The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael R. Depaul
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Theory Construction ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Past ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

The resurgence of interest in systematic moral theory over the past ten to fifteen years has brought to the fore debates concerning issues in moral epistemology, in particular, questions regarding the correct method for moral inquiry. Much of the controversy has focused on John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium. One merit claimed for this coherence method is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. Several of Rawls’ prominent critics have charged that Rawls’ loosely assembled rabble of starting points are not epistemically hefty enough to hoist a moral theory upon their shoulders. Perhaps unwittingly, these critics cling to the two level conception of theory construction, for they both defend general principles as the only appropriate starting points for theory construction and insist upon viewing Rawls as one working within the two tiered conception who opts for more particular judgments as starting points.

Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.

Moral epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Factual Proposition ◽  
The Way

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral propositions. Some discussions of moral epistemology interpret the category of ‘moral propositions’ broadly, to encompass all propositions that can be expressed with terms like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘ought’. Other discussions have focused on a narrower category of moral propositions – such as propositions about what rights people have, or about what we owe to each other. According to so-called noncognitivists, one cannot strictly speaking know (or be justified in believing) a moral proposition in the same sense in which one can know (or be justified in believing) an ordinary factual proposition. Other philosophers defend a cognitivist position, according to which it is possible to know or be justified in believing moral propositions in the very same sense as factual propositions. If one does know any moral propositions, they must presumably be true; and the way in which one knows those moral truths must provide access to them. This has led to a debate about whether one could ever know moral truths if a realist conception of these truths – according to which moral truths are not in any interesting sense of our making – were correct. Many philosophers agree that one way of obtaining justified moral beliefs involves seeking ‘reflective equilibrium’ – that is, roughly, considering theories, and adjusting one’s judgments to make them as systematic and coherent as possible. According to some philosophers, however, seeking reflective equilibrium is not enough: justified moral beliefs need to be supported by moral ‘intuitions’. Some hold that such moral intuitions are a priori, akin to our intuitions of the self-evident truths of mathematics. Others hold that these intuitions are closely related to emotions or sentiments; some theorists claim that empirical studies of moral psychology strongly support this ‘sentimentalist’ interpretation. Finally, moral thinking seems different from other areas of thought in two respects. First, there is particularly widespread disagreement about moral questions; and one rarely responds to such moral disagreement by retreating to a state of uncertainty as one does on other questions. Secondly, one rarely defers to other people’s moral judgments in the way in which one defers to experts about ordinary factual questions. These two puzzling features of moral thinking seem to demand explanation – which is a further problem that moral epistemology has to solve.

intuitions, heuristics, and utilitarianism

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 560-561 ◽  
Author(s):  
peter singer
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Common Objection

a common objection to utilitarianism is that it clashes with our common moral intuitions. understanding the role that heuristics play in moral judgments undermines this objection. it also indicates why we should not use john rawls' model of reflective equilibrium as the basis for testing normative moral theories.

Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points

1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines a hypothetical contract situation and argues rational people will agree on reflection it is fair to contractors. He solves the rational choice problem it poses by deriving two lexically-ordered principles of justice and suggests the derivation justifies the principles. Its soundness aside, just what justificatory force does such a derivation have?On one view, there is no justificatory force because the contract is rigged specifically to yield principles which match our pre-contract moral judgments. Rawls provides ammunition for this claim: “By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments [about what is just] and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”

The Wide and Narrow of Reflective Equilibrium

1989 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Holmgren
Keyword(s):  
Traditional Method ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Norman Daniels ◽  
Considered Moral Judgments ◽  
Theory Acceptance

In a well-known series of articles, Norman Daniels has drawn a contrast between wide reflective equilibrium and a more traditional method of theory acceptance in ethics that would be employed by a sophisticated moral intuitionist. The more traditional method is geared towards achieving a narrow equilibrium, or ‘an ordered pair of (a) a set of considered moral judgments acceptable to a given person P at a given time, and (b) a set of moral principles that economically systematizes (a).’ Although we might achieve narrow reflective equilibrium by deducing particular moral judgments from self-evident moral principles, the more plausible approach is to start from our particular moral judgments. Here we begin by screening our intial moral judgments to eliminate those in which we have little confidence and those made under circumstances conducive to error. We then search for general moral principles that best account for the remaining ‘considered’ moral judgments.

