Mistake in the Law of Theft

Glanville williams

doi:10.1017/s0008197300014379

Mistake in the Law of Theft

The Cambridge Law Journal ◽

10.1017/s0008197300014379 ◽

1977 ◽

Vol 36 (1) ◽

pp. 62-85

Author(s):

Glanville williams

Keyword(s):

The Other ◽

House Of Lords ◽

The Law ◽

Complex Question ◽

The Way

A person who receives property under an apparent contract of sale can be guilty of theft of what he receives if the contract is void, for mistake or otherwise. It seems, since the decision of the House of Lords in Lawrence, that a person who obtains a voidable title (title under a voidable contract) can be similarly guilty (assuming, as always, that the other essentials of theft are present). I argue else where that a person who obtains a valid title to property generally does not by doing so make a dishonest appropriation (even though he may be morally dishonest), and should not be guilty of theft. The object of this article is to consider the way in which these principles apply to transfers made under mistake.In Lawrence the defendant's title to the money was voidable for fraud, which induces a degree of mistake by the transferor; but other sources of mistake are possible. The transferor may make a spontaneous mistake, or a mistake resulting from the transferee's innocent misrepresentation, without fraud.Three legal results can follow from a mistake in transferring property, according to circumstances.(1) The mistake may avoid the transaction, preventing title from passing. The transferee can be guilty of theft of the property on ordinary principles, that is to say by applying the definition in section 1 (1) of the Theft Act 1968.(2) The mistake may make the transaction voidable, so that a voidable title passes. Precisely when the transferee commits theft is a complex question, which will be postponed for the time being.

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Voices of Spectators and Audience Power

Pólemos ◽

10.1515/pol-2015-0017 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Christian Biet

Keyword(s):

Social Relationship ◽

The Other ◽

Long Period ◽

The Social ◽

The Common ◽

Dramatic Action ◽

The Law ◽

The Voice ◽

The Way

AbstractTheatre and law are not so different. Generally, researchers work on the art of theatre, the rhetoric of the actors, or the dramaturgy built from law cases or from the questions that the law does not completely resolve. Trials, tragedies, even comedies are close: everybody can see the interpenetration of them on stage and in the courts. We know that, and we know that the dramas are made with/from/of law, we know that the art the actors are developing is not so far from the art of the lawyers, and conversely. In this paper, I would like to have a look at the action of the audience, at the session itself and at the way the spectators are here to evaluate and judge not only the dramatic action, not only the art of the actors, not only the text of the author, but also the other spectators, and themselves too. In particular, I will focus on the “common judgment” of the audience and on its judicial, aesthetic and social relationship. The spectators have been undisciplined, noisy, unruled, during such a long period that theatre still retains some prints of this behaviour, even if nowadays, the social and aesthetic rule is to be silent. But uncertainty, inattention, distraction, contradiction, heterogeneity are the notions which characterise the session, and the judgments of the spectators still depend on them. So, what was and what is the voice of the audience? And with what sort of voice do spectators give their judgments?

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REKONSTRUKSI IJTIHĀD DALAM ILMU UṢŪL AL-FIQH

Al-Ahkam ◽

10.21580/ahkam.2012.22.2.9 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 22 (2) ◽

pp. 161

Author(s):

Rokhmadi Rokhmadi

Keyword(s):

