RATIONALITY AND IDENTITY: A CRITIQUE OF ALESSANDRO PIZZORNO

2002 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
FERNANDO AGUIAR ◽  
ANDRÉS DE FRANCISCO

In a series of articles, A. Pizzorno has critically reviewed rational choice theory and developed an alternative to it. In certain academic environments, his work has become a clear referent of the sociological reaction against that paradigm. In this paper, we review and offer a critique of Pizzorno's contribution. Firstly, we reconstruct what we think to be the theoretical core of his position, as based on three main concepts: multiple identity, individuals as ‘strings of selves’ and ‘circles of recognition’ as mechanisms reducing identitary uncertainty. Secondly, we criticise this core as lacking philosophical rigour and as being underdeveloped. Thirdly, we analyse Pizzorno's theory as an alternative to the rational choice paradigm. Here we argue that social scientists – and Pizzorno is no exception – often make a double mistake when they oppose methodological individualism and rational choice models.

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-556
Author(s):  
Ryan H. Murphy

AbstractLeeson (2020) objects to the conflation of economics with applied econometrics, and argues that economics instead should be thought of as the implications of the assumption that individuals maximize, i.e. rational choice theory. But, narrowly defining economics in terms of method demands that we ignore alternative theoretical frameworks which potentially hold explanatory power about topics thought of as economics, all for the sake of a definition. I suggest that applying rational choice theory and applying econometrics became the comparative advantage for economists relative to other social scientists by accidents of history. These comparative advantages largely persist. It is reasonable to call applications of both rational choice theory and econometrics to topics outside conventional economic topics ‘economics’ simply because these applications remain the comparative advantage of economists.


1970 ◽  
pp. 309-332
Author(s):  
Tomasz Zając Tomasz Zając ◽  
Agata Komendant-Brodowska

The aim of the paper is to analyse decisions of first degree graduates concerning continuation of their education on second-degree programmes. One of the changes introduced by the Bologna process was a division of university programmes for the first-degree (bachelor’s degree) and seconddegree (master’s degree) programmes. As a result, a new educational threshold has appeared in the course of higher education and at that threshold students decide whether to continue education and if so, which university and programme to choose. All choices involve various costs and benefits, both to be experienced immediately, as well as those that students plan to achieve or incur in the future. The article presents data on the decisions regarding the continuation of studies in the context of the assumptions of rational choice theory: methodological individualism and rationality of actors. The analysed data come from registers of the University of Warsaw. The most common decision of first-degree graduates at the University is not to change anything: either the programme or mode of study. This result will be explained in the context of assumptions about the preferences of the students.


Author(s):  
Scott H. Ainsworth

Rational choice theory builds from a very simple foundation. To wit: individuals are presumed to pursue goal-oriented behavior stemming from rational preferences. Rational choice theory benefits from the very precise formulations of its assumptions. Individual-level rationality is generally defined as having complete and transitive preferences. Both completeness and transitivity have precise, formal definitions. From complete and transitive preferences, one can develop utility function presentations reflecting those preferences. Utility functions have the advantage of establishing a measure and allowing one to assess attitudes toward risk. That is, utility functions can reflect risk acceptance, risk neutrality, or risk aversion. Although some rational choice theorists focus on individual-level decision making, most rational choice theorists consider the ways in which individuals’ decisions are aggregated into some sort of social outcome or social preference order. The aggregation of individuals’ preferences occurs in both social choice and game theoretic models. Arrow’s theorem is the best-known result in social choice theory. Arrow showed that the rationality of individuals’ preferences could not be readily preserved at the group level when those individuals’ preferences were aggregated. That is, individual-level rationality does not ensure group-level rationality. Put slightly differently, irrationality at the group level cannot impugn rationality at the individual level. Other examples highlighting the difficulty of aggregating individuals’ preferences into a collective outcome abound. For instance, game theoretic presentations of the collective action problem highlight how individually rational decisions can lead to suboptimal outcomes. Rational choice models have been used to model interactions in a wide array of political institutions. Rational choice models have been developed to tackle some of the most challenging concepts in the social sciences, even in areas long thought impenetrable to rational choice theorizing. For instance, concepts such as ideology or personal identification have typically been used as preestablished descriptors. In contrast to treating those concepts as extant descriptors, rational choice theorists have modeled the endogenous development of ideologies and personal identification. Given the complexity of social phenomena, the relative parsimony and the clarity of rational choice models can be particularly helpful. The usefulness of rational choice models stems from their parsimony and their applicability to a wide range of settings.


Reputation ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 28-61
Author(s):  
Gloria Origgi

This chapter is devoted to the theoretical approaches to reputation developed in the different branches of social science that adopt the theory of rational choice. It answers the principal questions of whether reputation can be seen as a rational strategy or as a means to other ends or an end in itself. The chapter explores the various ways in which cultivating one's reputation, given the costs it imposes and the benefits it confers, can be a rational strategy. It examines how several most prominent social scientists approach the questions on reputation. It also treats explanations that synthesize evolutionary theory with rational-choice theory only as “theoretical models” useful for illuminating the conditions for the possibility of the emergence of a social trait, such as reputation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL K. MacDONALD

Rational choice theorists have not clearly articulated their epistemological positions, and for this reason, their arguments in favor of rational choice theory are inconsistent, contradictory, and unpersuasive. To remedy this problem, I describe how two of the main positions in the philosophy of science, instrumentalist-empiricism and scientific-realism, act as competing epistemological foundations for rational choice theory. I illustrate how these philosophical perspectives help political scientists (1) understand what is at stake in the theoretical debates surrounding the rationality assumption, self-interest, and methodological individualism, (2) identify inconsistencies in the epistemological positions adopted by rational choice theorists, and (3) assess the feasibility and desirability of a universal theory based on the rationality assumption.


1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Rosenberg

Social and behavioral scientists — that is, students of human nature — nowadays hardly ever use the term ‘human nature’. This reticence reflects both a becoming modesty about the aims of their disciplines and a healthy skepticism about whether there is any one thing really worthy of the label ‘human nature’.For some feature of humankind to be identified as accounting for our ‘nature’, it would have to reflect some property both distinctive of our species and systematically influential enough to explain some very important aspect of our behavior. Compare: molecular structure gives the essence or the nature of water just because it explains most of its salient properties. Few students of the human sciences currently hold that there is just one or a small number of such features that can explain our actions and/or our institutions. And even among those who do, there is reluctance to label their theories as claims about ‘human nature’.Among anthropologists and sociologists, the label seems too universal and indiscriminant to be useful. The idea that there is a single underlying character that might explain similarities threatens the differences among people and cultures that these social scientists seek to uncover. Even economists, who have explicitly attempted to parlay rational choice theory into an account of all human behavior, do not claim that the maximization of transitive preferences is ‘human nature’.I think part of the reason that social scientists are reluctant to use ‘human nature’ is that the term has traditionally labeled a theory with normative implications as well as descriptive ones.


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