The Realm of Rights

For some 20 years now, Judith Jarvis Thomson has written penetrating, insightful and scrupulously argued essays on controversial issues involving rights. The most important of these were collected and edited by William Parent in a volume entitled Rights, Restitution, and Risk. In an Afterword, reflecting on these essays, she lists a number of things that she felt were lacking from her discussions. Three of them are particularly important: a clear account of what it is to have a right, a clear statement of what rights we have and a clear statement of the role that detailed discussions of controversial cases play in moral theory construction. The volume under review expands and refines her earlier work on rights, and provides a more systematic treatment by, among other things, filling these three gaps. Those familiar with her work will not be disappointed: the new book is as lucid, challenging, illuminating and vigorously argued as her earlier essays, but now affords an overview of the realm of rights, as well as a delineation and location of “the territory of rights” on “the continent of morality” (p. 3).

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Paternalism and Moderate Deontology

10.1093/oso/9780190877132.003.0005 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Jason Hanna

Keyword(s):

Moral Theory ◽

Moral Rights ◽

Judith Jarvis Thomson ◽

The Right ◽

Paternalistic Intervention

This chapter attempts to situate pro-paternalism within a moderate deontological moral theory. According to moderate deontologists such as Judith Jarvis Thomson, moral rights have thresholds beyond which they can be permissibly infringed. According to one plausible way of developing this view, a right has a threshold of zero when its infringement would benefit the right-bearer. If so, then beneficial paternalistic intervention may be permissible even if it infringes rights. After developing this argument, the chapter considers several possible anti-paternalist replies, including the suggestion that rights thresholds are sensitive to the value of autonomy. It is argued that each reply either has implausible implications or is unlikely to support common anti-paternalist judgments about cases.

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Moral prescriptions and lawful actions: interpretation of Aristotle arguments in Hare’s meta-ethics

ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition ◽

10.25205/1995-4328-2021-15-2-814-824 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 15 (2) ◽

pp. 814-824

Author(s):

Anton Didikin

Keyword(s):

Moral Theory ◽

Ethical Theory ◽

Linguistic Analysis ◽

Controversial Issues ◽

Moral Language ◽

Moral Principles ◽

Meta Level ◽

Conceptual Foundations

The paper interprets the arguments of Aristotle, which characterize his ethical theory and had a significant impact on the moral theory of R. Hare. The author reveals the conceptual foundations of R. Hare's understanding of the nature of moral prescriptions and the ways of their expression in the moral language, and the controversial issues of his interpretation of the content of moral principles and other ethical concepts. The author comes to the conclusion that R. Hare's reinterpretation of the grounds for committing ethically significant actions leads him to formulate moral imperatives in the context of the method of linguistic analysis, which brings ethical theory to the meta-level.

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Rights and Moral Theory: A Critical Review of Judith Thomson's Rights, Restitution, and RiskRights, Restitution, and Risk. Judith Jarvis Thomson , William Parent

Ethics ◽

10.1086/293007 ◽

1988 ◽

Vol 98 (4) ◽

pp. 806-826 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Nancy Davis

Keyword(s):

Critical Review ◽

Moral Theory ◽

Judith Jarvis Thomson

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The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1988.10717166 ◽

1988 ◽

Vol 18 (1) ◽

pp. 67-86 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Michael R. Depaul

Keyword(s):

John Rawls ◽

Moral Theory ◽

Reflective Equilibrium ◽

Moral Epistemology ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Moral Inquiry ◽

Theory Construction ◽

Moral Principles ◽

The Past ◽

Problem Of The Criterion

The resurgence of interest in systematic moral theory over the past ten to fifteen years has brought to the fore debates concerning issues in moral epistemology, in particular, questions regarding the correct method for moral inquiry. Much of the controversy has focused on John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium. One merit claimed for this coherence method is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. Several of Rawls’ prominent critics have charged that Rawls’ loosely assembled rabble of starting points are not epistemically hefty enough to hoist a moral theory upon their shoulders. Perhaps unwittingly, these critics cling to the two level conception of theory construction, for they both defend general principles as the only appropriate starting points for theory construction and insist upon viewing Rawls as one working within the two tiered conception who opts for more particular judgments as starting points.

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Thomson's Trolley Problem

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy ◽

10.26556/jesp.v12i2.227 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 168-190 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Peter Graham

Keyword(s):

Moral Theory ◽

Double Effect ◽

Simple Solution ◽

Trolley Problem ◽

Doctrine Of Double Effect ◽

The Past ◽

Philippa Foot ◽

Judith Jarvis Thomson ◽

Vexing Problem

No one has done more over the past four decades to draw attention to the importance of, and attempt to solve, a particularly vexing problem in ethics—the Trolley Problem—than Judith Jarvis Thomson. Though the problem is originally due to Philippa Foot (“The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect”), Thomson showed how Foot’s simple solution would not do and offered some solutions of her own. No solution is uncontroversial and the problem remains a thorn in the side of non-consequentialist moral theory. Recently, however, Thomson has changed her mind about the problem. She no longer thinks she was right to reject Foot’s solution to it. I argue that, though illuminating, Thomson’s current take on the Trolley Problem is mistaken. I end with a solution to the problem that I find promising.

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