Islamic Law ◽

The Other ◽

Basic Principles ◽

The Law ◽

The Way

Al-Qur’an and Sunnah, needs of understanding and extracting optimally, so that the contents of law can be applied for the benefit of people. The way- to understand and to extract the contents in these two sources- called ijtihād. Thus, ijtihād is needed on istinbāṭ of law from many arguments of the texts (naṣ), eventhough it is qaṭ’ī in which the uṣūliyyūn have agreed that it is not the area for re-extracting to the law (ijtihādiyyah). The problem in this case is that even a qaṭ’ī argument according to the most of uṣūliyyūn has not been qaṭ’ī argument in the other uṣūliyyūn opinion. Reconstruction of ijtihād becomes an alternative, with some considerations: First, weight and tightening the requirements to become a mujtahid, which is almost impossible controlled by someone at the present time; Second, the increasing complexity of the problems faced by the ummat which is very urgent to get the solution; Third, let the period without ijtihād (vacuum of mujtahid) is contrary to the basic principles of Islamic law are always sāliḥ li kulli zamān wa makān. This paper present to discuss further about the urgency of the reconstruction of ijtihād in the challenge of modernity.***Al-Qur<ins cite="mailto:hasan" datetime="2015-02-17T11:11">’</ins>an maupun <ins cite="mailto:hasan" datetime="2015-02-17T11:11">s</ins>unnah sangat membutuhkan pemahaman dan penggalian secara optimal agar isi kandungan hukumnya dapat diterapkan bagi kemaslahatan umat. Cara untuk menggali dan mengeluarkan isi kandungan yang ada dalam kedua sumber tersebut dinamakan ijtihād. Ijtihād sangat dibutuhkan pada setiap isti<ins cite="mailto:muthohar" datetime="2015-01-29T05:30">n</ins><del cite="mailto:muthohar" datetime="2015-01-29T05:30"></del>bāṭ hukum dari dalil naṣ, sekalipun dalil naṣ tersebut bersifat qaṭ'ī yang oleh para uṣūliyyūn sudah disepakati tidak menjadi wilayah untuk dijitihadi lagi. Permasalahannya adalah bahwa sesuatu dalil naṣ yang sudah bersifat qaṭ'ī sekalipun oleh sebagian besar uṣūliyyūn, belum tentu dipandang qaṭ'ī oleh sebagian uṣūliyyūn yang lain. Rekonstruksi ijtihād menjadi sebuah alternatif, dengan beberapa pertimbangan: Pertama, berat dan ketatnya persyaratan-persyaratan menjadi seorang mujtahid, yang hampir tidak mungkin dikuasai oleh seseorang pada masa sekarang; Kedua, semakin kompleksnya permasalahan yang dihadapi oleh ummat yang sangat mendesak untuk mendapatkan solusi; Ketiga, membiarkan satu periode tanpa ijtihād (kevakuman mujtahid) adalah bertentangan dengan prinsip dasar hukum Islam yang selalu sāliḥ li kulli zamān wa makān. Tulisan ini hadir untuk mendiskusikan lebih jauh tentang urgensi rekonstruksi ijtihād dalam menghadapi tantangan modernitas.***Keywords: ijtihād, qaṭ'ī, ẓannī, uṣūl al-fiqh

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Formation of Contracts: Gibson v. Manchester City Council

Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad ◽

10.1108/case.iima.2020.000031 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 1-11

Author(s):

Akhileshwar Pathak

Keyword(s):

United Kingdom ◽

City Council ◽

The Other ◽

Business Practices ◽

The Past ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

House Of Lords ◽

Modern Business ◽

The Law ◽

Manchester City

Business contracts are formed through negotiations, where the parties agree on some terms, disagree on others and keep yet others undecided. Over a period of time, they see themselves as having moved from being negotiating parties to contracting parties, settling on most of the terms. The law, however, states that a contract is formed when a person makes an offer and the other accepts it. The principle arose from the rudimentary trade practices in the past. The principles coming from the prior centuries and the modern business practices may not be in consonance. The Gibson v. Manchester City Council Case, a judgement of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, reviewed attempts to modernize the law.

