Consultative Council of Western Powers

1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 510-512

Eighth SessionThe eighth session of the Consultative Council of Western Powers was held in Brussels on April 16 and 17, 1950. The main business of the meeting was to discuss how the costs of the joint defense projects could be shared. Up to this time each government had paid the costs of its own contingents at the disposal of the organization and all expenditure incurred within its own territory. From the French point of view this had tended to make the common effort relatively more expensive for France than for the other countries while from the United Kingdom point of view, simply fixing the percentages that each country should, bear of the total expenditure would not necessarily be fair, as an airfield built under the treaty plans could in peace time be an advantage to the country in which it was located. This point of view was, in turn, not particularly favored by the Belgians who felt that Belgium had contributed to the common defense proportionally as much as the other powers. The relative amount in each country's budget devoted to the common pool was not an accurate indication as each budget had been drawn up in an entirely different manner, making comparisons difficult. The only thing which counted was the final result: the number of men trained and equipped as well as the material which each country could put on the line; in this regard the Belgians felt they were certainly not lagging behind. It was finally agreed at the meeting that projects of common interest should be paid for in common. The procedure for such payment was to be the subject of proposals submitted to the governments.

1946 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-78
Author(s):  
A. H. Shrewsbury

‘If there be one point free from obscurity in the Act of 1842 it is this, that the Legislature intended all traders, whether in groceries, annuities or other articles of commerce, to be assessed upon the same footing.’ Lord Watson in The Gresham Life Assurance Society υ. Styles.The main object is to discuss principles and therefore many points of detail will be omitted, however intrinsically interesting they may be. Satisfactory consideration of principles entails reference to all classes of business which involve an actuarial valuation (viz. life assurance and annuity business, sinking fund business and permanent sickness insurance business). Reference will be made to the National Defence Contribution and the Excess Profits Tax, which are based upon income-tax legislation. The subject in mind is the relation of such taxation to insurance business and funds of the classes mentioned, as distinct from other aspects of income tax which an insurance office encounters, and it will be considered solely from the point of view of an office established in the United Kingdom which transacts business only in the United Kingdom. In view of the paper by Messrs S. J. Rowland and F. H. Wales on ‘The Taxation of the Annuity Fund’ (March 1937, J.I.A. Vol. LXVIII), only brief reference will be made to annuity business, and it will be assumed that it is unnecessary, in describing taxation processes, to include explanations or qualifying phrases on account of annuity business.


1902 ◽  
Vol 36 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 417-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Nicoll

The liability of the employer to compensate his employees, as well as other persons, for injuries sustained through his fault, may be traced from an early period in the world's history in the Common Law of various countries.For example, by the Jewish Law, said to have been promulgated about the year 1500 B.C., if a master were the means of causing the loss, either intentionally or unintentionally, of the eye or of the tooth of his slave, he was bound to let him go free for his eye or his tooth's sake. Again, according to the same law, if an employer allowed his ox to gore either his servant or a stranger, he was required to pay various compensations to the injured if he survived, or to his relatives in the event of the injury being followed by death.


1967 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. D. B. Mitchell

When first I was invited to participate in this colloquium, I was given the title of “Constitutional difficulties to the introduction of a system of administrative law,” which I take to imply a full administrative jurisdiction. That subject was, in a sense, not exciting, except as a challenge to produce legal difficulties, under a system such as our own, to doing anything at all. Difficulties undoubtedly do exist, but they exist in the realm of psychology, not of rules of law. Even so they are important. A constitution does not live by legal logic alone, and the positive changes in law which the introduction of such a system would involve run counter to received, but unexamined, notions or myths, particularly those relating to Parliament. Such notions have surprising strength. It would have been difficult to persuade the Pontifex Maximus to lead the other Pontiffs into proclaiming the inadequacy of their mythology, let alone to lead them into propounding the virtues of a rival. Yet under our cult of Parliament this is precisely what the Prime Minister or the alternative Pontifex Maximus has to do. This change is beyond the scope of those subtle shifts which we can achieve by stealth, in the way in which we transferred power from King to Ministers. While these difficulties are real and must be mentioned, I take it that in the form in which the subject is now posed it is broader and that I can treat of the constitutional advantages as well as, and rather more than, these political difficulties.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-80
Author(s):  
James Goudkamp ◽  
Lorenz König

AbstractThis article addresses the principles of tort law that govern claims in respect of lost illegal earnings. It focuses on common law jurisdictions (and the law in the United Kingdom in particular) where such claims, despite apparently being commonplace, have been largely ignored by academics. It describes the existing law and calls in aid in this regard a four-fold taxonomy of cases. The article then turns attention to how claims in respect of lost illegal earnings ought to be decided. At this juncture, the article looks to ideas emanating from German tort law, which has developed a highly sophisticated jurisprudence on the subject of illegal earnings. The German approach, stated simply, requires tort law to defer to rules in other departments of private law. If, for example, contract law would not protect an interest that a claimant has in a particular transaction by reason of the transaction being tainted with illegality, tort law will not allow a claimant indirectly to obtain the benefits of that transaction via a claim for lost illegal earnings. It is argued that the German solution holds considerable promise and merits consideration as a serious alternative to the significantly more complicated principles that the common law courts have developed, which principles currently lack any thoroughgoing rationalisation.


