Economics is whatever the comparative advantage of economists is: a comment on Leeson (2020)

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-556
Author(s):  
Ryan H. Murphy

AbstractLeeson (2020) objects to the conflation of economics with applied econometrics, and argues that economics instead should be thought of as the implications of the assumption that individuals maximize, i.e. rational choice theory. But, narrowly defining economics in terms of method demands that we ignore alternative theoretical frameworks which potentially hold explanatory power about topics thought of as economics, all for the sake of a definition. I suggest that applying rational choice theory and applying econometrics became the comparative advantage for economists relative to other social scientists by accidents of history. These comparative advantages largely persist. It is reasonable to call applications of both rational choice theory and econometrics to topics outside conventional economic topics ‘economics’ simply because these applications remain the comparative advantage of economists.

Reputation ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 28-61
Author(s):  
Gloria Origgi

This chapter is devoted to the theoretical approaches to reputation developed in the different branches of social science that adopt the theory of rational choice. It answers the principal questions of whether reputation can be seen as a rational strategy or as a means to other ends or an end in itself. The chapter explores the various ways in which cultivating one's reputation, given the costs it imposes and the benefits it confers, can be a rational strategy. It examines how several most prominent social scientists approach the questions on reputation. It also treats explanations that synthesize evolutionary theory with rational-choice theory only as “theoretical models” useful for illuminating the conditions for the possibility of the emergence of a social trait, such as reputation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gamze Çavdar

AbstractA growing body of literature criticizes the notion that Islamism is sui generis and argues that it could be explained by existing conceptions about human behavior. This approach relies on rational choice theory and its derivatives, characterizing Islamists as rational political actors that engage in cost-benefit analysis and strategic calculation. This article evaluates the explanatory power of this characterization through three case studies, namely the Turkish Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami), and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun). It argues that although the approach offers explanations for Islamist pragmatism, this characterization has three major limitations: lack of room for ideological change, extreme voluntarism between violence and non-violence, and lack of insight for intra-group gender relations.


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 747-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONATHAN ALDRED

In a recent paper, Dryzek and List attempt a reconciliation of Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy. Such an attempt is certainly long overdue and their original article is an important first step. In some ways it succeeds. In particular, they show that much of the imagined tension between the two theoretical frameworks is illusory and due to the mistaken assumption that many of the claims of rational choice theory form part of social choice theory (SCT) too. But in the nature of a Comment, I shall concentrate on aspects of their discussion which in my view warrant more critical scrutiny.


2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-322
Author(s):  
Bojana Radovanovic

This paper focuses on Sen?s concept of contrapreferential choice. Sen has developed this concept in order to overcome weaknesses of the rational choice theory. According to rational choice theory a decision-maker can be always seen as someone who maximises utility, and each choice he makes as the one that brings to him the highest level of personal wellbeing. Sen argues that in some situations we chose alternatives that bring us lower level of wellbeing than we could achieve if we had chosen some other alternative available to us. This happens when we base our decisions on moral principles, when we act out of duty. Sen calls such action a commitment-based action. When we act out of commitment we actually neglect our preferences and thus we make a contrapreferential choice, as Sen argues. This paper shows that, contrary to Sen, a commitment-based action can be explained within the framework of rational choice theory. However, when each choice we make can be explained within the framework of rational choice theory, when in everything we do maximisation principle can be loaded, then the variety of our motives and traits is lost, and the explanatory power of the rational choice theory is questionable.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-661
Author(s):  
Loren King

Abstract.Critics fault rational choice theory for dubious assumptions and limited explanatory power. The aims of rational choice are, however, as much normative as explanatory, and I argue that an abiding concern of political thought—the wrong of exploitation—gives moral weight to some of the more substantive assumptions underlying many rational choice prescriptions.Résumé.Les critiques reprochent à la théorie du choix rationnel d'avancer des hypothèses douteuses et d'offrir des explications restreintes. Les objectifs du choix rationnel sont, cependant, aussi bien normatifs qu'explicatifs. J'affirme qu'une préoccupation centrale de la pensée politique – le mal de l'exploitation – donne une signification morale à certains postulats du choix rationnel.


2002 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
FERNANDO AGUIAR ◽  
ANDRÉS DE FRANCISCO

In a series of articles, A. Pizzorno has critically reviewed rational choice theory and developed an alternative to it. In certain academic environments, his work has become a clear referent of the sociological reaction against that paradigm. In this paper, we review and offer a critique of Pizzorno's contribution. Firstly, we reconstruct what we think to be the theoretical core of his position, as based on three main concepts: multiple identity, individuals as ‘strings of selves’ and ‘circles of recognition’ as mechanisms reducing identitary uncertainty. Secondly, we criticise this core as lacking philosophical rigour and as being underdeveloped. Thirdly, we analyse Pizzorno's theory as an alternative to the rational choice paradigm. Here we argue that social scientists – and Pizzorno is no exception – often make a double mistake when they oppose methodological individualism and rational choice models.


1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Rosenberg

Social and behavioral scientists — that is, students of human nature — nowadays hardly ever use the term ‘human nature’. This reticence reflects both a becoming modesty about the aims of their disciplines and a healthy skepticism about whether there is any one thing really worthy of the label ‘human nature’.For some feature of humankind to be identified as accounting for our ‘nature’, it would have to reflect some property both distinctive of our species and systematically influential enough to explain some very important aspect of our behavior. Compare: molecular structure gives the essence or the nature of water just because it explains most of its salient properties. Few students of the human sciences currently hold that there is just one or a small number of such features that can explain our actions and/or our institutions. And even among those who do, there is reluctance to label their theories as claims about ‘human nature’.Among anthropologists and sociologists, the label seems too universal and indiscriminant to be useful. The idea that there is a single underlying character that might explain similarities threatens the differences among people and cultures that these social scientists seek to uncover. Even economists, who have explicitly attempted to parlay rational choice theory into an account of all human behavior, do not claim that the maximization of transitive preferences is ‘human nature’.I think part of the reason that social scientists are reluctant to use ‘human nature’ is that the term has traditionally labeled a theory with normative implications as well as descriptive ones.


OUGHTOPIA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-282
Author(s):  
In-Kyun Kim ◽  
Myeong-Geon Koh

Author(s):  
Kealeboga J Maphunye

This article examines South Africa's 20-year democracy by contextualising the roles of the 'small' political parties that contested South Africa's 2014 elections. Through the  prism  of South  Africa's  Constitution,  electoral legislation  and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it examines these parties' roles in South Africa's democratisation; their influence,  if any, in parliament, and whether they play any role in South Africa's continental or international engagements. Based on a review of the extant literature, official documents,  legislation, media, secondary research, reports and the results of South Africa's elections, the article relies on game theory, rational choice theory and theories of democracy and democratic consolidation to examine 'small' political parties' roles in the country's political and legal systems. It concludes that the roles of 'small' parties in governance and democracy deserve greater recognition than is currently the case, but acknowledges the extreme difficulty experienced by the 'small'  parties in playing a significant role in democratic consolidation, given their formidable opponent in a one-party dominant system.


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