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Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence under Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

The Cambridge Law Journal ◽

10.1017/s0008197300106907 ◽

1990 ◽

Vol 49 (1) ◽

pp. 80-90 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

C.J.W. Allen

Keyword(s):

Common Law ◽

The Other ◽

Rule Of Thumb ◽

The Common ◽

Political Compromise ◽

The Law ◽

Law Of Evidence ◽

Court Of Appeal ◽

The Way

Among rules of law Karl Llewellyn noted at one extreme the “rule-of-thumb, in which the flat result is articulated, leaving behind and unexpressed all indication of its reason”. At the other extreme was “the way of principle, in which the reason is clearly and effectively articulated, and that articulation is made part of the very rule”. The vice of principle, he observed, “can be a vaporish vagueness, and the techniques of its effective formulation are not easy to isolate for communication and use”. Partly for this reason, partly perhaps because of its origin in a last-minute political compromise, section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at first confounded attempts to predict the manner of its application. One commentary suggested that it was “of no practical use”; there were dicta in the Court of Appeal to the effect that it did “no more than to re-state the power which judges had at common law before the Act of 1984 was passed”. A leading work on the law of evidence expressed the view that the sub-section was “cast in terms of such vagueness and generality as to furnish little guidance to the court”. There has been some development since those early days. It now seems clear that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be regarded as a codifying Act which has to be looked at on its own wording. Section 78(1), therefore, does not merely re-state the position at common law. It is also clear that in its operation it overlaps section 76 and, through section 82(3), some of the common law. Section 78(1) may be applied in a variety of situations, with or without the presence of some element of impropriety in the way in which the evidence was obtained. Basic questions about its operation nevertheless remain.

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Liability for Manslaughter by Omission: Don't Let the Baby Drown!

The Journal of Criminal Law ◽

10.1350/jcla.2010.74.2.627 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 74 (2) ◽

pp. 163-179 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Catherine Elliott

Keyword(s):

Common Law ◽

Moral Values ◽

The Other ◽

Duty Of Care ◽

Trial Judge ◽

House Of Lords ◽

The Common ◽

The Law

By removing the common law rules on a duty to act from liability for manslaughter by omission, the law would more accurately reflect the intention of the House of Lords in R v Adomako (1995). The current duplicitous requirement of both a duty to act and a duty of care appears to be confusing both the trial judge and the jury. The causing of a harm by an omission does not automatically mean the conduct was less morally reprehensible than where harm is caused by an act and this reform would therefore potentially bring the law more closely into line with society's moral values. The law would be rendered clearer and simpler and injustices would be avoided due to the other requirements of the Law Commission's proposed offence of killing by gross carelessness, including causation and gross carelessness. Through this reform justice could at last be offered should a stranger choose to walk by a drowning baby.

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16. Locus Standi

10.1093/he/9780198860129.003.0016 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 428-446

Author(s):

Ian Loveland

Keyword(s):

Small Businesses ◽

Legal Limits ◽

Locus Standi ◽

Choice Of Procedure ◽

House Of Lords ◽

Short Period ◽

National Federation ◽

The Law ◽

Practical Sense ◽

The Way

This chapter focuses on the concept of locus standi, perhaps the most important way in which administrative law deals with the question of how to balance the protection of individual citizens’ rights and interests with the desire to ensure that government decision-making remains within legal limits and that government bodies (including the courts) are protected from vexatious litigants. It is organised as follows. The first section addresses the law that existed prior to the introduction of the Order 53 reforms in 1977 whilst the second covers the short period between the introduction of those reforms and the House of Lords’ decision in IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses. The third section runs from the mid-1980s to the present day. The pervasive analytical concerns are to explore the way the law of locus standi interacts with the question of the choice of procedure issues which were addressed in chapter fifteen, and—more broadly—to assess how those two matters both singly and in combination structure in a practical sense the way our constitution gives effect to the various values inherent in theories relating to the rule of law and sovereignty of Parliament.

