchange rates to shocks. We document two facts about inflation-targeting countries. First, the current real exchange rate predicts future changes in the nominal exchange rate. Second, the real exchange rate is a poor predictor of future inflation rates. We estimate a medium-size, open-economy DSGE model that accounts quantitatively for these facts as well as other empirical properties of real and nominal exchange rates. The key estimated shocks that drive the dynamics of exchange rates and their covariance with inflation are disturbances to the foreign demand for dollar-denominated bonds.


Author(s):  
W. Kindred Winecoff

First-wave international political economy (IPE) was preoccupied with the “complex interdependencies” within a world system that (it believed) was rapidly devolving following the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. The original IPE scholars were more dedicated to theorizing about the emergence and evolution of global systems than any strict methodology. As IPE developed, it began to emphasize the possibility that institutions could promote cooperation in an anarchic environment, so IPE scholarship increasingly studied the conditions under which these institutions might emerge. Second-wave IPE scholars began to focus on the domestic “level of analysis” for explanatory power, and in particular analyzed the role of domestic political institutions in promoting global economic cooperation (or conflict). They also employed a “second-image reversed” paradigm in which the international system was treated as an explanatory variable that influenced the domestic policymaking process. In opening up the “black box” of domestic politics, in particular as it pertained to foreign economic policy, the “American school” of IPE thoroughly explored the terrain with regression-based statistical models that assume observational independence. As a result, complex interdependencies in the global system were increasingly ignored. Over time the analytical focus progressively shifted to micro-level units—firms and individuals, whenever possible—using neoclassical economic theory as its logical underpinning (with complications for political factors). This third wave of IPE, “open economy politics,” has been criticized in the post-crisis period for its narrow focus, rigid methodology, and lack of systemic theory. Leading scholars have called modern IPE “boring,” “deplorable,” “myopic,” and “reductionist,” among other epithets. A “fourth-wave” of IPE must retain its strong commitment to empiricism while re-integrating systemic processes into its analysis. A new class of complex statistical models is capable of incorporating interdependencies as well as domestic- and individual-level processes into a common framework. This will allow scholars to model the global political economy as an interdependent system consisting of multiple strata.


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrique Martínez-García ◽  
Jens Søndergaard

This paper investigates how the inclusion of capital in the workhorse new open economy macro model affects its ability to generate volatile and persistent real exchange rates. We show that capital accumulation facilitates intertemporal consumption smoothing and significantly reduces the volatility of the real exchange rate. Nonetheless, monetary and investment-specific technology (IST) shocks still induce more real exchange rate volatility and less consumption comovement than productivity shocks (with or without capital). We find that endogenous persistence is particularly sensitive to the inertia of the monetary policy rule even with persistent exogenous shocks. However, irrespective of whether capital is present, productivity and IST shocks trigger highly persistent real exchange rates, whereas monetary shocks do not. Moreover, we point out that IST shocks tend to generate countercyclical real exchange rates—unlike productivity or monetary shocks—but have the counterfactual effect of also producing excessive investment volatility and countercyclical consumption.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansgar Belke ◽  
Dominik Kronen

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to estimate the effect of policy and exchange rate uncertainty shocks on EU countries’ exports to the world economy. The authors examine the performance of the four biggest economies, namely Germany, France, Italy and the UK, under policy and exchange rate uncertainty in exports to some of the most important global export destinations (the USA, Japan, Brazil, Russia and China). Design/methodology/approach For this purpose, the authors apply a non-linear model, where suddenly strong spurts of exports occur when changes of the exchange rate go beyond a zone of inaction, which the authors call “play” area – analogous to mechanical play. The authors implement an algorithm describing path-dependent play hysteresis into a regression framework. The hysteretic impact of real exchange rates on exports is estimated based on the period from 1995M1 to 2015M12. Findings Looking at some of the main export destinations of the selected EU member countries, the USA, Japan and some of the members of BRICS (Brazil, Russia and China), the authors identify significant hysteretic effects for a large part of the EU member countries’ exports. The authors find that their export activity is characterized by “bands of inaction” with respect to changes in the real exchange. To check for robustness, the authors estimate export equations for limited samples: excluding the recent financial crisis and excluding the period up to the burst of the dotcom bubble and September 11. In addition, the authors employ an economic policy uncertainty variable and an exchange rate uncertainty variable as determinants of the width of the area of weak reaction of exports. Research limitations/implications Overall, the authors find that those specifications which take uncertainty into account display the highest goodness of fit, with economic policy uncertainty dominating exchange rate uncertainty. In other words, the option value of waiting dominates the real exchange rate effect on the EU member countries’ exports. Practical implications The existence of “bands of inaction” (called “play”) in EU member countries’ exports should lead to a more objective discussion of peaks and troughs in those countries’ real exchange rates and, more specifically, of the relevance of internal and external devaluation and other indicators to gain international competitiveness on exports in political debates. If policy and/or exchange rate uncertainty are diminished, one may expect an earlier boost in exports, if the home currency is devaluing in real terms. Social implications The results are useful as arguments in the debate about exchange rate pain threshold vs export triggers. Originality/value The authors focus on the export performance of the four biggest economies in the European Union, namely Germany, France, Italy and the UK. The authors examine their respective export performance, as an innovation, under policy and exchange rate uncertainty and, for this purpose, look at some of the most important global export destinations (the USA, Japan and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia and China)). The authors do so, also as an innovation, by differentiating between intervals of weak and strong reaction of their exports to real exchange rate changes.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Ayres ◽  
Constantino Hevia ◽  
Juan Pablo Nicolini

We show that explicitly modeling primary commodities in an otherwise totally standard incomplete markets open economy model can go a long way in explaining the Mussa puzzle and the Backus-Smith puzzle, two of the main puzzles in the international economics literature.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 1238-1283
Author(s):  
Michael B Devereux ◽  
Viktoria V Hnatkovska

Abstract Models of risk-sharing predict that relative consumption growth rates are positively related to changes in real exchange rates. We investigate this hypothesis using a new multicountry and multiregional data set. Within countries, we find evidence for risk-sharing: episodes of high relative regional consumption growth are associated with regional real exchange rate depreciation. Across countries, however, the association is reversed: relative consumption and real exchange rates are negatively correlated. We define this reversal as a “border” effect. We find the border effect and show that it accounts for over half of the deviations from full risk-sharing. Since cross–border real exchange rates involve different currencies, it is natural to ask how much of the border effect is accounted for by movements in exchange rates. Our measures indicate that a large part of the border effect comes from nominal exchange rate fluctuations. We develop a simple open economy model that is consistent with the importance of nominal exchange rate variability in accounting for deviations from cross–country risk-sharing.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document