Res Gesta in Criminal Cases

1956 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-215
Author(s):  
R. N. Gooderson

Sir Frederick Pollock once said that the phrase res gesta meant in English neither more nor less than part of the story. This indicates that the idea behind this principle of the law of evidence is fundamentally a simple one, yet the present state of the law is such that a learned judge may confess without shame that he sees as through a glass darkly, and of the writers, Wigmore and Julius Stone, despairing of finding any firm basis for any such principle, favour a fresh start upon a different foundation or foundations. The general impression conveyed to lawyers is of an idea of great amplitude, and one fraught with tremendous possibilities. Lord Blackburn, a Victorian common lawyer, and Harman J., a modern Chancery judge, both jocularly advise any counsel seeking to obtain admission of a doubtful piece of evidence to pin his faith in res gesta. The feeling that at a pinch the doctrine might give some relief is not unjustified. Owing to the many exclusionary rules of the law of evidence, it is rarely possible to tell a plain tale in court. The importance of the res gesta principle is that where it applies it will nullify certain of these exclusionary rules. An act, a declaration accompanying an act, or a mere declaration may form part of the res gesta. Before qualifying for admission, all such evidence must satisfy the test of relevancy in the sense of materiality. In the case of an act, this is normally the only test, at any rate if the act is offered in evidence for its own sake, and not as equivalent to an assertion of fact or opinion.

Author(s):  
Michael Ashdown

The present state of the law must now be treated as authoritatively set out by Lord Walker in Pitt v Holt, and to a lesser but still important extent by the earlier judgment of Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal in the same case. This chapter, however, is concerned with the earlier development of the Re Hastings-Bass doctrine. Its purpose is to establish the doctrinal legitimacy of the rule in Re Hastings-Bass as an aspect of the English law of trusts. Whilst this is primarily of academic and theoretical concern, in view of the Supreme Court’s reformulation of the law into its present shape, it is also of practical importance. In particular, the future application of the doctrine to novel situations will depend upon understanding the precise nature and scope of the rule propounded by the Supreme Court. That decision cannot simply be divorced from the many decided cases which preceded it, and from its place in the wider compass of the law of trusts.


1940 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 452
Author(s):  
Bora Laskin ◽  
J. D. Finlaison

Legal Studies ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hirst

‘In my view, the criminal law of evidence should be developed along common-sense lines readily comprehensible to the men and women who comprise the jury and bear the responsibility for the major decisions in criminal cases. I believe that most laymen, if told that the criminal law of evidence forbade them even to consider such evidence as we are debating in this appeal, would reply, “Then the law is an ass.”…The hearsay rule was created by our judicial predecessors, and if we find that it no longer serves to do justice in certain conditions then the judges of today should accept the responsibility of reviewing and adapting the rules of evidence to serve present society.’


Evidence ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 348-415
Author(s):  
Roderick Munday

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. The rule against hearsay is one of the great exclusionary rules of the law of evidence. The underlying idea seems sound enough. In a system that places a premium on orality, with witnesses delivering their testimony in person, it is an understandable corollary that witness A should be forbidden from giving testimony on behalf of witness B. This chapter discusses the following: the rationale underlying a rule against hearsay; the hearsay rule in criminal cases, and its exceptions; and the hearsay rule in civil proceedings.


2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-396
Author(s):  
Fraser Davidson
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

‘Accountability’ is one of the democratic values entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. It is a value recognised throughout the Constitution and imposed upon the law-making organs of state, the Executive, the Judiciary and all public functionaries. This constitutional imperative is given pride of place among the other founding values: equality before the law, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. This study therefore sets out to investigate how the courts have grappled with the interpretation and application of the principle of accountability, the starting point being the relationship between accountability and judicial review. Therefore, in the exercise of its judicial review power, a court may enquire whether the failure of a public functionary to comply with a constitutional duty of accountability renders the decision made illegal, irrational or unreasonable. One of the many facets of the principle of accountability upon which this article dwells is to ascertain how the courts have deployed that expression in making the state and its agencies liable for the delictual wrongs committed against an individual in vindication of a breach of the individual’s constitutional right in the course of performing a public duty. Here, accountability and breach of public duty; the liability of the state for detaining illegal immigrants contrary to the prescripts of the law; the vicarious liability of the state for the criminal acts of the police and other law-enforcement officers (as in police rape cases and misuse of official firearms by police officers), and the liability of the state for delictual conduct in the context of public procurement are discussed. Having carefully analysed the available case law, this article concludes that no public functionary can brush aside the duty of accountability wherever it is imposed without being in breach of a vital constitutional mandate. Further, it is the constitutional duty of the courts, when called upon, to declare such act or conduct an infringement of the Constitution.


1989 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Taha Jabir Al Alwani

IntroductionCurrent developments and the many acute problems facing the MuslimUmmah, especially at the intellectual level, present a serious challenge toIslam. This is why an attempt to outline an intellectual Islamic alternativein thought and knowledge has never been so urgent and imperative. Thiwill, insha 'Allah, help in formulating a clear and coordinated policy withregard to cultural transformation based on firm principles and sound strategy.It is also hoped that this policy will lead to scientific findings.By way of introduction, I will give a brief description of the state ofknowledge and thought. and of the educational and cultural systems in thecontemporary Arab and Muslim world.The Present State of ThoughtWhen examining the present state of thought among the Muslim peoples.three basic approaches can be identified:• The first can be described as the traditionalist approach which,by and large, considers the "traditional'' thought of the Ummahto be self-sufficient and capable of being presented asit is or with very little alteration. This approach suggeststhat the Ummah's contemporary intellectual life can be formedand organized and that the structure of its civilization canbe built on this basis. This approach i often described asthe approach of authenticity.• The second approach considers contemporary Western thoughtand its world-view-its concepts of existence, of life and ofman-to be universal, without it a modern culture and civilizationcannot be built. This tendency maintains that Westernthought must be adopted in toto, and any consequent negativeaspects are the price that must be paid if a modern cultureand civilization are to be established. This view is oftendescribed as mcdemistic.• The third trend, or the eclectic approach, advocates yetanother view. It contends that one must select from traditionalthought what is most sound, and from "modern" contemporarythought that which one considers and proves tobe correct, and weld the two to form an intellectual structurethat will provide a guaranteed basis for achieving what isrequired.However, the traditional approach, in the manner it has been presentedand applied, did not help to prevent the Ummah from falling into Lhe stateof decline and failure from which it is still suffering. Likewise, Western thought,as it also is presented and applied, cannot protect the Ummah from its inherentadverse, harmful and even disastrous effects. The advocates of theeclectic selective approach have not yet presented the details of this proposedblend, let alone tried to put it into effect. All this is conducive to the widerangingquestion: Is the Umrnah going through a serious intellectual crisis;and . if so, what is the way out of it? ...


1987 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferdinand Schoeman

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