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The Politics of the Osborne Judgment

The Historical Journal ◽

10.1017/s0018246x00021270 ◽

1982 ◽

Vol 25 (4) ◽

pp. 889-909 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Henry Pelling

Keyword(s):

Twentieth Century ◽

Trade Unions ◽

Labour Party ◽

The Other ◽

Early Twentieth Century ◽

House Of Lords ◽

The Law ◽

Liberal Government

The Osborne judgment is always mentioned in political histories of the early twentieth century as one of the two principal judgments affecting the trade unions and the growth of the Labour party-the other being the Taff Vale decision of 1901. In both cases officers of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants were acting upon what they believed to be constitutional lines; in both cases, after lawsuits which went to the highest court in the land, the House of Lords, they were found to be behaving illegally; and in both cases parliament was eventually persuaded, if not precisely to reverse the Lords’ decision, at least to modify the law drastically in the unions’ favour. The repercussions upon the Lords themselves were not insignificant: the ordinary voter found it difficult to distinguish between the judicial and the legislative functions of the Upper House; and so both cases strengthened the willingness of trade unionists to support the Liberal government in its constitutional struggle against the Lords. Such was the outcome of Disraeli's decision in 1875 to retain the final appeal to the Lords, despite Gladstone's attempt, in the Judicature Act of 1873, to abolish it altogether.

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Protestations to Parliament for Remeid of Law

The Scottish Historical Review ◽

10.3366/e0036924109000584 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 88 (1) ◽

pp. 57-107 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

J. D. FORD

Keyword(s):

Private Law ◽

Civil Court ◽

House Of Lords ◽

The Common ◽

The Law ◽

The Way

The Articles of Union approved by the parliaments of Scotland and England in 1707 provided for the preservation of the private law of Scotland and for the determination of disputes arising north of the border in Scottish courts. At the same time, however, the Articles not only allowed for the amendment of the law by legislation enacted at Westminster but also left open the possibility of appeals being made to the British parliament against decisions delivered in Scottish courts. The Articles did not allow explicitly for appeals, but nor did they prohibit them, and dissatisfied litigants, by exercising the privilege asserted in the Claim of Right to protest for remeid of law against decisions of the lords of council and session, enabled the upper house of the new parliament to substitute its decisions for those delivered by the supreme civil court in Scotland. This much has long been understood by historians of Scots law, as has the significant impact the opinions expressed by English judges in the House of Lords came to have on the development of the modern law. Yet what has never been properly understood is the nature of the protestations for remeid of law from which appeals to the British parliament emerged. Detailed study of these protestations in the years before and immediately following the union reveals that they were conceived of in several different ways and that their nature was never clearly defined. Nevertheless, it also tends to confirm that there is some basis for the common suspicion that appeals were not intended to be made to the House of Lords in the way that they have been.

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PEMBANGUNAN EKONOMI DALAM TINJAUAN MAQASHID SYARI’AH

Dialog ◽

10.47655/dialog.v36i1.76 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 36 (1) ◽

pp. 31-46

Author(s):

Ali Rama ◽

Makhlan Makhlan

Keyword(s):

Islamic Law ◽

Educational Institution ◽

The Other ◽

Money Management ◽

Management Innovation ◽

Positive Law ◽

The Law ◽

The Way

Waqf as the way to worship Allah is also as a great potential asset for moslem. This great potential is empowered by various management innovation. Cash Wakaf that has been developed in several countries, in fact, be able to strengthen the economics of Moslem society. In the perspective of Moslem scholars”, not all of them agree with cash waqf. Although there is a different opinion about cash waqf, the majority of them legalized it. Either Hanafi or Maliki legalized cash waqf. Furthermore Hambali Moslem scholar also accept cash waqf and the other is not, while mazhab Syafi’iyah generally does not allow the practice of cash waqf. In the context of Indonesian Law. Law number 41, 2004 legalizes cash waqf, or valuable letter. This article discusses and analyzes cash waqf management at PPPA (The program for children who learn Quran by heart) with the analysis from the perspective of Islamic law and positive law No. 41, 2004. Based on the result of the research, it can be stated that cash money management at PPPA has been relevant with both of the approach of the law, and those developed cash waqf programs included educational institution, health, religion, and society needs services, that recently can reach hundreds of billions.

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