Basic Premises and Method

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-42
Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Just War ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
High Level

The reigning method in moral philosophy is the search for reflective equilibrium. An interesting feature of contemporary moral philosophy is how much weight most theorists put on matching intuitions in test cases, rather than finding plausible, relevant, high-level moral principles that can be used to generate mid-level principles and judgments in particular situations. This chapter covers four themes in two groups. The first group concerns the author’s general approach to moral theory. It includes the role of theory and cases in the author’s own work and the role of evidence and facts in justification. The second group concerns two topics specifically relevant to just war theory: reductive individualism and the distinctive causal structure of eliminative killing.

Morality Reconstructed

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Judgments ◽  
Moral Semantics ◽  
Moral Metaphysics ◽  
Bona Fide ◽  
In Virtue Of

If morality could plausibly have emerged in the manner described, then various lessons follow for ethics. In moral metaphysics, that ethics presupposes only a naturalistic basis and that the desire to be moral can be associated with the desire to live up to the persona we each project in speaking for ourselves in avowals and pledges. In moral semantics, that ethical judgments may be true or false, and that ethical terms may ascribe bona fide properties, despite having a wholly naturalistic base. In moral epistemology, that our ability to make judgments of desirability and responsibility, as well as other moral judgments, depends on our being immersed in practices like those of avowal and pledging. In moral psychology, that moral judgments are closely tied up with desire and that they are effective in motivating us, not in their own right, but in virtue of the robustly attractive desiderata that they rely on for support. And in moral theory or normative ethics, that it is perfectly understandable why in the ordinary world, moral thinkers should divide on issues like that between consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches.

Rawlsian Objectivity

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-564
Author(s):  
C. M. MELENOVSKY
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium

AbstractIn a 1981 letter to H .L. A. Hart, John Rawls sketches a view of moral objectivity that substantially differs from that of contemporary constructivists. The view he describes does not rely on constitutive features of agency as Korsgaard's does, and it does not bottom out in a form of realism as Scanlon's moral theory does. Instead, Rawls's view grounds objectivity on the fundamental conceptions that could be shared in wide reflective equilibrium. Constructivism grounds objectivity in a kind of intersubjectivity, and Rawls finds the relevant kind of intersubjectivity in the alignment between fundamental convictions. This article develops this Rawlsian view of objectivity and highlights its strengths.

scholarly journals Rawls’s normative conception of the person: A Kantian reinterpretation

2007 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nythamar De Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Transcendental Subjectivity ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Normative Conception ◽  
Semantic Transformation

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade (Persönlichkeit). Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivo para responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista de justificativa epistêmico-moral. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Construtivismo. Equilíbrio reflexivo. Liberalismo político. Personalidade. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood (Persönlichkeit). A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of selfidentity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. KEY WORDS – Constructivism. Personhood. Political liberalism. Reflective equilibrium.

Common-sense ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte R. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Main Figure

‘Common-sense ethics’ refers to the pre-theoretical moral judgments of ordinary people. Moral philosophers have taken different attitudes towards the pre-theoretical judgments of ordinary people. For some they are the ‘facts’ which any successful moral theory must explain and justify, while for others the point of moral theory is to refine and improve them. ‘Common Sense ethics’ as a specific kind of moral theory was developed in Scotland during the latter part of the eighteenth century to counter what its proponents saw as the moral scepticism of David Hume. Thomas Reid, the main figure in this school, and his followers argued that moral knowledge and the motives to abide by it are within the reach of everyone. They believed that a plurality of basic self-evident moral principles is revealed by conscience to all mature moral agents. Conscience is an original and natural power of the human mind and this shows that God meant it to guide our will. A deeply Christian outlook underwrites their theory.

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