scholarly journals Liability for Manslaughter by Omission: Don't Let the Baby Drown!

2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
The Other ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

By removing the common law rules on a duty to act from liability for manslaughter by omission, the law would more accurately reflect the intention of the House of Lords in R v Adomako (1995). The current duplicitous requirement of both a duty to act and a duty of care appears to be confusing both the trial judge and the jury. The causing of a harm by an omission does not automatically mean the conduct was less morally reprehensible than where harm is caused by an act and this reform would therefore potentially bring the law more closely into line with society's moral values. The law would be rendered clearer and simpler and injustices would be avoided due to the other requirements of the Law Commission's proposed offence of killing by gross carelessness, including causation and gross carelessness. Through this reform justice could at last be offered should a stranger choose to walk by a drowning baby.

Admissibility of confession evidence: Principles of hearsay and the rule of voluntariness

2021 ◽  
pp. 136571272110022
Author(s):  
Jennifer Porter
Keyword(s):  
Western Australia ◽  
Common Law ◽  
South Australia ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Important Policy ◽  
Oral Testimony ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Confession Evidence

The common law test of voluntariness has come to be associated with important policy rationales including the privilege against self-incrimination. However, when the test originated more than a century ago, it was a test concerned specifically with the truthfulness of confession evidence; which evidence was at that time adduced in the form of indirect oral testimony, that is, as hearsay. Given that, a century later, confession evidence is now mostly adduced in the form of an audiovisual recording that can be observed directly by the trial judge, rather than as indirect oral testimony, there may be capacity for a different emphasis regarding the question of admissibility. This article considers the law currently operating in Western Australia, Queensland and South Australia to see whether or not, in the form of an audiovisual recording, the exercise of judicial discretion as to the question of the admissibility of confession evidence might be supported if the common law test of voluntariness was not a strict test of exclusion.

5. Psychiatric injury

2019 ◽  
pp. 48-59
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Physical Injury ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
The South ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter discusses the law on psychiatric injury. Psychiatric injury which is not derived from physical injury is a type of damage which is not always recoverable in negligence. It is an aspect of duty of care. The range of allowable actions has evolved through developments of control mechanisms in the common law, often policy based. The legal distinction between the primary and secondary victim is explored, as are more atypical situations. The four key cases are McLoughlin v O’Brian (1983), Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1991), Page v Smith (1995), and White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police (1999).

scholarly journals Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police; [2008] UKHL; 50

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Exclusive Focus

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 

scholarly journals Occupier's Liability: Alberta Proposes Reform

1969 ◽  
pp. 89
Author(s):  
E. R. Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Social Needs ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Judicial Reform ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
Convincing Argument ◽  
South Wales ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

In view of proposed reform of the law of occupiers' liability in Alberta, the common law approach to this area of law is examined by way of introduction. Professor Alexander adumbrates the categories of visitors and the duty of care owed to each, within the framework of the modern tort tendency to generalize. An examination in some detail is also made of the judicial techniques used in recent years to evolve the law of occupier's liability. As reform results from criticism, an examination of the criticisms of the present law, specifically judicial interpretation of the categories, as well as the categories themselves, their origin, com pass and applicability to vwdern society, are undertaken. Based on the criticisms, law reform has occurred. From the point of view of evaluating whether the reform has answered the criticisms of the common Iaio approach, the author attempts to examine the actual and proposed re form of England, Scotland, New Zealand, New South Wales, and Alberta. Particular detail is addressed to the Alberta proposals regarding com mon duty of care, the trespasser, the child trespasser and the ability to exclude liability. Concluding that convincing argument can be ad vanced for judicial reform in the area of private law, and that stare decisis does not have justification in the law of tort, Professor Alexander proposes that, while reform can be valuable as method of evolution, judicial history evidences that the Courts are able to adapt the law to meet changing social needs. The author concludes also that the common law today is preferable to the proposed Alberta reform.

5. Psychiatric injury

2021 ◽  
pp. 50-61
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Physical Injury ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
The South ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter discusses the law on psychiatric injury. Psychiatric injury which is not derived from physical injury is a type of damage which is not always recoverable in negligence. It is an aspect of duty of care. The range of allowable actions has evolved through developments of control mechanisms in the common law, often policy-based. The legal distinction between the primary and secondary victim is explored, as are more atypical situations. The four key cases are McLoughlin v O’Brian (1983), Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1991), Page v Smith (1995), and White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police (1999).

Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords

1988 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Milgate
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Rule ◽  
The Past ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Second Degree

In the field of criminal law we should be used to the House of Lords changing its mind. In the course of the past three years the House has fundamentally altered its view on the meaning of intention, on the relationship between statutory and common law conspiracy and on the law of impossible attempts. Now we have another about turn. In R. v. Howe and Bannister the House of Lords has unanimously decided that duress can never be a defence to murder. Yet elsewhere in the criminal law (with the exception of some forms of treason) duress operates as a complete defence, leading to acquittal if raised successfully. In making murder an exception to this general rule the House, using its power under the Practice Statement of 1966, has departed from its previous decision in D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch which allowed the defence of duress to be raised by principals in the second degree to murder. The Lynch decision, which had stood as part of the common law for some twelve years, is now consigned to the legal scrapheap.

Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence under Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.J.W. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rule Of Thumb ◽  
The Common ◽  
Political Compromise ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

Among rules of law Karl Llewellyn noted at one extreme the “rule-of-thumb, in which the flat result is articulated, leaving behind and unexpressed all indication of its reason”. At the other extreme was “the way of principle, in which the reason is clearly and effectively articulated, and that articulation is made part of the very rule”. The vice of principle, he observed, “can be a vaporish vagueness, and the techniques of its effective formulation are not easy to isolate for communication and use”. Partly for this reason, partly perhaps because of its origin in a last-minute political compromise, section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at first confounded attempts to predict the manner of its application. One commentary suggested that it was “of no practical use”; there were dicta in the Court of Appeal to the effect that it did “no more than to re-state the power which judges had at common law before the Act of 1984 was passed”. A leading work on the law of evidence expressed the view that the sub-section was “cast in terms of such vagueness and generality as to furnish little guidance to the court”. There has been some development since those early days. It now seems clear that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be regarded as a codifying Act which has to be looked at on its own wording. Section 78(1), therefore, does not merely re-state the position at common law. It is also clear that in its operation it overlaps section 76 and, through section 82(3), some of the common law. Section 78(1) may be applied in a variety of situations, with or without the presence of some element of impropriety in the way in which the evidence was obtained. Basic questions about its operation nevertheless remain.

scholarly journals Mental Distress Damages for Breach of Contract

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 687
Author(s):  
Renee Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Mental Distress ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Sound Policy

The common law has long held that damages for the mental distress suffered after a breach of contract are unrecoverable. Like all rules, a range of exceptions has developed to mitigate the severity of this rule. In this article the author argues that both the rule and its exceptions, being based neither in principle nor sound policy, have only created confusion in the law. The decision of the House of Lords in Farley v Skinner is analysed as a possible solution to this confusion, but is found to be unhelpful. The author concludes by calling for a principled revision of this area of the law in accordance with the usual principles of damages.

Mistake

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hein Kötz
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
European Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Receive

This chapter examines how the law deals with contracts that a party entered into by mistake. After a brief discussion of the historical background of the rules in the civil law and the common law, the question is raised whether there is a relevant mistake if a party’s ‘motive’ for entering into the contract turns out to be incorrect, if the party’s mistake refers to the value of what it promised or was to receive under the contract, or if the party’s mistake is due to its carelessness. Should the relevance of a mistake not depend on whether it was caused or shared by the other party? Finally, the chapter outlines some common threads in the development of a European law on mistake.

created by the common law rule were addressed by Parliament in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, considered below, but the unjust enrichment principle is also relevant in other respects in determining whether a particular event is capable of frustrating a contract. If the decision to treat a contract as frustrated might give one of the parties an undue advantage this may operate as a justification for refusing to treat the contract as frustrated. For example, in Tamplin SS Co v Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co Ltd, an oil tanker was chartered for a period of five years, but was subject to government requisition when the charterparty still had nearly three years to run. In the circumstances, there was no prejudice to the charterers, since the government compensation payable to the charterers exceeded the agreed hire charges. However, the owners of the ship claimed that the contract was frustrated. The House of Lords held, by a narrow majority, that the contract was not frustrated. One explanation for the action of the owners is that they wanted to secure the increased benefit of the government compensation in replacement for the lower hire charges. In this case, it is readily understandable that the majority of the House of Lords preferred not to allow the owners to benefit in this way at the expense of the charterers. Remedies, unjust enrichment and frustration Money paid or payable before the date of frustration

1995 ◽  
pp. 382-382
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Petroleum Products ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
Undue Advantage ◽  
Oil Tanker
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