Political Solutions to the Collective Action Problem

1980 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Laver
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Core ◽  
Political Entrepreneurs ◽  
Production Problems

This paper juxtaposes two important political solutions to the collective action problem in the context of a common set of core assumptions. Once the core assumptions have been discussed, the distinction between the consumption and the production problems associated with public goods provision is elaborated. These assumptions and this distinction are applied to a comparison between a theory of individualistic anarchy, and a theory of competitive political entrepreneurs. Revisions of both are required to enable them to be placed within this framework. While the two theories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive they can, between them, be used to understand public goods provision in a number of different circumstances.

Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
YIQING XU ◽  
YANG YAO
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Local Governance ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Public Investment ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Causal Effects ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Bureaucratic Institutions ◽  
Local Leaders

Do informal institutions, rules, and norms created and enforced by social groups promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the article, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans in a village increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable.

Corporate Unionism and Labor Market Flexibility in South Korea

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae-jin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Protection ◽  
Employment Protection ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Core ◽  
Labor Market Flexibility ◽  
High Employment

There is significant variance in the strategies of labor market flexibility under the same pressure of globalization. This article attempts to explain that variance by examining closely the Korean case, with particular attention to the response of labor, one of the most intractable actors in the reform process. After theorizing the nature of social welfare as a quasi-collective good and hypothesizing labor's responses based on Olson's theory of collective action, the study seeks to explain Korea's low commitment to flexicurity and the resultant dualism in the labor market. The core argument here is that the collective action problem among atomized corporate unions has led to high employment protection for regular workers in big business at the expense of marginal workers without appropriate social protection.

scholarly journals How “Free” is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem

2007 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stathis N. Kalyvas ◽  
Matthew Adam Kocher
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Individual Participation

That rebels face a collective action problem is one of the most widely shared assumptions in the literature on civil wars. The authors argue that the collective action paradigm can be both descriptively inaccurate and analytically misleading when it comes to civil wars. They question both pillars of the paradigm as applied to the study of civil wars, namely, the free-riding incentive generated by the public goods dimension of insurgency and the risks of individual participation in insurgent collective action. The authors argue, instead, that although insurgent collective action may entail the expectation of future collective benefits, public (rather than just private) costs tend to predominate in the short term. Moreover, the costs of nonparticipation and free riding may equal or even exceed those of participation. The authors support these claims by triangulating three types of evidence: historical evidence from counterinsurgency operations in several civil wars; data from the Vietnam War's Phoenix Program; and regional evidence from the Greek Civil War. They conclude by drawing implications for the study of civil wars.

THE CORE COINCIDES WITH THE NUCLEOLUS ALLOCATIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY WITH TAXATION

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (02) ◽  
pp. 141-155
Author(s):  
TOSHIYUKI HIRAI
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Tax System ◽  
The Core ◽  
Convexity Assumptions

We study a public goods economy with a certain tax system to finance public goods provision. Each coalition is allowed to tax the complementary coalition when proposing a new allocation. Taxation is regulated by a public authority so as to satisfy certain restriction on the resulting allocation. We show that the core coincides with the set of nucleolus allocations defined in this economy. We also show that the core is nonempty under the usual convexity assumptions.

scholarly journals Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Arena ◽  
Nicholas P. Nicoletti
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
The Core ◽  
Realistic Picture ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Simple Models

We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory, while avoiding modeling choices we believe to be less appropriate. We argue for a revised version of selectorate theory, one that continues to emphasize the importance of the size of the winning coalition, yet we believe it provides a more realistic picture of democratic politics.

Informal Customary Institutions, Collective Action, and Submunicipal Public Goods Provision in Mexico

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Mart E. Trasberg
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Social Infrastructure ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Theoretical Mechanism ◽  
Village Communities ◽  
Development Outcomes ◽  
Original Survey

ABSTRACT This article explores the role of informal customary institutions (usos y costumbres) in local public goods provision in Mexico. It argues that the presence of informal customary institutions offers submunicipal village communities considerable advantages in local distributive politics. Hamlet communities with dense customary institutions have higher collective action capacity to organize their citizens for small-scale protests in municipal centers, which grants them access to more social infrastructure projects controlled by municipal politicians. This article therefore suggests a novel theoretical mechanism through which customary institutions affect development outcomes: collective contentious action. The study tests the main empirical implications of this theory, drawing on an original survey of submunicipal community presidents in the states of Puebla and Tlaxcala and qualitative interviews.

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