Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
YIQING XU ◽  
YANG YAO
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Local Governance ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Public Investment ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Causal Effects ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Bureaucratic Institutions ◽  
Local Leaders

Do informal institutions, rules, and norms created and enforced by social groups promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the article, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans in a village increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable.

Refounding the African state and local self-governance: the neglected foundation

2000 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
James S. Wunsch
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Local Governance ◽  
African State ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Political Relationships ◽  
State And Local ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Rule Systems ◽  
Local Leaders

The political revolution of contemporary Africa has so far largely been limited to the centre and to re-establishing the same institutional forms and processes which failed Africa in the 1960s. These regimes are already showing signs of erosion. This problem can be understood through the theory of public goods. Key collective or ‘public’ goods problems impede the collective action necessary for institutional development. Top-down strategies cannot surmount these problems because they cannot integrate and unify the population or structure consensual and sustained collective action.As currently constituted, national levels of government in Africa will be poor partners with local communities in development, be it of democracy or of the economy. In many cases, national regimes only exist at all because minimal contributing sets or political monopolists controlled, were given, or mobilised the resources to establish constituting rule systems which they used to sustain their existing relative advantages during the break-up of imperial systems. As this advantage is usually at the expense of the majority which lives outside the capitals, resources and policies to improve these areas are slow in coming. The slow, bottom-up process by which a true public constitution is built, one which reflects and elaborates generally held values, is built on existing political relationships, and protects social diversity, has never been allowed to develop.Refounding the African state must resolve these problems if it is to succeed. Ethnically and religiously diverse peoples will rule themselves better under federal and consociational systems which give local leaders space to lead local institutional development, authority to play a role in national governance, a process to develop consensus on central policy and to check the centre when there is no consensus. This requires a foundation of viable, real, developed structures of local governance if it is to succeed.

INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND LOCAL PUBLIC INVESTMENTS IN RURAL CHINA

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (04) ◽  
pp. 899-916
Author(s):  
JIANGLI DOU ◽  
BING YE
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Public Investment ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
Public Investments ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of informal institutions on local public investment in rural China. We find that lineage groups have a significant effect on local public investment (per capita investment in irrigation, schools, roads, etc.): One clan is good for local public goods investment, while two or more clans in a village have a negative effect. The effect is increasing with the coverage of the largest clan. The evidence on religious groups is mixed.

Political Solutions to the Collective Action Problem

1980 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Laver
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Core ◽  
Political Entrepreneurs ◽  
Production Problems

This paper juxtaposes two important political solutions to the collective action problem in the context of a common set of core assumptions. Once the core assumptions have been discussed, the distinction between the consumption and the production problems associated with public goods provision is elaborated. These assumptions and this distinction are applied to a comparison between a theory of individualistic anarchy, and a theory of competitive political entrepreneurs. Revisions of both are required to enable them to be placed within this framework. While the two theories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive they can, between them, be used to understand public goods provision in a number of different circumstances.

scholarly journals How “Free” is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem

2007 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stathis N. Kalyvas ◽  
Matthew Adam Kocher
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Individual Participation

That rebels face a collective action problem is one of the most widely shared assumptions in the literature on civil wars. The authors argue that the collective action paradigm can be both descriptively inaccurate and analytically misleading when it comes to civil wars. They question both pillars of the paradigm as applied to the study of civil wars, namely, the free-riding incentive generated by the public goods dimension of insurgency and the risks of individual participation in insurgent collective action. The authors argue, instead, that although insurgent collective action may entail the expectation of future collective benefits, public (rather than just private) costs tend to predominate in the short term. Moreover, the costs of nonparticipation and free riding may equal or even exceed those of participation. The authors support these claims by triangulating three types of evidence: historical evidence from counterinsurgency operations in several civil wars; data from the Vietnam War's Phoenix Program; and regional evidence from the Greek Civil War. They conclude by drawing implications for the study of civil wars.

scholarly journals Local governance and public goods provision in rural China

2004 ◽  
Vol 88 (12) ◽  
pp. 2857-2871 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaobo Zhang ◽  
Shenggen Fan ◽  
Linxiu Zhang ◽  
Jikun Huang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Local Governance ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Public Goods Provision

Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
LILY L. TSAI
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Case Study Research ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Local Officials ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Bureaucratic Institutions ◽  
Informal Accountability

Why would government officials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more than the minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local officials can be subject to unofficial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations. These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and embedding solidary groups. Villages where these types of groups exist are more likely to have better local governmental public goods provision than villages without these solidary groups, all other things being equal.

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