1830 ◽  
Vol 120 ◽  
pp. 359-381

In the course of the adjustment and verification of the copies of the Imperial standard yard, destined for the Exchequer, Guildhall, Dublin, and Edinburgh, I discovered a source of error till then, I believe, wholly unsuspected, arising from the thickness of the bar upon the surface of which measures of linear dimension are traced. The difficulties which I experienced, and the remedy which suggested itself upon that occasion, and which was found efficient, are shortly detailed in the account of the construction and adjustment of the new standards of weights and measures of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, published in the Philosophical Transactions for 1826. But as the notice there given occupies little more than a single page, and might therefore pass unremarked, I cannot but think that a fact of such importance in inquiries where linear measures are concerned, and which may be sufficient to account for the discrepancies to be found in the experiments of different observers, ought to be placed before the Royal Society in a more pro­minent point of view than that which it at present occupies. I shall, therefore, first extract from the paper alluded to the part to which I refer, and then add an account of such experiments as I have since made on the subject; and describe a scale which I have caused to be constructed so as almost entirely to obviate the source of error of which I am treating.


2001 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
James McConvill ◽  
Darryl Smith

[C]o-operative federalism is not a constitutional term. It is a political slogan, not a criterion of constitutional validity or power. … Where constitutional power does not exist, no cry of co-operative federalism can supply it. If the object lies outside the reach or the effect of what a State or the Common-wealth can constitutionally do, the subject matter is beyond the reach of the legislature. 1 1 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 (‘Re Wakim’) at 556 per McHugh J. See also McHugh J's pertinent comment in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 231-32: “After the decision of this Court in the Engineers' Case, the Court had consistently held, prior to Nationwide News and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth, that it is not legitimate to construe the Constitution by reference to political principles or theories that are not anchored in the text of the Constitution or are not necessary implications from its structure” (emphasis added). For a discussion of the High Court's alternative “flexible” approach to constitutional interpretation, refer to J McConvill “The United Kingdom is a Foreign Power- Sue v Hill” (2000) 4(2) Deakin L R 151.


1981 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-380
Author(s):  
R. B. Rutherford

The epistle to Florus (Ep. 2. 2) has usually been grouped with the epistle to Augustus and the Ars Poetica, partly because of its length, which sets it, like the other two, apart from the letters of the first book, and partly because of the common interest in literary theory which is manifested in all three. These poems have always been the subject of controversy; but 2. 2 has received less attention than the others, perhaps because the elegance and humour of the poem, which have been so often praised, have eclipsed the possibility that it may have something to say, especially about Horace himself, his personality and his changing allegiances to philosophy and poetry. The object of this paper is to offer a reading of 2. 2, not as a piece of autobiography, nor as a mosaic of conventional motifs, but as an examination by Horace of his own poetry and poetic aims, in which he is testing and criticizing his own achievement, and himself. In this he continues one of the most attractive and impressive practices of the earlier book of epistles.Horace here abnegates his role as a lyric poet, and this is generally taken literally as placing the poem quite precisely between the completion of Epistles 1 and Horace's resumption of lyric writing in the Carmen Saeculare and Odes 4. But more important is the way in which Horace in Ep. 2. 2 itself expresses a judgement about his own poetic ambitions. The philosophic themes of the Epistles and the more frivolous lyric subjects (‘iocos, Venerem, convivia, ludum’, 2. 2. 56) which he presents as the essence of his Odes, are both aspects of Horace's poetry and personality; the question is whether one should be considered more valid than the other in the poet's own mature judgement, whether Horace should in fact have outgrown either or both kinds of poetry. In this poem, then, it is important not only that he renews the renunciation of poetry and the gay life which he made at Ep. 1. 1. 10–11, but also that this decision is to some extent forced on him, and reluctantly made (2. 2. 55–7).


1987 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oscar S. Gellein

This paper traces in descriptive fashion some of the developments of thought about capital maintenance during this century. The adverse consequences of neglecting the subject are mentioned after a basic review of the concepts. Contrasts among the theories from the United Kingdom and Ireland, Canada, Australia and other countries are also made.


Author(s):  
Dolores Morondo Taramundi

This chapter analyses arguments regarding conflicts of rights in the field of antidiscrimination law, which is a troublesome and less studied area of the growing literature on conflicts of rights. Through discussion of Ladele and McFarlane v. The United Kingdom, a case before the European Court of Human Rights, the chapter examines how the construction of this kind of controversy in terms of ‘competing rights’ or ‘conflicts of rights’ seems to produce paradoxical results. Assessment of these apparent difficulties leads the discussion in two different directions. On the one hand, some troubles come to light regarding the use of the conflict of rights frame itself in the field of antidiscrimination law, particularly in relation to the main technique (‘balancing of rights’) to solve them. On the other hand, some serious consequences of the conflict of rights frame on the development of the antidiscrimination theory of the ECtHR are unearthed.


Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
Sandrine Brachotte

This article studies religious arbitration from the perspective of global legal pluralism, which embraces both normative plurality and cultural diversity. In this context, the article considers that UK arbitration law regulates both commercial and religious arbitration while relying on a monist conception of arbitration. It further identifies two intertwined issues regarding cultural diversity, which find their source in this monist conception. Firstly, through the study of Jivraj v. Hashwani ([2011] UKSC 40), this article shows that the governance of religious arbitration may generate a conflict between arbitration law and equality law, the avoidance of which can require sacrificing the objectives of one or the other branch of law. The Jivraj case concerned an Ismaili arbitration clause, requiring that all arbitrators be Ismaili—a clause valid under arbitration law but potentially not under employment-equality law. To avoid such conflict, the Supreme Court reduced the scope of employment-equality law, thereby excluding self-employed persons. Secondly, based on cultural studies of law, this article shows that the conception of arbitration underlying UK arbitration law is ill-suited to make sense of Ismaili arbitration. In view of these two issues, this article argues that UK arbitration law acknowledges normative multiplicity but fails to embrace the cultural diversity entangled therewith.


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